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The attached student reports are an interim deliverable for
our project "Strategic Management for the Defense Department"
sponsored by the Director, Net Assessment, in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), and co-sponsored by the OSD
Competitive Strategies Office and Strategic Planning Branch and
the National Security Council Staff. A companion technical
report, "Strategic Management for the Defense Department," NPS-
56-88-031, September 1988, details the project's genesis, efforts
during the first year, and results to date. No attempt is made
to duplicate that information in this volume.
The reports contained herein were prepared by strategic
planning curricula students enrolled in the National Security
Affairs (NSA) Department capstone Seminar in Strategic Planning,
taught during the Spring Quarter, Academic Year 1988. A course
description is attached as Appendix A. This seminar, NS 4230,
was the first opportunity to introduce strategic management
concepts to students enrolled in the NSA strategic planning
curricula.
The reports herein will be recycled to students that take NS
4230 during Academic Year 1989. They will also be used in the
capstone strategic management course in the Administrative
Sciences Department, Strategic Management: Public and Private.
This course, MN 4105, was revised substantially to introduce
public sector material - much of it taken from the reports
in
developed by the NSA students. The course outline for MN 4105 is
attached as Appendix B.
NSA and Administrative Sciences faculty at the Naval Post-
graduate School who teach these two courses will continue to
develop and refine the attached reports into more formal case
studies for classroom use in addition to generating new reports
and cases for subsequent class offerings. Initial copies of the
student reports were delivered to the sponsors at a meeting held
in Monterey on 19 - 20 July 1988. Comments from the sponsors and
other readers of this report should be directed to the
investigators:
Associate Professor, James J. Tritten (Code 56Tr)





Associate Professor, Nancy C. Roberts (Code 54Rc)





Part I of the attached reports contains examples of
strategic planning and management done at the Washington
headquarters level. The first of these is an example of
strategic planning which results from a Congressional mandate,
and performed by line organizations within the executive branch
of government. The two White House reports, National Security
Strategy of the United States , represent planning in the abstract
- a plan not tied at all to any execution effort.
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The second report is an example of a Blue-Ribbon panel
commissioned jointly by the Secretary of Defense and the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. As the
previously mentioned White House reports, Discriminate Deterrence
is the result of planning done without regard to execution of
that plan under a strategic management scheme. The third report
is the result of original research done by a student on the
introduction of competitive strategies (a business concept) into
the Defense Department. Since this is an on-going effort,
complete findings are premature.
The final two cases presented in Part I are examples of
strategic management at the national level. In the case of the
Marshall Plan, multiple agencies in Washington were able to agree
on an international plan of action and successfully execute that
plan. In the case of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS), introduced into the Department of Defense during
the tenure of Secretary Robert S. McNamara, the plan for PPBS was
developed and executed, with mixed results. Like many reform
efforts, PPBS was an attempt to introduce rationality into what
is otherwise political decision-making.
Part II contains individual reports that are examples of
Navy strategic planning and one case of joint service planning
with emphasis on the Navy and a maritime theater of military
operations. The focus on the Navy, despite the lack of
official sponsorship of this project by the Navy, is logical
since the student body of the NSA classes is entirely made up of
active duty naval officers who are enrolled in the strategic
planning curricula. Perhaps as a result of reading this and the
companion technical report, additional Navy interest will be
generated.
The first case in Part II involves a historical example of
strategic planning done by the Navy prior to World War I. Inter-
War strategic planning and in particular, war planning, is
examined in the second case study. In both cases, the
relationship of pre-war planning to execution of plans during a
war is of interest to the reader.
The third report in Part II deals with attempts to implement
strategic plans by two services that were in disagreement over
basic roles and missions. The post-War B-36/USS United States
controversy is well known within the defense community as an
example of interservice rivalry at its most damaging.
The final three reports in Part II deal with more recent
attempts at long-range strategic planning within the Navy. The
first is an overview of general efforts within the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations. The second is a examination of a
special ad hoc planning effort conducted by the Navy that made
use of the expertise at the Naval War College. The author of
this report also prepared his thesis as a part of our research
project. Sponsors were provided copies of "A Theory of Naval
Strategic Planning," by LT John R. Hafey, June 1988, during their
meeting in Monterey. An additional seventy- five copies were
sent to military planning staff offices, libraries, and selected
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defense contractors. Other interested parties may obtain a copy
of this thesis from the Defense Technical Information Center.
The final report in Part II is a look at the creation of The
Maritime Strategy under the Reagan administration. The Maritime
Strategy is an example of strategic planning and strategic
management conducted by a staff organization itself. The
results of this section are, in part, a result of participation
by faculty and students in the "Maritime Strategy in the Pacific
Conference" held at the NPS during August 1987. At that
conference were many of the individuals who were responsible for
the writing of The Maritime Strategy and others who worked on
earlier and similar concepts of operations. The conference was
sponsored by the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (Policy).
Part III contains additional strategic planning cases that
Navy strategic planning students would have not normally been
exposed to prior to this research project. The first of these
involves Air Force efforts in long range planning. The Air Force
method of planning is in sharp contrast to that of the Navy. The
final NS 4230 seminar session includeded a retired Army general
officer whose focus was on the differences in substance and style
in service strategic planning efforts. The final session also
addressed the question "should naval officers be strategists?"
The next two reports concern multi-agency efforts to manage
the national defense stockpile and strategic petroleum reserve.
Both endeavors involve strategic analysis, planning, and actual
execution of plans. These two plans involve international
vn
economic and politico-military affairs and both thoroughly
involve the legislative and executive branches of the government.
The final two student reports involve strategic planning by
non-defense organizations. The report on the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) finds that good
management can overcome poor planning. The second, the case of
the Supersonic Transport involves reasonably good planning but a
failure to execute the plan.
Each of the student papers is supposed to have a background
of the international or national context at the time, a brief
description of the strategic planning/management system itself,
key assumptions made by personnel involved in the process, and an
analysis of the key elements that resulted in success or failure
of the plan or the execution of that plan.
Some of these student reports will eventually be developed
into formal case studies and included in our final technical
report at the end of the three years research effort. The
researchers wish to acknowledge the contribution of the students
to our project and express their appreciation for the research,








Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (Public
Law 99-443) requires the President to transmit to Congress
each year a comprehensive report on the U.S. national
security strategy. Accordingly, the Reagan Administration
has submitted two such reports: 1987 and 1988. It is
difficult to define the exact importance of these documents.
They are called "national security strategy reports," but
under our system of government the President does not have
the final say in setting U.S. strategy. On the other hand,
while the reports cannot speak for the nation, the Presi-
dent ' s view of national strategy is very important—he or
she is the nation's chief executive and the commander-in-
chief of the nation's military.
Another factor which confuses the importance of the
documents is that they are issued at what appears to be a
time of strategic transition. The 1987 report states that
the postwar era ended in the 1970 's. In the 1970 's, the
U.S. lost its position of global preeminence which it held
at the onset of the postwar era. However, neither the 1987
nor the 1988 report enumerate the characteristics of the new
era except for the loss of U.S. preeminence. Furthermore,
both reports claim that the present U.S. strategy is that
which was adopted at the beginning of the postwar era. This
claim creates a confusion: how can the U.S. maintain the
same strategy if the world environment has fundamentally
changed?
This paper analyzes the 1987 and 1988 national security
strategy reports as examples of strategic management. After
a review of the nature of the system of management and of
the key assumptions and constraints of the reports, a
discussion will be provided of the key elements of the
present U.S. strategy as outlined in the 1987 and 1988
reports.
II. SYSTEM OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
Under the U.S. system of government, the ultimate
responsibility for national security rests upon the American
people themselves. The U.S. government is merely the
creation of the American people, instituted to secure their
unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. The U.S. Constitution thus embodies the form of
government which the American people have chosen to secure
their rights.
Under the U.S. Constitution, the government's responsi-
bility for national security is divided between the Presi-
dent and Congress. The President is the chief executive and
the commander-in-chief of the U.S. military. He or she has
the power—by and with the consent of the Senate—to make
treaties and to appoint ambassadors and other public
officers. (Article II) Balanced against this power of the
President, the Congress has the power to lay and collect
taxes, provide for the common defense, to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, to define and punish offenses against
the Law of Nations, to declare war, to raise and support
armies, to provide and maintain a Navy, to make rules for
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces,
and to make all laws which are necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the powers vested in the federal
government by the Constitution. (Article I) Under this
system, the President and Congress must cooperate in order
to formulate and to implement U.S. national security
strategy.
The 1987 and 1988 National Security Strategy Reports
recognize this system of strategic management. The 1987
report states that
The continued development and successful implementation of
U.S. National Security Strategy is a major responsibility
of the Executive Branch. But the Administration cannot
accomplish this alone. Developing and supporting a
National Security Strategy for the United States that
provides a sound vision for the future and a realistic
guide to action must be a cooperative endeavor of the
Congress and the Administration. (1987 report, p. 40)
The 1988 report reiterates this view (1988 report, p. 40)
.
The Constitution requires the President "from time to
time give the Congress information of the State of the
Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as
he shall judge necessary and expedient." (Article II)
However, more than anything else, it is the federal budget
which forces the President and Congress to work together.
Without money, the President can achieve very little. To
obtain money, he or she must convince Congress to raise the
money and to allocate it to the desired programs. The
Goldwater-Nichols Act recognizes this reality and specific-
ally requires the President to submit the national security
strategy report on the same date which the proposed budget
is submitted. Presumably, the report is intended to be an
explanation for the national security aspects of the budget.
III. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS
A. KEY ASSUMPTIONS IN THE REPORTS
On the cover page of the 1987 national security report,
President Reagan is quoted as saying "Freedom, peace and
prosperity. . .that 's what America is all about... for our-
selves, our friends, and those people across the globe
struggling for democracy." This concept of America's
mission in the world is the unifying theme of both the 1987
and 1988 reports.
The reports elaborate on the meaning of the concepts of
freedom, peace and prosperity. Freedom is the ultimate
value, because it seems to be the best means of achieving
everything else which is good. The 1987 report confidently
asserts that "if we are to achieve the kind of world we all
hope to see, democracy must continue to prosper and expand."
(1987 report, p. 9) Peace is the result of a stable equi-
librium of international forces. To achieve peace, we must
ensure that hostile states or groups of states are deterred
from seeking to dominate the Eurasian land mass (1988
report, p. 1) and that no power dares to initiate a nuclear
war (1987 report, p. 22; 1988 report, p. 15). Thus, peace
requires strong U.S. conventional and nuclear forces.
Finally, prosperity is the result of a commitment to
capitalism and free trade. The 1987 national security
strategy report explains that "we believe that market-
oriented policies are key to greater growth in America and
throughout the world." (1987 report, p. 12)
The 1988 report states that freedom, peace and prosper-
ity are at the heart of the U.S. strategy and that this
strategy has been the basic Y.S. approach to world affairs
ever since the Second World War. This continuity reflects
"the fact that the strategy is grounded in unchanging geo-
graphic considerations, and designed to preserve the funda-
mental values of our democracy." (1988 report, p. 2) The
report refutes the "commonplace criticism that U.S. Nation-
al Security Strategy changes erratically every four to eight
years as a result of a new Administration taking office."
(1988 report, p. 1)
B. CONSTRAINTS ON THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The biggest constraint on the U.S. management system for
national security is the continual need to seek consent from
those being governed—a constraint which the Founding
Fathers believed to be the essence of just governmental
power. The President, despite his position as the chief
executive, must seek consent from a wide range of groups in
order to implement national security strategy. The 1988
report concludes
The Administration and Congress must both work harder to
build a bipartisan public consensus on our National
Security Strategy and the resources needed to execute
it. . . .Renewed consensus will be forged on the anvil of
public debate—among responsible officials in government,
between the Congress and the Executive, in consultation
with our allies and friends, and among the larger
community of interested and concerned American citizens.
(1988 report, p. 41)
The cost of seeking such a consensus is a major reduction in
the President's freedom of action in world affairs; however,
this cost has been consciously accepted by the American
people as the price of ensuring government by the consent of
the governed.
IV. ANALYSIS OF KEY ELEMENTS
According to the 1987 and 1988 reports, the key elements
of the U.S. national security strategy are: (1) the spread
of democracy, (2) the containment of Soviet influence, (3)
the avoidance of nuclear war, and (4) the spread of free
market policies. While there has been significant national
debate over the implementation of these goals, it does seem
fair to say that these goals have been the essence of U.S.
strategy since the Second World War. Measured over this
period of time, the strategy has been a success. However,
international affairs pose a very long term global struggle-
-perhaps an eternal one. Over time, the world changes,
therefore aspects of U.S. strategy must change to reflect
the new conditions. While the present strategy's commitment
to democracy and the avoidance of nuclear war will probably
prove to be an enduring aspect of U.S. strategy, other
aspects may have to change to accommodate changing world
conditions.
A. THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY
The heart of the U.S. national security strategy is its
commitment to "the promotion of our democratic way of life."
(1987 report, p. 9) The 1987 report states that
History has shown us repeatedly that only in democracies
is there inherent respect for individual liberties and
rights. In the postwar world, democracies have also
exhibited extraordinary economic vitality. (1987 report,
p. 9)
The role for the U.S. in the spread of democracy is to be a
"beacon for democracy" and to provide active support to
democratic forces. However, the report acknowledges limits
to what the U.S. can achieve.
Change must come from within, following a path dictated by
national and local traditions. In some instances,
assistance and guidance is better provided by other democ-
racies or multilaterally. Patience and respect for
different cultures and recognition of our own limitations
must guide our effort. (1987 report, p. 9)
Examples of successful promotion of democracy are U.S.
assistance to postwar Western Europe and Asia and, more
recently, Western European assistance to democratic
movements in Spain and Portugal
.
It should not be a surprise that a commitment to democ-
racy is a basic thrust of U.S. national security strategy
—
it is also a basic thrust of U.S. culture and government.
Furthermore, the individuals who formulate U.S. strategy,
the President and Congressmen, achieved their positions
through the democratic process. At times other U.S. values
may conflict with its commitment to democracy, but it is
impossible to imagine a U.S. national security strategy
which lacks such a fundamental commitment.
The difficulty in spreading democracy, which the 1987
and 1988 reports recognize, is that democracy can not thrive
unless it exists in a supportive culture. Not all existing
cultures are supportive of democracy; and even if these
cultures evolve into being more supportive, such cultural
evolution is a slow and difficult process. The 1987
report's admonition for "patience, respect for different
cultures and recognition of our own limitations" is critical
for the success of the U.S. strategy. Given the U.S.
culture's deep commitment to democracy, the necessary
political commitment for such a long term goal probably
exists. The difficult part of the strategy will always be
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the need both for patience and for a sense of our own
limitations.
B. THE CONTAINMENT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE
Both the 1987 and 1988 reports agree that "the most
significant threat to U.S. security interests remains the
global challenge posed by the Soviet Union." (1987 report,
p. 6) The only basis for U.S. -Soviet cooperation is "the
common goal of avoiding direct confrontation and reducing
the threat of nuclear war." (1987 report, p. 6)
The problem with the goal of containment is the
ambiguity in the nature of the U.S. -Soviet competition. In
the late 194 0's, when the containment of the Soviets became
a national goal, George Kennan defined the problem of
containment as blunting the expansionistic impulse of a
radical regime until its radical nature was moderated by the
passage of time. Presumably, once this cooling had taken
effect, the U.S. -Soviet competition could be handled on a
more normal diplomatic basis. Arguably, this cooling has
already occurred--certainly , the Soviet Union under
Gorbachev in 1988 is significantly less radical than it was
under Stalin in 1948. If so, then the 1987 and 1988
national security strategy reports are at least partially
obsolete. By focusing too much on the Soviet Union and too
little on the rest of the world, they fail to develop a more
comprehensive strategic framework which is now needed.
However, this concept of the nature of the U.S. -Soviet
competition is not the only one. John Foster Dulles tended
to see the struggle between the U.S. and the Soviets as a
clash between good and evil. Accordingly, the struggle is
intense and will not end until one side is totally
vanquished. This interpretation of the containment strategy
appears to be that of the 1987 and 1988 reports. If this
view is correct, then the reports' emphasis on Soviet
containment provides a good blueprint for renewing and
continuing the U.S. leadership of the Free World.
Determining the nature of the U.S. -Soviet competition is
difficult. As stated by the 1987 report, "only a handful of
people in the Politburo can claim with any confidence to
know the Kremlin's precise near-term, tactical plans...."
(1987 report, p. 6) Nonetheless, the 1987 report was
confident that Soviet history clearly demonstrated the
Soviet's long-term strategic goal: Soviet global hegemony.
But doubt crept into the 1988 report. The report seemed
torn between characterizing recent Soviet reforms as a cam-
paign of disinformation and characterizing them as "hopes
for fundamental changes in Soviet behavior." (1988 report,
p. 5) The 1988 report concluded with a wait-and-see
attitude.
Interestingly, the 1987 report, while emphasizing the
continuity of U.S. strategy since the Second World War,
observed that "the postwar era came to an end during the
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1970 "s." (1987 report, p. 3) The report noted both that a
policy of Soviet containment was the essence of our postwar
strategy and that containment was an expensive policy.
Given the economic reality of the postwar era—i.e., U.S.
economic dominance—we could afford such a policy. However,
in the new era, "the United States no longer has an over-
whelming economic position vis-a-vis Western Europe and the
East Asia rimland." (1987 report, p. 3) Combining these
1987 economic observations with the 1988 observations about
the changing nature of the Soviets, the U.S. may very well
be leaving the era of containment. If so, what will be our
new strategic framework? Strategically and diplomatically,
the U.S. is probably now in an era of fundamental
transition.
C. THE AVOIDANCE OF NUCLEAR WAR
The policy of containment has always included a concept
of military deterrence. The 1988 national security strategy
report states that in order to deter the Soviet Union, "we
must make clear to its leaders that we have the means and
the will to respond effectively to coercion or aggression
against our security interests." (1988 report, p. 13) The
1988 report describes the U.S. strategic nuclear forces and
the supporting nuclear doctrine as the "essential founda-
tion" of deterrence. (1988 report, p. 14) The U.S. nuclear
doctrine is that we deter by maintaining a response
11
flexiblity and by targeting Soviet assets which are
essential to their war-making capability.
However, the nuclear age has posed a severe dilemma to
the American people, a dilemma which we have not yet
comfortably solved. Because we believe that Soviet
expansion threatens that which we value, we have been
committed in deterring that expansion. In the nuclear age,
that deterrence has required massive U.S. strategic nuclear
forces. But now, given the size of the U.S. and Soviet
nuclear arsenals, we fear that if a nuclear war erupts,
nothing that we value will survive. Thus, we build nuclear
weapons to protect that we value, but the weapons seem to
generate as much risk as they do security.
The 1987 and 1988 reports are sensitive to this dilemma.
In both reports, President Reagan unequivocably states, "I
have repeatedly emphasized that a nuclear war cannot be won
and must never be fought." (1987 report, p. 22; 1988
report, p. 15) The reports view the basic problem to be how
to deter the Soviets while reducing the risk of nuclear war.
The solution proposed by both reports is to maintain the
strength of our conventional and nuclear forces, maintain
our allied structure, develop strategic defenses and seek
equitable and effective arms reductions which do not
compromise our alliance obligations.
If we are entering a post-containment era, certainly the
problem of avoiding a nuclear war will remain. An
12
interesting issue is how will the new era affect the problem
of avoiding nuclear war? If Western Europe and Japan accept
the principle that they must be more self-sufficient
militarily, how can they do this—to their own satisfaction
—without developing significant nuclear arsenals? If they
develop these arsenals, the U.S. may no longer be able to
define the nuclear threat as only coming from the Soviet
Union. If the future holds a proliferation of nuclear
superpowers, arms negotiations may expand from being
bilateral in nature to being multilateral in nature.
Furthermore, if the nuclear threat to the U.S. increases due
to an increase in the number of nuclear-armed rivals,
strategic defenses may become even more critical than they
are now to the U.S. welfare.
D. THE SPREAD OF FREE MARKET POLICIES
The 1987 and 1988 reports assert that U.S. national
power rests on the strength of our domestic economy (1988
report, p. 11; 1987 report, p. 11) and that U.S. prosperity
is dependent on the cooperation of Western Europe and Japan
(1988 report, p. 11; 1987 report, p. 12). Thus, the major
economic goal of the U.S. national security strategy is to
promote market-oriented policies through close consultation
and negotiation with our allies. In addition, the U.S.
recognizes a need for the developed nations to assist the
developing nations to "realize sustained, non-inflationary
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growth" and to help them resolve their debt problems. (1988
report, p. 12)
The main obstacle to such international economic cooper-
ation is domestic political pressure. The 1988 report
acknowledges that "the challenge to the United States now is
to avoid letting tensions and disputes over trade issues
undermine domestic support for free trade...." (1988
report, p. 12) This same potential pressure exists within
each of our allies as well.
The problem with a global free trade policy is that
there is no effective enforcement mechanism. The only
enforcement mechanism now is the threat by each nation to
retaliate, with trade barriers, against violators. This
threat of retaliation probably works in times of global
prosperity; but the mechanism may fail in times of hardship
when it is most needed. Such a failure was demonstrated by
the trade barriers which sprang up at the onset of the
depression of the 1930* s.
Free trade among the industrialized nations was a pre-
dominant economic feature of the postwar era. Will it
continue to be a feature of the new era? The example of
OPEC in the 1970 's and 1980 's is illustrative of one
possible course for economic cooperation among nations. In
the 1970' s, the OPEC nations—led by Saudi Arabia—cooper-
ated to control the world supply of oil and its price. All
the OPEC nations benefitted, but to varying degrees. By the
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1980' s, individual hardships and international rivalries led
some nations to seek a greater share of the group benefits.
The rivalries led to a break down in cooperation, and the
price of oil dropped as each nation unilaterally increased
its production of oil.
Was the economic cooperation among the industrialized
nations during the postwar era a product of the U.S. ability
to act as a leader due to its predominant military and
economic power? Arguably, it was. Thus, with that predom-
inance at an end, the foundation for the cooperation may now
be a lot weaker than it was ten years ago. If so, the trend
for cooperation may not be able to survive a severe setback
in the global economy. On the other hand, perhaps the post-
containment era will learn from the experience of the post-
war era and continue to cooperate economically, but without
a clear leader. Only time will tell.
V. CONCLUSION
Neither the 1987 nor the 1988 national security strategy
report indicate possible new directions for U.S. strategy
now that the postwar era has ended. This failure may stem
from the fact that the American people themselves are not
sure what the new era may look like or what the new U.S.
role may be. In contemporary American political rhetoric,
one can sense an awareness of change. The American people
remain committed to democracy, the U.S. remains a powerful
15
military and economic power, the Soviets remain a powerful
rival and nuclear war still poses a serious dilemma. Yet
there seems to be important change underway. Maybe the
Soviets are different from what they were in the late
194 O's. The U.S. may no longer be able to guarantee the
security of itself and its allies, without an increased
contribution from its allies. If the allies increase their
military strength, will the character of the alliance
change? Furthermore, the U.S. probably does not have the
same commitment to free-market policies that it does to
democracy. Future economic challenges may bring the present
U.S. economic policy into question.
Under the U.S. system of government, it is the U.S.
people who decide the long-term direction of the U.S. When
the world situation is itself not clear, the U.S. people
will be divided as to the best strategic direction for the
country. We now live in an era of transition. The postwar
era has ended, and a new era has already begun. But, we the
people, can not yet see the features of this new era.
Accordingly, the 1987 and 1988 National security strategy
reports will probably be remembered as a glimpse of U.S.
strategy in the midst of fundamental flux.
16




The United States faces a major challenge in preparing
for the security environment of the early 21st century.
This environment will become increasingly multipolar as
Japan and China rise to major power status. Proliferation
of high technology weapon systems should be expected as well
as a growing disparity in the standards of living between
the leading powers and many Third World countries. The
animosity created by this disparity, coupled with the avail-
ability of highly accurate, relatively inexpensive weapons,
will make this an extremely dangerous world from the stand-
points of terrorism, blackmail, and small-scale attack.
A more near term problem deals with maintaining our
deterrent posture and then containment of Soviet expansion.
In spite of public announcements, the Soviets are continuing
an unprecedented military buildup in conventional as well as
nuclear forces. They are also feverishly pursuing military
applications for advanced technologies. Although direct
U.S. -Soviet military interaction is improbable, there exists
a distinct likelihood that the need will arise to put down
Soviet sponsored insurrections in remote locations
17
throughout the world. In a crisis, lack of a credible
deterrent against the Soviets could prove disastrous.
Faced with the responsibility of organizing America's
resources to ensure her continued physical security in the
evolving world, President Reagan commissioned an advisory
committee to investigate the policy and strategy implica-
tions of the applications of advanced technology as they
relate to strategic offense, strategic defense, and the
conduct of theater war (including conventional war). 1 The
President's charter also charged the committee with
assessing the utility of and recommending applications for
advanced technology concepts relating to U.S. security
interests under conditions of peace, crisis, and theater or
strategic war.
The 15 month period spanning the Commission's delibera-
tions witnessed the employment of U.S. naval forces in the
Persian Gulf, continued Soviet armed intervention in
Afghanistan, the October stock market crash and resultant
world economic system oscillations, the launching of a
Chinese ballistic missile submarine, implementation of the
Reorganization and Acquisition Improvement Acts of 1986,
continued Soviet claims of glasnost and perestroika, a
multitude of Third World problems, and U.S. involvement in
several major overseas basing disputes. Other issues which
surfaced either concurrently with this period or shortly
thereafter included the resignation of Casper Weinberger as
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Secretary of Defense, Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF)
reduction negotiations with the Soviets, the Presidential
election primaries, and a major across-the-board Defense
Department budget cut. All of these events had a major
impact on the nation's perceived strategic direction needs.
Discriminant Deterrence , the product of the efforts of
the Advisory Committee on Integrated Long-Term Strategy as
reported to the President on January 12, 1988, is touted as
"having alerted us to the new varieties of danger that lie
ahead and having shown us that, in our present condition, we
are unprepared for the changes we are about to encounter." 2
At first glance it appears that this excellent strategic
work is about to be swept into oblivion even before its
content is digested. It has failed to receive official
Presidential endorsement and is never mentioned in the
fiscal year 1989 Secretary of Defense report to Congress.
However, if one looks beyond the rhetoric and focuses on the
driving forces behind our national strategy, it becomes
obvious that the influence of the substance of Discriminate
Deterrence is diligently at work. The beliefs and recommen-
dations set forth in the document form the basis of a
"second generation" strategic document, "Competitive Strate-
gies," which promises to provide vital strategic direction
for our country.
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II. THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The Long-Term Integrated Strategy Advisory Committee was
established on October 24, 1986 with a charter lifetime of
18 months (now amended to 24 months) . It reports directly
to the Secretary of Defense and the President's National
Security Advisor. The bipartisan commission is co-chaired
by Fred Ikle, a former Reagan Administration Undersecretary
of Defense for Policy, and Albert Wohlstetter, an accom-
plished strategic analyst. Other members include former
National Security Advisors Zbigniew Brzezinski and William
Clark, former Secretary of State Henry Kissenger, Admiral
James Holloway, Generals John Vessy, Bernard Schriever, and
Andrew Goodpaster, Ambassador Anne Armstrong, Harvard's
Professor Samuel Huntington, and Rockefeller University
President Joshua Lederberg.
In preparing the Discriminate Deterrence document this
distinguished group was formally supported by a research
staff, an administrative staff, a public affairs counselor,
and representatives acting for the President's Assistant for
National Security affairs and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Individual representatives from the Joint
Staff, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force were also
provided. In Addition to this support, the Commission
received valuable counsel from members of Congress, the
President's Science Advisor, members of the National
Security Council Staff, numerous professionals in the
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Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency,




Information provided by the above sources was dissemi-
nated among a set of special study groups (the research
staff) for discussion and analysis. These groups were
organized to investigate such things as the security
environment for the next 2 years (Future Security Environ-
ment Group) , the role of advanced technology in military
systems (Technology Group) , interactions between offensive
and defensive systems on the periphery of the Soviet Union
(Offense-Defense Group), the U.S. posture in regional con-
flicts around the world (Regional Conflict Group) , and the
effects of shifts in the world's population distribution
(Demographic Study Group) . The first four groups were
chaired by Commission members while the fifth was managed by
the National Defense University. The results of these
deliberations were synthesized by the Commission's co-chairs
to produce a coherent, unified statement of the recommended
strategic directions for the nation.
Although not explicitly defined, a logical framework of
analysis was followed in producing the study. 4 First, a
concept of the future environment was developed through the
efforts of the Future Security Environment Working Group and
RAND's National Defense Research Institute. 5 Next, U.S.
national goals and interests were compiled from the
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Constitution, statements from the President's National
Security Strategy of the United States (1987) , and the
personal beliefs of the Commission members—most notably
Ikle, Wohlstetter, and Gorman.
This third component introduced a filter through which
all information was judged. It was held that the United
States faces a changing security environment. In this new
environment, concentration on the apocalyptic threat will be
undesirable and may be self-defeating. Also, the challenge
of deterring war will remain a prime concern and can best be
served by exploiting the discriminating capabilities of
long-range, precision weaponry. Finally, the lessons of El
Salvador impressed on the members the importance of employ-
ing the indigenous population in regional conflicts rather
than U.S. combat troops
.
6
Having postulated a credible future environment and
having succinctly defined the U.S. goals and interests, the
Commission's next task was to define the future threats to
our nation. This was accomplished by comparing the future
environment with U.S. interests as well as assessing trends
in the military capabilities of various countries (particu-
larly the Soviet Union) against those of our own.
The final step entailed the stipulation of a set of
principles and recommendations that could be used to revise
the current U.S. "grand strategy" to bring it into line with
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contemporary realities. 7 These were presented as the
Commission's main points in its January report.
III. KEY PLAN ELEMENTS
A. ASSUMPTIONS
Several key assumptions were made in formulating the
Commission's report. The first assumption, inherent in
statements expounding methods to avoid war with the Soviet
Union, maintains that the Soviets are deterred by a credible
fighting force. It is also assumed that superpower
conflicts can be limited. The following statement contained
in the report's section covering the extreme threats
provides illustration: "To deter the more plausible Soviet
attacks, we must be able to respond discriminately, but must
also have some prospects of keeping any such war within
bounds—of ensuring that it does not rapidly deteriorate
into an apocalypse." 8 The Commission is extremely critical
of the strategic doctrine of "mutual deterrence" and
maintains that we should never rely on stability through
mutual vulnerability for our security.
A second assumption deals with establishing a credible
measurement of military capability. The Commission has
assumed that total annual military expenditures and annual
outlays for capital stock provide adequate measures of
military strength. To develop values for these estimates,
the following procedure was used: 1) a roughly consistent
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set of "backward-looking" and "forward-looking" estimates
was produced for each by employing an aggregate production
function expressing the unknown as a function of inputs of
capital, labor, and technological change, and the output in
1980 value rubles; 2) key model parameters were based on
historical evidence and recent experience, then modified to
conform to explicit judgments concerning the course of
future (in the next two decades) developments; 3) ruble-to-
dollar conversion was accomplished using CIA ruble value
estimates and conversion rates; and finally, 4) output
values in 1980 dollars were converted to 1986 dollars using
the U.S. GNP price deflator. 9 Other measures of military
strength are acknowledged such as order-of-battle data,
readiness and training levels, the state of moral and
leadership, among others. The previous methods were chosen
for their descriptive utility and ease of documentation.
Although based on empirical analysis, the global
economic reorganization expressed in the report assumes that
trends in certain operative factors (labor and capital
distributive shares, rates of change in factor productivity,
savings-investment rates from annual income, base year
capital stock estimates, depreciation rates on capital
stock, and demographically-consistent labor supply esti-
mates 10 ) will follow their predicted directions. Great care
was taken to be thorough in the formulation of these trends
so only minor fluctuations should be expected.
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The report emphasizes the continuing need for strong
NATO forces to deter aggression by those of the Warsaw Pact
thereby disclosing another major assumption: that the NATO
and Warsaw Pact Alliances will continue as viable entities
throughout this period of change. However, several Commis-
sion members warn that discriminate deterrence (or the dis-
criminate use of force) will be as necessary to ensure the
existence of a united Europe in the future. 11
B. CONSTRAINTS
Few actual constraints were levied against the planning
system. The Commission received enormous cooperation from
all the resources it called upon. Funding for the project
included an estimated $40,000 in salaries for a professional
staff and secretarial support as well as $50,000 for various
fees, travel, and administrative costs. Additionally,
$500,000 was provided for contractor support. 12 Finally,
the Commission's stature was greatly enhanced by the
prominence of its members.
One limitation that has been placed on the Commission is
that of time. The Commission's charter expires after a
maximum life of 24 months. Even though the initial report
is complete, the Commission members stand ready to assist in
implementing its conclusions. Once the charter expires,
this mass of talent and influence will be disbanded.
Independent efforts of the various working groups are also
constrained by this deadline.
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The Commission's scope has also been limited. Its name
reflects reality in that the Committee's sole function is to
serve as an advisory body. It is constrained to operate
under the provisions of Public Law 92-463, Executive Order
12 024 and implementing CSA and DoD regulations for Federal
Advisory committees. As a result, its findings and recom-
mendations cannot, of their own, formulate policy or direct
acquisition.
C. COMMON GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Good planning systems provide a focal point for the
ensuing effort. In the case of the Advisory Committee on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy, this guidance was provided by
its charter.
The Advisory Committee on Integrated Long-Term Strategy
will serve the public interest by providing the Secretary
of Defense and the President's National Security Advisor
with an independent, informed assessment of the policy and
strategy implications of advanced technologies for
strategic defense, strategic offense and theater warfare,
including conventional war. 13
The members also shared the belief that "need demanded
regeneration of certain basic concepts and ideas." 14 These
included concerns about the developing security environment,
the future of deterrence, and the role of technology in
providing for national security. Of final note is the fact
that the conclusions of the Discriminate Deterrence report
are unanimously supported by the Commission's members, a




IV. ANALYSIS OF PLAN IMPLEMENTATION
An uninterrupted trail of efforts to define a comprehen-
sive national strategy for the United States can be traced
to Truman's NSC 20/4 (November 23, 1948), "U.S. Objectives
with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S.
Security." Since then, no fewer than 13 such attempts have
been made to codify our national strategy. Aaron Friedberg
analyzed these efforts to identify patterns of success and
failure as well as to develop a strategy that could be used
to improve the chances for success of the efforts of the
Advisory Committee on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. 15 . His
results indicated that: 1) the ability of a planning
effort to influence subsequent government policy declines as
an administration increases in age; 2) those efforts
completed shortly after inauguration fare better since the
new President's strength is generally at its peak and a
consensus exists as to the need for setting strategic guide-
lines within a new administration; 3) attempts at mid-
course correction are of moderate success either because the
initial danger is perceived to have disappeared or because
the people who formulate the revisions lack credibility;
and, 4) studies completed just prior to a major public
catastrophe can capitalize on the ensuing unrest.
He suggests three strategies that can be used for
increasing the probability that a planning effort will prove
effective. The first calls for a broad-brush diagnosis of
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the existing problems accompanied by general recommendations
to treat the situation. A second approach involves identi-
fication of a specific threat combined with a specific plan
to deal with it. The final method portends that a unifying
theme should be developed along with an attendant set of
loosely related recommendations for specific programs
designed to counter a perceived threat.
Other problem areas for past plans were identified as:
1) inattention to prediction, 2) lack of a sense of
urgency concerning the threat, 3) a moderation in American
perceptions of the Soviet Union, 4) the inability to define
a set of peacetime military goals and a "competitive
strategy" for achieving them, and 5) failure to success-
fully incorporate arguments for strategic defense
capabilities. These and other marketing tactics ("corridor
work," staff meetings with influential groups and congres-
sional leaders, open discussions with the press, and release
timing are examples) were carefully pursued by the Commis-
sion members but the impact of the West European outcry over
the report's implications proved too strong.
Michael Howard, Regius professor of modern history at
Oxford University, Karl Kaiser, director of the Research
Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs, and
Francois de Rose, a former French representative to NATO,
provided a lucid enunciation of the European concerns over
Discriminate Deterrence in an article for the International
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Herald Tribune . The first concern involves the report's
passages on the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe.
Although they acknowledge the need for modern, discriminate,
nuclear weapons, the group contends that failure to link the
use of these weapons directly to escalation into a wider,
more devastating war (other than one in which nuclear
weapons are employed only to deny success to invading Soviet
forces) undermines the most important basis of alliance:
the community of risk. 16 . Their real concern is that Europe
may become a limited nuclear battle zone.
A similar concern revolves around the report's proposal
to develop conventional forces that are capable of stopping
a Soviet invasion of Western Europe dead in its tracks
without resort to nuclear weapons.
The notion of a grand conventional conflict to defeat
Soviet forces has no support in Europe, primarily because
the means do not exist but also because it would be likely
to produce the kind of annihilation of Europe that
Americans fear from nuclear escalation. 17
A third concern centers on the report's proposal that
NATO ground forces be prepared to mount deep-strike attacks
across the NATO-Warsaw Pact border. Development of such a
posture would be "both economically and politically
unacceptable in Europe." 18 It is also feared that such a
posture would be perceived as an offensive force build-up
that would endanger East-West relations.
The final European concern is that the report neglects
Europe's role as an actor in future world politics. They
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accuse the report's authors of treating Western Europe "only
as an object and not as an actor in politics—not even
considered worth mentioning as a force influencing the
strategic environment 20 years hence." 19
Only one other public critique has emerged that could
possibly have an influence on the fate of the report. The
short fall identified claims that the report does not
adequately deal with the nation's economic situation and can
therefore be of only limited use. According to one journal-
ist, "What's needed now is an equally serious and high-level
study integrating national security strategy with the
economic realities faced by the United States." 20 In fact,
the Commission did consider the international economic
environment and did relate costs to the programs recommended
for support of our national security. The problem is that
these findings were not published with the lead document.
Instead, they are pending publication as the output from the
Future Security Environment Working Group. Also, scope of
the Commission's deliberations was limited by its mandate.
Had an economic study been requested, this group could have
produced an extremely good one.
As mentioned above, Discriminate Deterrence has failed
to achieve public endorsement by those who commissioned it.
Examination of the Committee's charter sheds some light on
the fate of this report but the ominous forces of politics
and international relations have obviously played a role in
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its public demise. Perhaps the one shortfall not planned
for, an Administration not willing to take certain painful
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LT David J. Kern
In February 1986, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
announced the establishment of a Competitive Strategies
Initiative (CSI) within the Department of Defense (DoD). 1
Since that time both Secretary Weinberger and his successor
Frank Carlucci have taken steps to institutionalize this
process of strategic planning. Just what is competitive
strategies and how will it influence U.S. military strategic
planning?
I. BACKGROUND
A Competitive Strategies analysis employs a chess
match methodology which aligns enduring U.S. strengths
against enduring Soviet weaknesses in a move-response-
countermove sequence. This process seeks to exploit areas
of potential high leverage gain that will ideally result
in a new military capability reflecting a combination of
operational concepts, systems, technologies, and organiza-
tional approaches. 2
The idea of contrasting the strengths and weaknesses of
one's military forces against those of the enemy has long
1Caspar Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress FY87
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1986),
p. 88.
2Frank Carlucci, Annual Report to the Congress FY89
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988),
p. 115.
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been a prescription for military success. For example, the
famous 19th century Japanese master swordsman, Miyamoto
Musashi, urged his students to carefully study the fighting
styles of other schools in order to learn how to defeat
them. 3 Competitive Strategies applies this traditional
military concept to the modern national security
environment.
Since the end of World War II, the concept of deterrence
has evolved into the primary goal of U.S. military forces.
The CSI proposes to enhance deterrence by developing poli-
cies which will direct the peacetime superpower competition
into safer areas. 4 This DoD initiative also recognizes that
the domestic needs of the United States require the employ-
ment of efficient military acquisition policies in the face
of a large Soviet military investment. 5 The CSI establishes
task forces which study the force structures necessary for
the efficient maintenance of deterrence in potential future
conflict scenarios.
The first Competitive Strategies Task Force met in July
1987 to study the scenario of a high intensity conventional
conflict between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces on the Euro-
3Miyamoto Musashi, A Book of Five Rings: The Classic
Guide to Strategy , translated by Victor Harris (Woodstock,





Competitive Strategies Office, A Department of Defense
Competitive Strategies Primer , unpublished paper, March 15,
1988, p. 4.
35
pean Continent. The members of this task force proposed
four areas in which NATO's superior information processing
capability could be aligned against the Soviet requirement
for strict time management and high tempo operations. The
result of the task force was to identify technologies
crucial to maintaining a competitive warfighting edge which




It is too early to tell what the effect of this first
Competitive Strategies Task Force Report will be. In the
overall system of U.S. defense planning, the contribution of
Competitive Strategies remains small. The CSI is an ad hoc
system of planning employed by the Secretary of Defense con-
current with the standardized process of Planning, Program-
ming, and Budgeting (PPBS) . Unless the results of the
Competitive Strategies Task Forces are incorporated into
both U.S. war plans and the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP)
,
the CSI cannot succeed.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES METHODOLOGY
In establishing an explicit methodology for exploring
the competitive relationships of military adversaries, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense was able to draw upon the
experience of U.S. corporate strategic planners. Beginning
6Annual Report FY89 . pp. 117-118
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in the early 70's, corporate planners began to examine
methods of developing policies which would create a competi-
tive economic advantage. In particular, Dr. Michael Porter
at the Harvard School of Business began a series of lectures
on Industry and Competitive Analysis. 7 In a broad sense,
the CSI methodology has much in common with the corporate
approach to competitive strategic analysis.
Dr. Porter describes corporate competitive strategy as
the system of developing goals and policies which then shape
a corporation's strategy for economic competition. His
book, Competitive Strategy , is based on the proposition that
these strategies for competition should be based upon an
explicitly formulated analytical approach. Dr. Porter
suggests a series of questions whose answers will form the
basis of a competitive strategy: 8
- What is your current strategy? The answer to this ques-
tion requires both the explicit statement of current
goals and policies and also a listing of the assumptions
upon which the current strategy is based.
- What is happening in the environment? This question
focuses on analyzing the industry in which the competi-
tion will take place, potential adversaries, and
external factor relevant to the competition (government
policies, environmental concerns, etc.). This analysis
concludes by examining the strengths and weaknesses of
all competitors in the contemporary environment.
- What should your strategy be? This question forces the
corporation to examine whether the assumptions of its
7Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy; Technigues






current strategy apply to the competitive environment.
Several alternative strategies are developed. In the
end, a strategy must be chosen.
The first Competitive Strategies Task Force employed a
narrower methodology than their corporate contemporaries.
The task force members developed their analysis in five
phases: 9
- Critical Soviet military tasks were identified;
- U.S. strengths were aligned against Soviet weaknesses;
- Several candidate strategies were developed;
- Potential Soviet responses were identified; and
- U.S. countermoves were developed and net result
determined.
This Competitive Strategies analysis should be viewed as
supplementing the systems analysis methods already being
employed in PPBS. Competitive Strategies provides an
adaptive framework for analyzing operational concepts while
systems analysis focuses on weapon system comparisons.
Competitive Strategies is able to postulate the effects of
changing U.S. goals on the future competition. Systems
analysis must analyze the goals established for the current
budget cycle. Competitive Strategies narrows its analysis
to selected competition scenarios. Systems analysis must
encompass the entire plan for U.S. defense acquisition. 10
9Annual Report FY89 . p. 116.
10Competitive Strategies Primer , p. 3
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The results of Competitive Strategies analysis is
injected into the PPBS system by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. Technological systems identified by the CSI are
placed on a list and tracked through the budget planning
system. These lists are then transmitted to the respective
Service Secretaries so that important competitive technolo-
gies are afforded a protected status. 11
Currently, the CSI expects to expand its methodology by
designing computer simulations and war games which will
validate the strategic concepts developed by the Competitive
Strategies Task Forces. 12 These war games will also provide
an excellent forum for educating policy makers on the
benefits of the Competitive Strategies approach.
III. EVALUATION OF THE COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES INITIATIVE
The stated institutional goals of the CSI are to: 13
- Maintain credible deterrence in the face of substan-
tially greater Soviet defense investments;
- Make past Soviet military investments obsolete, thereby
reducing the military threat... and making them realize
that cooperation is a more beneficial choice;
- Channel the competition into safer areas; and
- Channel the competition into areas less costly for us
and more costly for them in offensive weapons.
•^Competitive Strategies Primer , p. 6.
12Competitive Strategies Primer , p. 5.
13Competitive Strategies Primer , pp. 2-3.
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Examination of these goals reveals several assumptions
implicit in the Competitive Strategies process. First and
foremost, the principal adversary identified by the CSI is
the Soviet Union. There is no indication that this analysis
will be applied on a broader scale in order to examine
alternative competitors in the national security arena.
Second, Competitive Strategies planning is focused on
the national security environment 10 to 15 years in the
future. The conflict scenarios developed for the future are
intended to guide procurement policies in the current peace-
time environment. The development and execution of
competitive policies assumes the continued peaceful coexis-
tence of the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
Third, the Competitive Strategies Task Forces, while
looking to exploit any competitive advantage, will probably
focus on technology as the answer. U.S. strategic planners
tend to assume that technological advantage will continue to
provide for U.S. national security.
Fourth, the Competitive Strategies methodology seems to
assume that Soviet military procurement policies can be
influenced by U.S. procurement policies in a sort of action-
reaction arms race model. This is a very difficult assum-
tion to verify. On the surface, there appears to be
supporting evidence. The U.S. development of the B-52 is
often cited as an example of a successful competitive
strategy. The deployment of B-52 strategic bombers
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supposedly forced the Soviet Union to spend enormous
resources on air defense. This argument, however, overlooks
the possibility that other events may have caused Soviet
concern over air defense. For instance, it may have been
spurred by U.S. intelligence aircraft which systematically
overflew the USSR in the late 50' s. The formulation of an
action-reaction superpower procurement model oversimplifies
a complex decision-making process.
Even assuming that these assumptions are valid, the
Competitive Strategies process is greatly constrained by the
bureaucratic environment of DoD military planning. First,
the CSI is confined to influencing DoD policies only. The
Competitive Strategies process is not free to examine the
larger score of U.S. national security policy.
Each of the individual players in the Competitive
Strategies process are influenced by parochial bureaucratic
interests. The strategic planning performed by Competitive
Strategies Task Forces is based upon an analysis of future
U.S. warfighting capability. Current war plans are
developed by the Unified and Specified Commanders and
approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The potential for
internal conflict is high if civilians in Competitive
Strategies Task Forces attempt to usurp this traditionally
military function.
The implementation procedures of the Competitive Strate-
gies process promise to protect technological programs
41
considered vital to the future security needs of the nation.
The creation of protected programs reduces the ability of
the service secretaries to determine their service budgets.
Friction may be created by programs lobbying the Competitive
Strategies Task Forces for protection behind the backs of
the service secretaries.
IV. ANALYSIS
One should not overemphasize the negative aspects of
assumptions and constraints when examining the Competitive
Strategies Initiative. Any strategic planning initiative
developed within the DoD would be based upon assumptions,
and resistance always accompanies change. The important
question is, "Are the assumptions invalid or the resistance
insurmountable?
"
The assumptions used by the CSI are generally accepted
by the U.S. defense establishment in general. Most U.S.
warfighting doctrines (Maritime Strategy, Flexible Response,
etc.) are based on a characterization of the Soviet Union as
the enemy. Also, it is reasonable to assume that the U.S.
and USSR will not soon go to war since the CSI is intended
to guide peacetime procurement policies. The assumptions
that U.S. technological advantage can offset Soviet numeri-
cal advantage and the modeling of an action-reaction arms
race while untested, will not damage U.S. warfighting
capability should they prove untrue.
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There is no question that resistance to Competitive
Strategies exists within DoD. For example, an unnamed
Defense Department official recently noted: 14
...not everyone has the same view of competitive strate-
gies. Various people will pass judgement as to what is
competitive on a priority basis and they will attempt to
promote their pet rocks. They will have their own
candidates they want to use to gain a greater slice of
budget resources. It will confront a lot of people here
who want everything without any notion of priorities. It
will force them to make choices.
The results of the first Task Force seemed to support
the established warfighting doctrines of the various
services. The four initiatives proposed by the Task Force
were: 15
- Countering Soviet Air Operations;
- Countering Soviet Penetration of NATO Forward Defense;
- Stressing the Warsaw Pact Troop Control System; and
- Countering Soviet Global and Multitheater Operations.
These four initiatives mesh well with the already estab-
lished service doctrines of Maritime Strategy, Follow on
Forces Attack (FOFA) , Air-Land Battle, and Air Force bomber
programs such as the B-2 stealth bomber.
It is doubtful that the Competitive Strategies process
would be able to influence warfighting doctrines without
first gaining the support of the applicable military
services. It seems, therefore, that the true role of the
14Paul Mann, "Strategic Doctrine for High Technology,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology . June 15, 1987, p. 110.
15Annual Report FY89 . pp. 117-118.
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CSI is to integrate the accepted warfighting doctrines of
the services into a comprehensive procurement strategy which
will cause the Soviets to continue to spend heavily on their
defensive systems.
The ability of Competitive Strategies to influence
service budgets is already creating some internal friction
in DoD. According to Defense News , several U.S. Navy
officials are concerned that Navy programs will become
neglected as Air Force and Army programs become protected by
the results of the first CSI Task Force. 16 Despite
resistance, the CSI is slowly consolidating its position in
DoD. As a result of the first CSI Task Force, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Taft is supposed to have already signed
a list of military programs which will receive special
protected status in future service budget requests. 17
The potential advantages of the CSI probably outweigh
any negative aspects. Focusing on the long term superpower
competition provides an important supplement to the short
term focus of the PPBS system. It is too early, however, to
judge whether the CSI will ultimately be successful or not.
To a large extent, its continued existence may depend upon
16Dan Beyers, "New Priorities May Cost the Navy,"
Defense News . February 29, 1988, p. 3.
17Daniel J. Marcus, "Pentagon Forges Budget Shield to
Protect Vital C3I Systems," Defense News . April 11, 1988, p.
44.
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whether or not the next Administration views the CSI as a
political remnant of the Reagan defense program.
The true test of Competitive Strategies will be
performed sometime in the future. Will 21st century
strategic planners look back and congratulate today's
policies as helping to shape a safer superpower competition?
U.S. military planners must periodically think about the
future because weapons built today will remain in the U.S.
inventory for decades. Competitive Strategies provides a
needed forum for conceptualizing future U.S. military needs.
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THE MARSHALL PLAN:
A CASE STUDY IN STRATEGIC PLANNING
LT Nancy K. Jenkins
At the end of World War I, American proclivity for
isolationism resulted in a withdrawal of all U.S. forces
from European soil and a restoration of a pre-World War I
existence both internationally and domestically. When the
end of World War II arrived, that same desire for isolation-
ism caused Americans to briefly entertain a repeat perform-
ance. The domestic sentiment was to "bring the boys home,"
break wartime European commitments and return to a way of
life similar to that which had been experienced prior to the
entrance of the United States into the war before the glow
faded.
Relief for the war-torn countries was being administered
through the United Nations Recovery and Rehabilitation
Agency (UNRRA) and the Government and Relief in Occupied
Areas (GARIOA) program for the most urgent of needs—food
and fuel. Additionally, certain activities that had begun
under the Lend-Lease program were being continued.
I. THE EUROPEAN SCENE
The destruction and chaos that prevailed on the European
continent, however, was so vast and complete that it
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precluded the individual nations from enacting effective
recovery programs. Destitution could be witnessed in the
lack of basic necessities that resulted in multitudes of
people starving and freezing to death. Then, in the Summer
of 1947, there was a devastating drought. Although the
drought has been credited with producing some of the "finest
wines in a generation of memory," 1 it also led to the worst
harvest of crops that Europe had known in approximately 100
years. European dollar reserves were extremely low which
threatened a near cessation of the influx of goods from
America. By mid-1947, European gold reserves and dollar
holdings totalled $7 billion which was neither well
distributed amongst the countries nor sufficient to meet the
requirements of trade. 2 Additionally, the excessive
barriers to intra-European trade that had been established
during the inter-war years (quotas, tariffs, and subsidies)
were being further complicated by strikes, unemployment and
rapidly growing inflation. Europe was as near to collapse
as possible.
Owing to all these factors, Britain in effect claimed
bankruptcy and turned to the U.S. to request that it assume
the burden of assisting the Greek government's attempt to
stop a communist supported revolt. Britain could no longer
shoulder the financial responsibilities of "Pax Britanica."
On 12 March 1947, President Truman submitted a request to
Congress for economic and military assistance for both
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Greece and Turkey to prevent the expansion of communism. In
May 1947, the Congress appropriated $400 million in Greek-
Turkish aid 3 and the Truman Doctrine was born. It was
known by all that this aid was an interim measure and that
the assistance being provided through the UNRRA and GARIOA
was but marginal relief activity. By 1947, $10 billion in
aid had been given to Europe. All of it had been used on
subsistence and all of it was gone. 4 None of these measures
had worked toward a restoration of industrial capabilities
or even a resolution of the currency situation, both of
which would be required for an improvement in Europe's trade
and overall economic health. American leaders knew that if
these Western European governments fell, political liberty
in the region would have ended as well. The result would
place the defense and welfare of the U.S. in danger. What
was desperately needed was a long-term program that would
help rebuild Europe to enable it to take care of itself. A
creative approach to the problem was announced in a June
address delivered at Harvard by the Secretary of State
General Marshall where he unfolded a process by which Europe
could be set on the road to recovery.
II. THE PLAN
"The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The
role of this country should consist of friendly aid in
drafting of a European program and a later support of such a
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program so far as is practical for us to do so." 5 This was
the keynote of his Harvard speech—the Marshall plan was
envisioned as a European program to be financed by the
United States. It had been decided that the aid that was
being given had to be linked to specific long-term
objectives and not provided in an ad hoc manner that only
served to relieve the stress but did not contribute to
solving the problem.
The over-arching aims of the Marshall Plan were to
stabilize the international economic system such that it
would be favorable to capitalism and to prevent the spread
of communism beyond the Iron Curtain. The two aims were
mutually supportive and it was believed that by focusing on
the first, the later would be ensured. The long-term goal
of the Plan was to make Western Europe self-sufficient. In
order to attain that objective, its industry and its trade
had to be revived and both had to be achieved as simultane-
ously as was possible. Therefore, the specific approach was
two-pronged: close the "dollar gap" and build an industrial
base that would enable Europe to sell enough to earn its own
way. 6 In other words, the Marshall Plan sought to make
Europe productive again.
By making Europe self-supporting, it was believed that
Europe would be more resistant to communistic pressures,
both internally and externally. Initially, the Marshall
Plan also attempted to draw Eastern European countries away
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from the Soviet orbit7 through the enticement of capitalist
resources. Poland and Czechoslovakia were eager to partici-
pate in the program, but were later convinced to reverse
their decisions due to Soviet interference. In this regard,
the Marshall Plan can be viewed as America's last effort to
breakup the Soviet "camp." The German question, however,
was also part of the Marshall Plan in that the program
depended on an economically vital West Germany. To bring
this about, the demand for reparations had to be dealt with.
It was hoped that U.S. aid to the West European countries
would replace the demands placed on West Germany and keep
that Germany looking West thereby preventing it from sliding
into Soviet clutches.
The Americans understood the enormity of the challenge
and that for the goals to be achieved a sustained commitment
would be required. They had the vision, but beyond that
there were no clear, logical steps to arrive at this end.
The Europeans had to devise that for themselves. Addition-
ally, the Marshall Plan required European administration,
for the most part, and a contribution of a united effort by
those countries. The problem could not be solved on a
country-by-country basis.
Within five weeks of Secretary Marshall's speech, 16
countries had set up the Committee for European Economic
Cooperation. 9 It formulated a draft program of cooperative
economic arrangements and a report of the collective
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requirements for goods and foreign exchange to cover the
period of 1948-1952. 10 The U.S. Program Review Division of
the Plan served as the U.S. participation in jointly review-
ing all the funding requests and the draft program and
helped compile it into a single continental strategy. Being
motivated in part by the thrill of sharing the American
success story with the European nations and, in part, by a
desire to ward off another war, Congress appropriated funds
and passed the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1948. The Act
officially launched Europe and the U.S. on a joint venture
for the reconstruction of the western part of the continent
in a program entitled the European Recovery Program (ERP)
.
It also established the Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA) to
supervise the program. At the same time, Congress approved
an additional $600 million to relieve the immediate short-
ages of food, fuel and raw materials necessary to allow the
long-range planning to begin. 11 .
In April 1948, the committee that had drafted the
program became a permanent body known as the Organization of
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) . The first objective
of this group was to direct its energies toward achieving
liquidity for the purchasing of resources (i.e., closing the
"dollar Gap") . It devised a distribution plan for the funds
and determined measures that would facilitate growth in
trade. These measures included: reducing quotas, creating
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credit and providing a mechanism or the settlement of
accounts between countries.
For these later two tasks, the European Payment Union
(EPU) was set up to act as a type of "clearing house"
arrangement for intra-European payments. 12 This resulted in
a more efficient use of the funds and an increase in a
member's purchasing potential. However, there was a price
to be paid for this assistance. Each country was required
to submit to a review of its economic policies and, when
necessary, take corrective actions; many of which dealt with
the rigid quota and tariff systems that had grown up in
Europe during the previous two decades. In addition,
certain nations were required to make an equivalent amount
of aid to neighbors in the form of goods that they lacked. 13
The Marshall Plan financed investments in new electrici-
ty generating plants, oil refineries, industrial renovations
and new kinds of farming equipment. The following provides
a partial breakdown of the expenditures funded by the ERP: 14
$849 million—cargo hauling fees
$360 million—EPU, to unfreeze Europe's trade
$5.3 billion—agricultural products




$1.9 billion—machinery and vehicles
For the period 3 April 1948— 1 January 1952, $17.3 billion
in Marshall Plan funds were paid through the ECA. "Those
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who want to minimize the amount say it was less than
Americans spent on their liquor bill for the same period." 15
Yet, an alternative view would be to note that Americans
gave $10 million a day for nearly four years to assist
European recovery.
Despite the extremely impressive achievements in goods
and funds received, the true mastery of the Marshall Plan's
strategy was in its drive to bring about a united Europe, at
least economically. By the elimination of tariffs, quotas,
subsidies and import-export licenses, European industries
were led by competition and cooperation. The hallmark of
the ERP's achievement was to get Europe, where old national
protective barriers prohibited economic growth, to think in
new competitive modes. 16 For a number of reasons/ the year
1950 stands out as a turning point for the Marshall Plan,
the most telling of which is that every single production
target was met and surpassed by then. In 1950, the planners
and administrators of the Plan had discovered a word for
their vision of Europe—integration. An economically
integrated Europe was viewed as the solution to making it
self-sufficient. In fact, the U.S. Congress had articulated
the unification of Europe as one of the program's major
purposes in the second appropriation of funds. 17 Integra-
tion and the liberalization of trade had been the two
tactics utilized in the implementation of the strategy for
European recovery and, by 1950, it was working. However, in
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1950, the planners were just beginning to realize the true
depth of the problems they were working to overcome.
Europe had no anti-trust legislation. Age-old cartels
and trade habits were still controlling supplies. Restric-
tions and unfair practices between industries were control-
ling and fixing prices as well. 18 It was becoming increas-
ingly evident that business combinations were as much an
impediment to competition as the government-sponsored trade
barriers, and much more difficult to fix. This was not the
only problem being understood in 1950, the second goal of
the Marshall Plan—halting the spread of communism—was
being threatened.
Earning a loyalty to the democratic way of life through
"trickle down" economics was simply not occurring.
Continental workers in Europe's slums were not experiencing
the same recovery their respective national economies
appeared to be enjoying. The result was that communism
retained its hold on those voters for whom life had not
changed. The planners set out to alter the situation by
urging wage increases and prodding lethargic governments to
rebuild slum housing. 19 Congress, however, was beginning to
throttle-back on the appropriations which correspondingly
reduced ERP leverage.
Another 1950 event changed the thrust of the Marshall
Plan toward an entirely new direction. Originally, the plan
had specifically stipulated that not one penny of the funds
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was to be used on any non-productive endeavors, to include
military expenditures. The outbreak of the Korean War,
however, altered everything. What had begun as an attempt
for peaceful reconstruction was instantaneously converted to
a new effort—defense and rearmament.
Eight months after the North Koreans had invaded the
South, the U.S. directed that every dollar of the Plan's
funds was to be allotted to the purpose of rearming
Europe. 20 In a way, the Marshall Plan came to an end when
the invasion of South Korea occurred. By 1952, every
pretense of the Marshall Plan being engaged in economic
reconstruction was dropped and the funds ended, albeit
readily replaced by financial assistance in the form of
military aid. The Mutual Security Agency (MSA) absorbed the
remaining effort and contributed an additional $2.5 billion
to Europe. The war, however, did generate a type of world-
wide effect that served to accelerate recovery in Western
Europe.
By the end of the first decade (1958) , 17 billion U.S.
dollars had been infused into Western Europe resulting in
the establishment of a favorable balance of trade, the
doubling of foreign exchange reserves, the achievement of
the convertibility of all currencies and a GNP growth rate
of an average of 5% per annum. 21
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III. CONCLUSION
World War II served to alter the American preference for
isolationism by making the United States aware of the fact
that its national interests had become "entangled" with
those of the free European nations. The Marshall plan was a
result of that realization and two years of ad hoc aid being
gobbled up by the symptoms of economic collapse without
affecting the cause. There had never been an undertaking
anything like the ERP and the absence of a blueprint was a
guarantee that mistakes, shortfalls and inconsistencies
would be experienced. The real uncertainty lay in the
degree of success that the program would achieve. The
strengths of the plan should serve as lessons for the
future, the weaknesses as mere cautionary notes.
The resounding success of the Marshall Plan was based in
the factor of recipient participation in the formulation of
the program and in the factor of mandatory cooperation that
recipients were to contribute. As remains true today, the
lack of the resources of population and land that are vital
to industrial expansion and trade which plagued the individ-
ual nations could only be alleviated through a united
endeavor. THe vision of a unified Western Europe may seem
to be a possibility for the not-too-distant future, but for
the ERP planners in 1947 it probably appeared as a near
impossibility in that such an occurrence had no historical
precedent. At that time, Europe was a prisoner of its
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historical traditions and what was required was an economic
revolution—a dangerous undertaking owing to the lack of
control that could be exerted over the process.
In having the participants draft a program, the true
essence of the problems that needed to be addressed stood a
greater chance of being identified than if the plan had been
devised by an outsider. Yet, having the U.S. review the
plan provided the program with an opportunity for the
infusion of fresh ideas and novel approaches to old economic
habits. Forcing the participants to tear down the national-
istic barriers to trade was essential; as was exonerating
West Germany from crippling reparations. The insight to
national behavior that the planners demonstrated was to be
commended. It is unfortunate that they lacked the depth of
understanding that was required to have foreseen the levels
that would not be reached by the "trickle down" concept.
Today we would label specific measures as feedback
mechanisms which is something that the implementation of the
ERP strategy lacked. If the planners had monitored factors
that would have indicated economic recovery at all levels,
the realization that the situation of the workers was not
improving might have come sooner and more might have been
done to correct the problem and thereby further the cause of
democratic ideals and the pillars upon which they rest.
It is certain that the Marshall Plan could have been
executed with more efficiency, reached more people sooner
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and been more complete in the objective of the unification
of Western Europe. Yet, to have done so would have required
a crystal ball. The clarity of vision with which one can
view the past ought not strip the participants of the event
the glory that they are due. The measurement of success of
the ERP must be in the evaluation of the degree of achieve-
ment reached in the attainment of its goals. The thriving
economy that exists in Europe today is a tribute to the
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MCNAMARA AND PROGRAM BUDGETING:
IS THE FIRST "P" IN "PPBS" SILENT?
LCDR N.L. Flacco
I. BACKGROUND
A. PRE-1961 DEFENSE PLANNING
When President-elect John Kennedy formally introduced
Robert S. McNamara as his Secretary of Defense in December
I960, the system for defense planning was, as critics
charge, "completely unrelated to fiscal reality." 1 The
planning cycle was initiated by the annual submission of the
Joint Strategic Operations Plans (JSOP) , a compilation of
individual service plans. These long range plans for force
structure and weapons procurement were based on the
military's estimate of national security requirements.
Costs were generally not introduced. 2
Outside the Pentagon, the Bureau of the Budget advised
the president in setting a budget ceiling for every depart-
ment of government. The President in turn provided the
Department of Defense (DoD) with a general level of defense
lieutenant Colonel Mel Stinnett, "The ABCs of PPBS
(Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System)," in The
Greener Side of Blue. Volume Five , ed. Major Tim Smith
(Maxwell AFB: Air Command and Staff College, 1986)
, p. 1.
2William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York:
Harper and Row, 1964), p. 170.
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expenditure appropriate to prevailing economic policies.
Once the Secretary divided the total budget among the
military departments, each prepared a budget submission
according to its own functions, units, and plans.
Allocations were specified within the ceiling, with
additional requirements presented in an "addendum" budget.
Each budget and addendum was tabulated in the five resource
categories established in 1948 under the first Secretary,
James V. Forrestal: Military Personnel, Operations and
Maintenance, Procurement, Research and Development, and
Military Construction. 3 The Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) reviewed the submissions, attempting to
balance and reduce the requests. Budget cuts were by and
large conducted across-the-board, however, with very little
analytical basis. 4
Defense planning had evolved, then, to a system in which
planning was "militarized" and budgeting was "civilian-
ized." 5 Force requirements were developed without regard to
cost, and budget cuts were conducted without regard to need.
3 Charles J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965)
, pp. 23-29,
69-70.
4U.S. Congress, Senate, Staff Report to the Committee
on Armed Services, Defense Organization: The Need for
Change, 99th Congress, 1st session, 1985, p. 484.
5James Michael Roherty, Decisions of Robert S.
McNamara: A Study of the Role of the Secretary of Defense




The "required" forces would invariably cost more than the
budget allowed, and the process of resolving conflicts led
to waste and force imbalance. 6 Additionally, the failure to
consider program costs beyond the one-year budget submission
provided a "foot-in-the-door" incentive for services to
introduce new weapon systems with low first-year costs. 7
Since the JSOP was essentially a "pasted together"
version of the service plans, priorities were independently
established, resulting in weapon duplication or gaps.
During the Eisenhower years for example, the services were
developing as many as 12 separate ICBM systems. 8 Planning
assumptions were often mismatched, creating incompatible
logistics plans. While the Army planned for a long war of
attrition (and counted on the necessary airlift and tactical




The deficiencies of the defense planning system were
highlighted by the president-elect's Committee on the
Defense Establishment, chaired by Senator Stuart Symington.
The so-called Symington Report characterized the system as a
6Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy , p. 171.
7Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense , p. 25.
8Robert P. Meehan, Plans. Programs, and the Defense
Budget (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press,
1985), p. 5.
9Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security; Reflec-




"series of compromised positions among the military
services," and recommended far-reaching changes to the
organization of the DoD aimed at unification. 10 The
incoming Secretary of Defense successfully tabled the
report, however, seeking unification through planning
reforms.
B. SHAPING THE NEW SYSTEM
McNamara had forced one condition on Kennedy in accept-
ing the position as Pentagon chief: he could choose his own
subordinates. Captivated with the application of analysis
as espoused in the new book Economics of Defense in the
Nuclear Acre , McNamara offered the Comptroller job to the
author, Charles J. Hitch. Hitch invited Alain C. Enthoven,
formerly a colleague in the RAND economics division, to take
charge of the new Systems Analysis office. Gregory Palmer
described the unique contributions of these key players:
There were three separate approaches to defense policy,
not entirely compatible, all of which influenced the final
shape of the system: the management theory of McNamara,
the programming budgeting theories supported by Hitch, and
the economic theories of Enthoven. 11
In his transition from industry to the DoD, McNamara
brought an active management philosophy and a devotion to
10Michael D. Hobkirk, The Politics of Defense Budget-
ing. A Study of Organization and Resource Allocation in the
United Kingdom and the United States (Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1983)
, pp. 80-81.
11Gregory Palmer, The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam
War: Program Budgeting in the Pentagon. 1960-1968
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 48-49.
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the cost element of cost-benefit analysis. 12 While McNamara
stressed the applicability of industrial techniques to
defense, Hitch stressed the differences. He viewed cost-
benefit analysis as a device necessary to public organiza-
tions in gaining the efficiency provided by market forces in
private industry. Analysis could only be performed, Hitch
insisted, through the establishment of program budgeting and
forward planning. Organizing the budget into outputs,
rather than the traditional categories of resource inputs,
would facilitate the comparison of alternatives with like
missions. Maintaining an extended forward plan would allow
cost comparison of these systems over their entire life
cycle. 13
Enthoven introduced economic techniques to answer the
question "How much is enough?" Rather than impose an arbi-
trary ceiling on defense spending, the proper budget could
be determined by establishing the point of "diminishing
returns" for each program element. In Enthoven' s words:
Instead of working in terms of marginal rates of transfor-
mation and substitution, in effect we switched to marginal
products and marginal costs. This allowed the Secretary
to make his own judgments as to the point at which the
12Roherty, Decisions of Robert S. McNamara: A Study of
the Role of the Secretary of Defense , p. 65.
13 Palmer, The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam War:
Program Budgeting in the Pentagon. 1960-1968 . pp. 55-58.
68
various marginal products were no longer large enough to
justify the incurring of extra costs. 1*
The principal architects of the new planning system
formulated the needed reforms with two objectives in mind.
As McNamara later described them:
My instructions from both President Kennedy and President
Johnson were simple: [first] to determine and provide
what we needed to safeguard our security without arbitrary
budget limits, but [second] to do so as economically as
possible. 15
In the spring of 1961, Hitch (proclaimed by Enthoven as
the "father of PPBS" 16 ) outlined the Planning-Programming-
Budgeting System (PPBS) to McNamara, recommending it be
developed and applied in 18 months. McNamara reportedly
gave him six months to have it in operation. His first
budget, fiscal year 1963, was to be based on the new
system. 17
14Alain C. Enthoven, "Economic Analysis in the Depart-
ment of Defense," The American Economic Review , pp. 418-419,
cited in Palmer, The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam
War: Program Budgeting in the Pentagon. 1960-1968 . p. 61.
15McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in
Office , p. 87.
16Alain C. Enthoven, How Much is Enough? Shaping the
Defense Program. 1961-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971)
,
p. xiii.





II. PPBS IN THE PENTAGON. 1961-1968
The programming phase is the heart of PPBS, designed to
bridge planning and budgeting. The budget structure of
inputs remained, and the JSOP continued to be the planning
vehicle. Programming provided a means to sort the myriad
defense expenditures into meaningful program elements. The
nearly 1000 elements were grouped into nine mission areas
that cut across service lines: Strategic Retaliatory
Forces, Continental Defense Forces, General Purpose Forces,
Airlift and Seal ift, National Reserve and Guard, Research
and Development, General Support, Retired Pay, and Military
Assistance. Military forces were projected ahead eight
years for procurement lead time, while all other programs
were projected five years ahead, in the Five Year Defense
Plan (FYDP) . The FYDP represented a continuously available
long range plan, updated by a formal change control
program. 18
Programming, as McNamara described it, "would be a shell
without substance, however, were it not backed by a full
range of analytic support which operations research and
other modern management techniques can bring to bear." 19
Systems analysis provided a means of simultaneously evalu-
ating cost and effectiveness of program alternatives.
18Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense , p. 32.
19McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in
Office , p. 95.
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Enthoven's marginal cost and production data, used to estab-
lish procurement and force levels, was an additional product
of analysis. 20
The PPBS cycle would begin with the Secretary providing
vague strategic guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
.
Military force reguirements were determined by the JCS and
service planners, and proposed in the JSOP without explicit
budget constraints. McNamara's thinking on each area under
review was set down in Draft Presidential Memoranda (DPM)
,
written by the Systems Analysis office. While the DPMs
specified force levels in each major mission area, budget
levels remained unconstrained. As a result, the service
budget submissions, based on DPM guidance, were often 20-40%
higher than the final budget. Now arranged in nine mission
areas, the program elements were cut by OSD to reach an
unannounced target budget level. Cost-effectiveness
studies, completed in parallel with the service budget
submissions, provided the key tool in weighing program
alternatives. The reasons for the cuts were summarized in
OSD's Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). 21
The budgeting phase concluded with summation of the
pared-down program elements, and conversion to the five
traditional accounting categories. Proving a persuasive
20Trewhitt, McNamara, pp. 86-87.
21Thomas E. Anger, A Critical Review of Defense
Resource Planning and the Role of Analysis (Arlington,
Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, 1973), pp. 6-8.
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advocate before Congress, McNamara unfailingly presented the
defense budget as a product of cost savings and effective
civilian control over an extravagant military. He
convincingly argued that for the first time, the DoD was
answering "How much is enough?" without establishing arbi-
trary budget ceilings. Speaking before the House Armed
Services Committee in 1965, McNamara testified, "I know of
no way in which we could substantially increase our security
with the expenditure of additional funds." 22
III. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS
A. PPBS ASSUMPTIONS—EXPLICIT AND IMPLIED
The stated objectives of PPBS, providing the necessary
defense without arbitrary limit and doing so as economically
as possible, implied a purely rational process of decision-
making. The rational model, however, requires examination
of all possible alternatives with perfect information about
each. Further, it implies an absence of political accommo-
dation. A more accurate assumption, therefore, bases the
PPBS decision process on the limited rationality model. The
incremental nature of the decisions made in adjusting the
22Anger, A Critical REview of Defense Resource Planning
and the Role of Analysis , p. 8.
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comprehensive FYDP falls in between the "muddling through"
approach and pure rationality. 23
The most audacious assumption of PPBS is surely the
premise that military requirements can in fact be estab-
lished without regard to cost. Force requirement statements
vary widely depending on whether planning is based on worst-
case analysis, which in its entirety would always be too
costly, or some lesser level of hostility. That the prudent
level of military preparedness could be determined without
considering the overall cost is a less than certain concept.
The success of systems analysis in determining the best
program choices depends directly on the validity of two key
assumptions. It is first assumed that the established set
of program categories effectively serves all analytical
needs. Allen Schick pointed out that "there are as many
ways to classify information as there are analytic perspec-
tives." 24 Failure to choose the correct program categories
could result in comparing two systems that don't even
fulfill the same requirements. Secondly it must be assumed
that the optimal measures of effectiveness are used in the
cost-benefit analysis. A simple cost criterion would have
shown the cost of an on-station Polaris missile to cost two
23Robert D. Lee and Ronald W. Johnson, Public Budgeting
Systems (Baltimore: University Park Press, 1977), pp. 16-17,
91, 107.
24Allen Schick, "A Death in the Bureaucracy," Public
Administration Review . March 1973, p. 152.
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to three times that of a Minuteman, and the system would not
have been procured. Using survivable power as a measure,
the decision was made in 1961 to double Polaris production
from five to ten boats per year. 25
Finally, two assumptions are implicit in McNamara'
s
stated convictions that shaped PPBS. "The organization and
management of the Defense Department must be based on the
principle of centralized planning and decentralized opera-
tion." 26 That is, centralized planning is assumed to be
conducive to effective decision-making and force develop-
ment. "I equate planning and budgeting and consider the
terms almost synonymous, the budget being simply a quantita-
tive expression of the operating plans." 27 Here it is
assumed that the budget alone states the defense policy of
the United States.
B. PLANNING CONSTRAINTS
Fiscal reality provides the most ubiquitous constraint
in defense planning; PPBS is no exception. Hitch himself
admitted that "resources are always limited in comparison
25Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense , pp. 72-73.
26U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Hearings on Military Posture . 88th Congress, 1st session,
1963, p. 373, cited in Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy , p.
173.
27U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Oper-
ations, Organizing for National Security . 87th Congress, 1st
session, 1961, p. 1197, cited in Kaufmann, The McNamara
Strategy , p. 169.
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with our wants, always constraining our action." 28 While
the principal constraint remains the overall budget level,
the force structure is ultimately constrained by the
military manpower ceiling and the Gross National Product
(GNP)
.
Congress essentially imposed two constraints on the DoD
in overhauling the budgeting process. First, the new system
was still required to conform to the annual budget cycle.
Despite the DoD's repeated feelers as to congressional
accommodation of a biennial budget submission, support for
the change was not forthcoming. In addition, the budget had
to be submitted in a form acceptable to Congress. The
conventional appropriation accounts thereby continued to be
used in the budgeting phase.
While arbitrary budget ceilings were the nemesis of the
PPBS patriarchs, informal fiscal constraints undoubtedly
existed throughout the planning and programming phases.
Service planners could readily project the anticipated
overall budget from past appropriations. This fact was
clearly illustrated by James Roherty, who determined that
"during the McNamara years the defense budget was divided
28Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics




between the three services in the same percentage terms as
before." 29 Moreover, the viability of individual systems in
the fact of cost-cutters could be discerned from the record
of congressional budget actions. Even the Secretary
maintained an overall budget constraint in the form of a
White House target that certainly influenced the process.
IV. KEY ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE
The endurance of PPBS through eight Secretaries of
Defense provides a compelling argument to declare the system
successful. One Air Force officer observed that "periodic
face lifting has shifted the duties of certain participants,
changed the titles and formats of documents, and rearranged
timetables, but the basic PPBS structure and purpose has
remained intact." 30 The essential element of programming,
the framework for relating outputs and their costs to
military missions, is often cited as the preeminent contri-
bution of McNamara's PPBS.
The survival of program budgeting has facilitated the
balancing of military forces by cutting across service
lines. Where outputs were readily comparable and
29Roherty, Decisions of Robert S. McNamara; A Study of
the Role of the Secretary of Defense , p. 76. The service
percentages were consistent with previous budgets only after
subtracting the Vietnam buildup expenditures.
30Stinnett, "The ABCs of PPBS (Planning, Programming,
and Budgeting System),", p. 1.
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quantifiable, such as strategic nuclear weapons, PPBS claims
its greatest success. By organizing information on spending
by output programs and showing how they relate to specific
defense objectives, PPBS has also promoted external review
of DoD proposals.
The advent of forward planning in the FYDP has allowed
anticipation of long range costs and a realistic appraisal
of a system's price tag over its life cycle. The incentive
for interest groups to insert the "thin edge of the wedge"
by starting small and letting costs multiply later has been
largely eliminated.
Notwithstanding the considerable effort expended during
the period 1945-1960 to introduce operations research and
economic theory in defense planning, the inception of PPBS
brought broadened and institutionalized analysis to the
DoD. 31 Analysis provided a rational foundation for informed
decisions. "Where analysis has proved its highest value,"
James Schlesinger wrote, "is in uncovering cases of gross
waste: points at which substantial expenditures may contri-
bute little to any stated objective." 32
31Anger, A Critical Review of Defense Resource Planning
and the Role of Analysis , p. 1.
32U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National
Security and International Operations of the Committee on
Government Operations, Plannina-Proaramminq-Budaetina : Uses
and Abuses of Analysis . 90th Congress, 2nd session, 1968, p.
10.
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The most pervasive weaknesses of PPBS are usually
considered to lie within the planning phase. That the
programming and budgeting phases were dominant during
McNamara's tenure is hardly surprising in view of his stated
belief that the budget is simply "the quantitative expres-
sion of the operating plans." 33 Long-range planning, to be
more than a summing of service needs, must be guided by a
national military strategy. The Secretary of Defense and
JCS failed to proscribe unambiguous defense objectives and
overcome the generality of broad political statements of
foreign policy. "Lacking clear objectives and policies,"
Robert Meehan reasoned, "then DoD's approach to force
development becomes more, more, more." 34 PPBS left the old
JSOP development process virtually unchanged, prompting the
OSD to by and large treat the joint plans as irrelevant.
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt's evaluation of the JSOP is most
telling:
I found this document to be almost as valueless to read as
it was fatiguing to write. Some of its prescriptions were
always in the process of being falsified by events.
Others were so tortured a synthesis of mutually contradic-
tory positions that the guidance they gave was minimal. 35
33Roherty, Decisions of Robert S. McNamara: A Study of
the Role of the Secretary of Defense , p. 81.
34Meehan, Plans. Programs, and the Defense Budget , p.
12.
35U.S., Congress, Senate, Staff Report to the Commit-
tee on Armed Services, Defense Organization: The Need for
Change, 99th Congress, 1st session, 1985, p. 496.
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While consistency between plans and the budget were not
maintained, attainable plans were not developed in the first
place. The reason: realistic budget constraints were not
formally considered. Fiscal considerations and cost-effec-
tiveness analysis were conducted too late in the process.
The defense strategy, military force level and procurement
proposals, and DPMs specifying force requirements were all
conducted without explicit regard to cost. The budgets were
whittled down to fit a previously unrevealed budget target.
Analysis proved to have a limited impact on program
decisions. Aaron Wildavsky considered "the rare analytical
study which PPBS officials hold out as proof of advancement
is praised because it is unique." 36 Too often analysis is
selectively used to suit the political interests or personal
proclivities of the decision-maker. According to
Schlesinger, "half the time [during the McNamara years] a
decision had been foreclosed by high level political
involvement.
"
37 Nevertheless, the OSD Systems Analysis
staff swelled in the 1960s, becoming concerned with what was
often described as petty details best left to the services.
36Aaron B. Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgeting
Process (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1974)
,
p. 200.
37U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National
Security and International Operations of the Committee on
Government Operations, Planning-Programminq-Budgeting : Uses
and Abuses of Analysis . 90th Congress, 2nd session, 1968, p.
3.
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Not even the mix and level of trucks and radios in Army
divisions escaped the scrutiny of the OSD analysts. 38
By removing the services from decision-making, consider-
able friction was generated between McNamara's "whiz kids"
in OSD and senior military officers. After failing to gain
appointment for an additional tour of duty as Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral George Anderson provided this insight in
a 1963 address to the National Press Club:
Recommendations of service chiefs, each backed up by
competent military and civilian professional staffs, are
altered or overruled without interim consultation,
explanation, or discussion. .. .The operations analyst
—
properly concerned with "cost effectiveness"—seems to be
working at the wrong echelon—above the professional
military level rather than in an advisory capacity to the
military who should thoroughly appreciate this
assistance. 39
Under McNamara's successor, Melvin Laird, PPBS evolved
to permit a greater service role in evaluation of program
alternatives. Analysis became a tool used prior to the
budget submission to OSD, and fiscal reality was at last
infused into the planning process.
38Anger, A Critical Review of Defense Resource Planning
and the Role of Analysis , p. 2.
39Roherty, Decisions of Robert S. McNamara; A Study of
the Role of the Secretary of Defense , pp. 98-99.
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THE NAVY'S GENERAL BOARD
LT John E. Inman
In the late nineteenth century, the United States was
beginning to emerge as a world power. The industrial revo-
lution was in full swing as the nation and the entire civi-
lized world was undergoing a vast metamorphosis. Machinery
replaced animal and wind as the source of power in a more
modern world. The United States was at the center of this
new world as steam power shrunk the apparent distance
between the continents. In all, the United States found
itself undergoing tremendous changes, at a rate never before
imagined possible.
The Navy found itself totally caught up in this era of
change. The shift from sail to steam was the most obvious
of the changes that the Navy was forced to deal with.
Equally important, the Navy was now part of a nation with
true global interests, and also a nation with some very
powerful potential adversaries. Germany, England and Japan
were nations with naval power capable of challenging U.S.
interests around the globe. These changes in technology and
the world balance of power led many people in the Navy to
believe that an organized, formal method of planning was
required in order to maintain the force level and degree of
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modernization required for the Navy to fulfill its mission
in protecting the nation's interests.
In the year 1900, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long
authorized the formation of the General Board. 1 The job of
this board, composed of highly competent naval officers, was
to plan for war. More specifically it sought to plan for
war with Germany and Japan, though not exclusively so. The
type of war planning the General Board was to engage in
dealt with more than just the operations and tactics of
naval warfare. It also included planning for the force
levels required for the Navy to conduct the wars the General
Board envisioned possible in the not too distant future.
The final output of the General Board was a war plan
delivered to the appropriate fleet commander. The war plan
delivered was not, however, a pure product of the General
Board. Before its delivery, it was reviewed amended by the
Intelligence Office, the Naval War College and even the
appropriate fleet commander. 2 Recommendations for force
levels to support the war plans were delivered less formally
via memoranda delivered to the Secretary of the Navy.
The General Board never really saw its plans imple-
mented. The war with Germany in 1917 did not develop in the
Caribbean as foreseen, since the German fleet was kept
bottled up by the British for most of the war. By the time
World War II came around, and scenarios much more closely
resembling those they envisioned became reality, the General
85
Board lost its effectiveness and power as a planning body,
as the Navy had come full circle and reverted to its pre-
1900, more ad hoc planning style.
The General Board's composition, as originally estab-
lished by Secretary Loop, was as follows. There were to be
two categories of membership: ex-officio and individual.
The ex-officio members were: the Admiral of the Navy, the
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, the Chief Intelligence
Officer, the President of the Naval War College, and the
principal assistant of the last two officials: individual
memberships were to be three in number of or above the rank
of Lieutenant Commander. 3
The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation was assigned as
the custodian of the war plans developed by the General
Board. 4 Additionally, he served as the General Board's head
in the absence of the Admiral of the Navy. Meetings were
required to happen at least once each month, and at least
two of the monthly meetings each year were required to
include daily sessions of at least one week's duration.
After only one year, the composition of the board was
changed to eliminate the assistants to the President of the
Naval War College and the Chief Intelligence Officer and
instead allowed the Secretary of the Navy to designate by
name as many members, above Lieutenant Commander, as he
desired. 5
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General Board decisions were taken by vote. Each member
had one vote, regardless of rank. 6 Admiral Dewey, the
original head of the board, was adamant about not permitting
senior officers to influence the votes of junior board
members. Therefore, he permitted board decisions that he
did not agree with to be forwarded over his signature. 7
This attitude was not always popular with soon-to-be retired
Admirals that were serving on the board in a non-voting
capacity, as they found themselves overruled by voting
officers much junior to themselves.
The actual planning process revolved around a group of
committees formed to handle the different types of plans
required. The most important of these committees was the
Executive Committee. It was the function of the Executive
Committee to prepare the agenda for the General Board's
meetings and to take a preliminary look at material
presented to the General Board. 8 Also, the Executive Com-
mittee met on a near daily basis and that, combined with its
reviewing functions, made it the most powerful committee of
the General Board. Originally, other committees were formed
by the Board's chairman, assigned tasks to particular
members of the Board based on their areas of expertise.
After two years, two other permanent committees were formed.
The First Committee had responsibility for fleet organiza-
tion, combined operations with the Army, mobilization plans,
and the analysis of foreign fleets. The Second Committee
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was tasked with war plans, naval militia affairs, and sea
transport.
9
Originally, the General Board was not going to have a
permanently assigned staff to assist in the planning
process. This idea was soon abandoned and officers of all
ranks were assigned to the Board to help with the adminis-
tration and to lend expertise to the planning process.
Additionally, help could be sought from the War College or
from the Bureaus, especially on military matters that
required a particular technical knowledge or experience.
One of the key elements in the functioning of the Board
to produce its plans was its relationship with the Intelli-
gence Office and the Naval War College. The Intelligence
Office served as the Board's source of information. The War
College provided extra personnel when needed and served as a
type of reviewing or proofing station for the plans the
Board authored.
There were some key assumptions made by the proponents
of the General Board that made them feel that the old
planning system was inadequate. These assumptions dealt
mostly with the nature of the next war. It was assumed that
the next war would have a very sudden beginning, be very
complex in nature and have a very high tempo. The Board's
supporters felt that the old ad hoc system of planning was
not up to the challenge of preparing the nation for such a
war. It was felt that proper planning could be done only by
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those who job it was to plan, and not by the Bureau Chiefs
who were too busy with the administration of their depart-
ments to give any serious effort to the process of preparing
effective war plans.
The Navy was not totally void of any planning activity
before the General Board came into existence. Each of the
Bureaus had plans of their own for various different contin-
gencies. With no central planning system or method of
review, these plans were often uncoordinated, and worse,
sometimes even directly at odds with each other. However,
the parochial attitude of the Bureau Chiefs was strong and
thus they felt they knew what was best for themselves and
the Navy. They saw the existence of the General Board as an
erosion of their power and, in a way, it was. Thus, the old
system of Bureaus was a constraint on the planning function
of the General Board as the Bureau heads retained the true
power base in the Navy.
In addition to the Bureau Chiefs, extremists in the Line
Officer ranks sought to constrain the General Board. These
officers saw the General Board in the old terms of the Staff
versus Line power struggle that had existed in military
organizations for decades. The Line Officer community saw
the board as a tool used by Staff Officers to wrestle more
power away from them and to place them in a subordinate
position to the Staff Officers.
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Resistance came from outside the military also. Con-
gressional leaders saw two major problems with the General
Board. First, they feared the formation of a "General
Staff-type organization as an effort by the Navy to stray
from the traditional subordination of the United States
military forces to the civilian leadership. Specifically,
it was felt that the General Board might reduce the role of
the Secretary of the Navy to be that of a puppet. Second,
they were very comfortable with the power being held by the
Bureau Chiefs because it permitted numerous pork barrel
projects from the Navy to appear in their districts. 10
At the time the General Board was first implemented,
there was an attitude both in and out of the Navy, that the
General Board was an attempt by some people in the Navy to
fix a system that wasn't even broken. Many critics of the
General Board pointed to the successes of the Navy in the
Spanish-American War and said that those victories vindi-
cated the existing planning system. Proponents of the Board
argued that it was Spanish incompetence that led to the
United States' victory. In the presence of a formidable
foe, the weakness of the Americans' plans would have rapidly
become apparent and led to disastrous defeat.
Some real constraints came directly from the office of
the Secretary of the Navy. A strong Secretary was required
to counter the resistance of the Bureau Chiefs in order for
the General Board to be effective. Unfortunately, the
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position of the Secretary of the Navy was, at the time,
viewed either as a political pay-off or as a stepping stone
to a more important position. As a result, between the
years 1902 and 1909, there were seven different Secretaries
of the Navy. 11 Also, many of the Secretaries were unwilling
to resist the Bureau Chiefs even when they supported the
Board's ideas. They often believed that maintaining the
harmony within the Navy was more important than defending
the Board's position.
The original strategy used in the formation of the
General Board involved first establishing the Board, and
then once in existence and functioning well, to make it a
permanent structure through legislation. Ironically, this
strategy of establish first and legislate later not only led
to the formation of the Board, but also led to its demise as
the central planning body for the Navy.
Without the formal backing and legitimacy that congres-
sional legislation of the Board brought with it, the board
was doomed to failure. Despite the fact that the Congress
had approved the formation of a similar body for the Army,
it was reluctant to do the same for the Navy. This was
blamed, in large part, on poor salesmanship of the General
Board by the Navy. Since there was no law supporting the
General Board, when the first real crisis arose (World War
I) , support for the Board evaporated and planning responsi-
bilities reverted back to the Bureau Chiefs.
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One of the reasons support so rapidly vanished for the
Board is the methods used by its supporters to gain a legis-
lative sanction. Board supporters were accused of resorting
to "muckraking and chicanery" in order to gain the backing
they needed. These tactics backfired and instead of support
they only fostered ill-will toward the formalizing of the
General Board.
One of the failures of the Board itself centered around
logistic support. It was easy for those opposed to the
Board to use the Board's own plans against it since they
were not well thought out where logistics was concerned.
Not that there were necessarily any better plans around at
the time but the Board just shot itself in the foot with its
oversight on logistics. Additionally, the General Board
never established any workable system for the implementation
of the plans it formulated and thus the Board's plans
rapidly deteriorated into little more than an intellectual
exercise rather than effective war plans. As a result,
operational commanders rarely took the plans formulated by
the General Board as seriously as the planners did.
Support was eroded even further by over-optimistic
support. This came in two forms. First was the idea that
the General Board was a type of cure-all that could solve
all the Navy's problems. Second was the support from those
who saw the General Board as a stepping stone to a fully
formed General Staff system for the United States. Neither
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of these two factions endeared the idea of a General Board
to the Congress or other civilian leaders.
With the onset of the crisis in Europe in the 1910's,
serious war planning reverted back to the Bureau Chiefs and
the General Board concept was never given a chance to prove
its worth. Though the General Board continued to exist into
the 194 O's, any power or influence as a planning organiza-
tion was gone by the end of the first World War.
The overall goal of the General Board was to prepare the
Navy for the next war. In order to accomplish this it
sought to centralize Navy planning into a single body, with
people, tools and time to formulate well thought out and
executable war plans. This noble cause rapidly degenerated
into a bureaucratic power struggle over who was to do the
planning for the Navy. The onset of a crisis brought a
premature end to that struggle as the nation opted to stay
with the old system when danger arose, rather than put its
faith into an unknown and unproved system. With victory
came vindication for the old Bureau system and the General
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UNITED STATES INTER-WAR PLANNING—FROM ORANGE TO RAINBOW
LCDR Jan G. Rivenburg
This case study is of United States war planning between
World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII)
,
primarily from a
naval, Pacific perspective. This study should start with an
understanding of the environment surrounding the plan. In
short, post-WWI, the U.S. saw a changed world, especially in
the Pacific. Japan had been granted a United Nations Man-
date over the former German island chains, the Marshalls,
Carolines and Marianas. This decision made a recent
acquisition of the U.S., the Philippines, extremely diffi-
cult to protect, as the islands were astride the U.S. Sea
Lines of Communications (SLOCs) . The Japanese acquisition
also complicated the support of the "Open Door" policy of
China. Japan herself had already begun to flex her newly
developed national power, as evidenced by her victories in
the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars.
The Atlantic arena appeared more stable, although the
possibility of a British conflict was not discounted, she
being one of the few remaining strong European powers. This
theme resided with those who supported the Mahanian concept
that a nation's strength resided in cultivating overseas
markets. Finally, a basic fact the planners had to contend
with was how would the U.S. support the Monroe Doctrine.
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Briefly, this was the world that military war planners
faced—the Pacific was the most volatile. As early as 1907,
President Roosevelt requested advice on what should be done
to protect U.S. Far East interests. 1 By 1924, the first war
plan, against Japan (named "Orange") was officially
accepted. Other contingency plans were also developed
("Red"—Great Britain, "Black"—Germany, and "Green"—
Mexico) . The Orange plan was revised officially at least
five times by 1938, notwithstanding continual review within
the War and Navy Departments.
By the late 193 0s, the international arena had changed
significantly (in the Atlantic). In 1939, war plans were
designed (the "Rainbow" Plans) in five combinations that
differed by enemies, allies, and defense spheres. The
Rainbow Plan soon to be operative, Rainbow 5, envisioned the
U.S. assisting France and Great Britain, and fighting in
Europe, Africa or both.
All the Rainbow Plans envisioned some type of hemis-
phere defense and envisioned fighting more than one enemy.
During the years of planning, many scenarios were envi-
sioned, including those of enemy surprise air attacks. Some
plans attempted to fight a "two front" war with limited
resources. These exercises forced war planners to make some
joint decisions between the Navy and the War Department.
1Louis Morton, Strategy and Command; The First Two
Years . United States Army in World War II Series, The War in
the Pacific (Washington, D.C., 1962), p. 23.
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Overall, the war planning effort was successful—the U.S.
did defeat first Germany, and then Japan, her primary enemy
in the Pacific. These Rainbow/Orange war plans tried to
delineate how, what, where and when to fight. These plans
were not necessarily designed on how to deter a war.
The war planning process started in 1903, with the
formation of the Joint Army Navy Board, composed of four
individually appointed members from each service. This
first group, advisory only, was established by the Secre-
taries of War and Navy to enhance service cooperation.
Little was accomplished until a second subgroup was formed
in 1919, the Joint Planning Committee. Its members were
generally from each service's war plans divisions. The
joint committee could undertake study independently, without
direction from the service secretaries. 2
The committee was to present its conclusions to the
board. It would then present the plans to the service
secretaries for approval. Presidential approval might or
might not occur. Each service could initiate action itself.
In December 1921, the Army planners submitted a "Prelim-
inary Estimate of the Situation" to the Planning Committee.
This action spurred a Navy input by July 1922. By 1923, a
joint plan was recommended by the Senior Joint Board member
2Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun (New York:




to the Secretary of War and Navy, who gave their approval to
the first War Plan Orange in September 1924. 3
At times, those "in the field" (i.e., the Philippines)
prompted plan reviews. This occurred in 1934 (after the
Tydings-McDuf f ie Act) . Both the Army and Navy were dismayed
at the contradiction between national policy and military
feasibility. They knew the Philippines could not survive a
Japanese attack. 4 Just the opposite of this process was the
"top-down" approach. An example of this was the direction
in 1928 of the Joint Board, to the committee, to prepare a
plan that was based on the concept of a "strategic offen-
sive." 5 A top-down approach later in November 1938 set in
motion the memo presented in April 1939 that became the
basis of the five new color Rainbow plans.
The planning process also had to adapt if international
changes prompted the Secretaries of the War and Navy to call
for reviews of the plans. Simultaneous with one such
request in 1935, the Joint Board requested a State Depart-
ment representative. Here, the diplomatic, civilian
3Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years , p.
30.
4Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years ,
p. 37.
5Memo, JB for JPC, 26 Jan, sub: Joint Army-Navy Basic
War Plan ORANGE, JB 325, ser. 280 cited by Morton, p. 34.
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personnel were seen as required in the planning process in
view of the seriousness of the potential Pacific enemy. 6
As the international situation in the late 1930s became
even more ominous in 1939, President Roosevelt changed the
reporting relationship of the Joint Board. 7 It now reported
directly to him, although still via the respective secretar-
ies. Also, although not formally in the planning process,
similar war planning talks occurred at informal "War
Council" meetings, composed of the President, his military
advisors, the Secretary of State, War and Navy and the
service Chiefs. 8
Later, the planning process became intertwined with the
concerns of the U.S. allies. The Washington Staff Confer-
ences, begun in 1941, which produced ABC series plans that
committed U.S. forces, had to be considered.
Finally, the Navy "gamed" these plans at the Naval War
College. In fact, as stated by Admiral Nimitz, "the courses
were so thorough that nothing that happened in the Pacific
War was strange or unexpected." 9 This type of statement is
6Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years , p.
37.
7Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years , p.
72.
8Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years , p.
84.
9Grace P. Hayes, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War
Against Japan" (History division JCS, MS copy in National
ARchives)
, pp. 4-5 as quoted by Spector, Eagle Against the
Sun , p. 57.
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gratifying, yet should circumstances have been different,
the wrong games might have been played. This gaming was not
a formalized process of the strategic planning, but it
probably influenced many of those personnel capable of
making force planning and tactical operational planning
decisions in the late 193 0s. This same informal system
exists today, with leading personnel involved in the gaming
system.
The single, overriding assumption of Rainbow Plan 5 was
the concept of defeating Germany first. This led directly
to the second key assumption, which had been recognized and
warned about from the beginning—the Philippines would be
lost. The Army would attempt to hold out, but the main
warfighting would be a later naval offensive. The develop-
ment of the "loss of the Philippines" was present in the
initial Orange Plans; by 1936, the loss was clear. The
first Orange plan in 1924 had aimed to "hold Manila Bay as a
base for the navy until superior American seapower
arrived." 10 By 1936, this assertion had lessened to only
holding the entrances to Manila Bay. The Army did not even
plan for reinforcements.
Constraints on the overall war planning process may be
viewed from different perspectives. From the "nuts and
bolts" level, the planners had to decide who would be the
10Joint Army-Navy Basic War Plan Orange, March 12,
1924, Record Group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C.,
as cited by Spector, Eagle Against the Sun , p. 56.
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enemies and/or allies of the U.S. Germany's signing of a
Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union in 1939 , and then
later Japan's signature to the Non-Aggression Pact with the
Soviet Union in 1941, all began to clarify further the sides
of a future war.
"Absolute" military constraints existed in regards to
"hardware." What will the U.S. fight with? Both the
Washington Naval Treaty (1922) and the London Naval Treaty
(1930) limited capital ship tonnage. As important to ton-
nage was the agreement in the Four-Power Naval Agreement of
the 1922 treaty, which in effect prohibited the U.S. from
fortifying any islands west of Hawaii. The Navy war
planners had felt a 2:1 tonnage ratio was required to sup-
port the U.S. Far East policy, and further had assumed the
availability of advanced bases. 11
Geographical constraints were basic. The defense of the
Philippines either rested on a 7,000 mile voyage from the
West Coast, or a 5,000 mile voyage from Hawaii, the major
Pacific base. Finally, when considering military con-
straints on the planning system, a "roles and missions"
controversy was evident between the Army and the Navy.
Political constraints occurred at the highest level.
President Roosevelt declined to consider the request of the
Joint Army-Navy Planning Committee to allow Under Secretary
1:LCharles H. Melhorn, Two-Block Fox (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1974), p. 85.
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of State Sumner Welles participate in the Washington Staff
Conference—the conference was for the technical, military
planning personnel. 12 In June 1941, upon conclusion of the
ABC-1 Agreement produced by the conference, upon which a new
Rainbow 5 was developed, President Roosevelt signed neither.
This diplomatically signalled that the plans would only
become effective upon the initiation of war. Both were
approved by the Joint Planning Committee, the Joint Board
and the Secretaries of the Navy and War Departments. 13
Other high level political actions affected the content
of the war plans, and hence, the war planners. Due to
sensitive, secret diplomatic measures being conducted
(meetings in New York and in Washington, D.C., 1941) with
Japan, State Department officials would not allow fleet
posturing (to hinder any possible successful negotiations)
.
Yet military planners felt that for effective war plans, or
for any effective execution of the plans, the fleet had to
be prepositioned.
Lastly, in the civilian, political arena, Congressional
constraints, not only on budgetary matters, affected the
12Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming
of the War between the United States and Japan (Princeton:
University Press, 1950), p. 165, note 2, as cited by Robert
J. Quinlan, "The United States Fleet: Diplomacy, Strategy
and the Allocation of Ships (1940-1941)" in American Civil-
Military Decisions , ed. Harold Stein (Birmingham: University
of Alabama Press, 1963), p. 163.
13 Quinlan, "The United States Fleet: Diplomacy,
Strategy and the Allocation of Ships (1940-1941)," p. 168.
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process. The 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act, which granted
Philippines independence by 1946, created uncertainty as to
force availability and desired levels of military involve-
ment in the mid-1930s.
Personalities also affected the planning process. One
example was an early attempt for more realism by the
planners in 1922-23 concerning the fate of the Philippines.
However, General Leonard Wood, former Army Chief of Staff
and an influential personage with the Harding Administra-
tion, personally wrote the Secretary of War in 1923. The
essence of his thoughts were that one could not plan for the
loss of the Philippines—this was inexplicable for America's
prestige. Thus public opinion, which guided the nation's
political leaders, was a factor that the military war
planners could not control, but had to account for.
As a point to consider in the final analysis, the Orange
plan itself evolved over at least 25 years. It was revised
at least five, possibly eight times by 1939. 14 With this
passage of time, and the simultaneous resulting numbers of
revisions, the plan gained flexibility. Time itself
fostered this, for the planners had to respond to different
military and political constraints, different force struc-
tures, and even had to attempt to factor in new weapon
14USDN, Basic War Plan Orange (WP-13, WP-14) , Secret,
March 1939 cited by Melhorn, Two-Block Fox , p. 103.
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systems. By the time the first Rainbow plans were devised,
much background planning had occurred.
The planning process did not, in itself, resolve primary
differences of perceptions of war goals between the Army and
the Navy. By the 1930s, this could not be avoided—the
classic "roles and missions" controversy developed. Should
the Army's primary mission be to defend the continental
U.S.? If yes, then a defensive position was required in the
Pacific (using the triangle formed by Alaska, Oahu and
Panama) , and the Navy should simply defend the SLOCs. The
Navy planners thought went to their basic beliefs of
warfighting strategy—one must fight the enemy. Should that
be Japan, then an offensive, attacking strategy should be
utilized.
These basic decisions were not resolved, apparent in
both the 1937 and 1938 plans. 15 In 1937, a compromise plan
from the committee was finally submitted to the joint board.
In 1938, the joint board had to force even a compromise out
of the committee by appointing two personalities, General
Embick and Rear Admiral Richardson, to get the plan approved
out of the committee. The result was, predictably, a vague
plan. However, even these vague compromise plans had made
progress in terms of the general idea of, for instance,
15Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years ,
p. 38.
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eventually advancing westward to regain the Philippines.
Exact time schedules were not formulated, but concepts were.
Much is written on the civilian versus military con-
flicts in the war planning. The civilians appeared to be
spreading the responsibilities of the U.S. military forces
too thinly. Although the basic Rainbow plans had been
decided, decisions made in 1940-41 could and would greatly
affect their implementation. Questions on defending Hawaii,
the Philippines, supporting the British in Singapore and in
the Atlantic and the methods and manners in which the U.S.
assisted in Atlantic naval patrols all affected the disposi-
tion of the fleet. The dilemma was where will one's forces
have the greatest impact, without jeopardizing one's
interests in other areas, as well as other future commit-
ments. Thus, criticisms that the U.S. and military postures
were at odds are correct, yet the situation of the U.S.
recovering from the Depression in the 1930s, and certainly
the earlier isolationist sentiment of the 1920s, cannot be
divorced from the realistic war planning. Although writing
war plans involved primarily a military viewpoint, some
realistic constraints were surrounding these efforts.
Another example of a military-civilian conflict occurred
after Japan abrogated the Washington Naval Treaty in 1934.
The military war planners desired fortification of the U.S.
possessions. However, politically, the civilian political
leadership felt this was undesirable. The need to fortify
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Guam in the late 1930s was ignored as the Congress, "after a
heated debate, rejected the board's recommendations for fear
of offending Japan." 16 The planners were then forced to
continue their war plans assuming non-defensible islands.
Of interest, the military war planners did need
"civilian guidance." Without this key element, the war
plans could have been politically and strategically
insignificant
.
By April, 1940 the planners had gone about as far as they
could without having an explicitly approved basis for
assuming what the European colonial powers would do.
This, although not prerequisite to planning for joint
action by the U.S. and British Navies—already well
advanced on the basis of the President implicit approval
—
was a sine qua non even of a hypothetical exploration of
the politically explosive question of sending U.S. Army
forces to defend European colonial possessions in the Far
East. 17
In other words, the planners needed to ensure that they had
the "big" picture right.
As it became clearer that the war would involve a coali-
tion, this prompted the secret joint American-British
meetings in early 1941. Various revisions to all the
Rainbow plans had occurred throughout 1939-1940. In October
1940, the CNO and his staff reviewed options. Their result
was a memo named "plan Dog," which although it did not have
16Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years ,
p. 43.
17Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic
Planning For Coalition Warfare 1941-1942 . United States Army





presidential approval, it had implicit approval. With this
memo, and further meetings prior to conversations with the
British, successful allied meetings were held. The main
objectives of American national policy were decided upon.
The "United States should stand on the defensive in the
Pacific with the fleet based on Hawaii... the President laid
down a policy to govern the United States in case of war
—
the maintenance of material aid to Great Britain." 18 The
military planners could now clearly design the plans that
"fought Europe first."
Of interest also is the assumption in all the plans,
reasonably clear by the late 1920s, that the U.S. might have
to fight its way back to the Philippines. This may have
contributed to the development of the importance of the
aircraft carrier. Melhorn states that,
...having decided that the only feasible route to the
Philippines lay through the Marshalls and the Carolinas,
and acting on the assumption that passage through these
archipelagos would be contested, they had no choice but to
equip the fleet so that it would be able to force passage
...air superiority was essential. . .and air superiority
meant carriers. 19
Aircraft carriers, for all intensive purposes, had not been
limited by the Washington Naval Conference.
Key elements of the inter-war war planning effort are
developed by analyst Edward S. Miller. He writes that by
18Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning For Coalition
Warfare 1941-1942 . p. 29.
19Melhorn, Two-Block Fox , p. 106.
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1914, "the Navy had worked out the basics of a grand
strategy to defeat Japan." Three phases of the war would
occur: 1) Japan would strike by surprise, 2) the U.S. would
mobilize by transferring units from the Atlantic fleet, and
3) an amphibious advance would presage blockade and bombard-
ment. To Miller, from 1914-41, the Navy simply conducted
"campaign" planning. 20 Miller divides the war planners into
the "thrusters" and the "cautionaries. " Simply put, the
thrusters generally wanted to advance as quickly as possible
across the Pacific, and the cautionaries desired slower,
more defensive approaches. He states the cautionaries came
to dominate the planning. However, the three phases of the
war had been finalized.
Miller states that after the assumption was accepted by
all to fight Germany first, that the Pacific campaign
planning was relegated to the fleet commander. Thus, the
final prewar plan was developed by Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel. The advantage to this was that he could now do the
details. Once the national priority had been finalized, the
military, both army and navy, could get on with the job.
Miller states that the Orange route (that of Phase II) to
begin "leap-frogging" towards the Philippines, simply waited
two years into the war.
20Edward S. Miller, Lessons of War Plan Orange for




Miller states several observations that he viewed as
essential to the plan's success. 21 They include the follow-
ing: 1) the clear articulation of the goal of the war and
the strategy to do so, 2) a statement of the correct strate-
gic principles, 3) the structuring of the war into phases,
4) recognition of the decisive theater of war (near the
Japanese homeland) , 5) service-wide commitment to the
strategy, and 6) that good naval war plans occurred as of a
result of uniformed professionals, not a joint or civilian
body. Miller's view is that the Navy actually did most of
the planning, and that the army was only supplementary.
Although much of the island-hopping obviously involved a
projected sea force, whether or not the Pacific could really
have been won by the Navy alone, is not clear. Joint
planning efforts, although at times controversial, had
eventually put the Pacific war into an overall framework.
This included ensuring the non-viability of the continental
U.S. shores, which by the Army planners overall cautionary
approach, made this happen.
One naval analyst, Commander Michael A. Shelton, states
a key factor in correct war planning is to correctly assess
the enemy's warfighting capability. The fact that Japan had
a strong, battle-tested, long-legged navy (with air power)
,
combined with the importance that the Japanese Army placed
21Miller, Lessons of War Plan Orange for Maritime
Strategists , pp. 21-22.
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on the Navy for logistical support (adding to its value)
,
made it a threatening force. Thus to defeat Japan, one had
to attack her primary weakness, her dependence on oil.
Simply build enough weapons and platforms, and mobilize
enough manpower to last longer. 22 To him, the major weak-
ness with the war plans was that the U.S. did not have
enough assets initially, and also did not start with the
proper appreciation of a new weapon, the airplane. But,
overall, a more basic decision to fight the Japanese in the
Philippines (as occurred at Leyte Gulf) , in a decisive
battle, was key to the plan's overall success.
Thus, were these war plans, first "Orange," and then the
"Rainbow" series, effective? The almost 20 year development
of the different plans by the Army and Navy War Departments
was certainly not always smooth. Decisions were often not
even made; only weak compromises. But, when war did "break
out," the ideas and thoughts of how and when to fight at
least had been envisioned by some personnel, both military
and civilian. The basic Rainbow 5 had foreseen some of the
essential warfighting requirements. Some fleet preposition-
ing had been accomplished. Although tactical changes would
occur throughout the war, the efforts of the interwar
planners did advance some of the basic goals and problems
that the war would bring to the U.S.
22CDR Michael P. Shelton, "Plan Orange Revisited," Pro-
ceedings 110 (December 1984), pp. 52-55.
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THE B-36/USS UNITED STATES CONTROVERSY
Arthur D. Holmes
I. BACKGROUND
The B-3 6/USS United States controversy arose in the late
1940' s as the focal point of a larger debate on the future
of U.S. military strategy. Both the Navy and the Air Force
had calculated the forces they would need to prosecute a
future war against the Soviet Union. This case is an inter-
esting study for strategic planners not in how each service
arrived at its own calculations of force structure but
rather in how it established the framework for the United
States to arrive at a national consensus on national
strategy questions up to the present. Many of the ways this
debate was carried on in Washington and in the press can be
seen as the prototype of how the largest issues of strategic
planning have been decided in the United States ever since.
In the years immediately after the end of the Second
World War the United States faced a critical period in which
a new national security strategy and the bureaucratic struc-
ture is to implement it had to be created in addition to the
physical destruction that Europe was left in, the United
States found its interests were rapidly diverging from those
of the Soviet Union, a former ally. Although there had been
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a hope in the United States that the wartime alliance with
the Soviets might have established a basis for mutual trust,
it soon became apparent that the Soviet Union, under
Stalin's leadership, was making a concerted effort to
politically and military dominate as much of Europe as
possible. Faced with a heightened appearance of hostility
from the Soviets, a prostrate Europe that was in no condi-
tion to defend itself, and a war weary populace that had
little understanding of the Soviet threat, the country's
political and military leaders struggled with the problem of
how to economically fashion a strategy that would keep the
Soviets at bay while Europe was rebuilt.
Within this historical context of searching for a new
strategy the U.S. Navy found itself ill-prepared to "sell"
its contribution to the new strategic thinking. In the
years immediately after the war the Navy found itself under
siege bureaucratically, fiscally, and strategically. The
National Security Act of 1947, which the Navy had lobbied
and testified before Congress against, had created the Air
Force as a separate service and reduced the Navy from being
a separate cabinet level department to being on egual status
with the Army and Air Force under a new layer of bureaucracy
in the Defense Department. Fiscally, the Navy felt
frustrated because President Truman was keeping a tight
spending ceiling on the Defense Department budget during the
immediate postwar years. With the defense budget limited by
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the President, the three armed services were set against
each other in an annual budget battle. The Navy faced an
uphill fight in these budget battles because Congress, the
public, and the defense academic community were all
enthralled with the role which atomic bombs would play in
any future war. The importance of atomic bombing in future
wars had so enthralled every faction in the post-war defense
debate that the Navy leadership found little interest on the
part of Congress or the civilian leadership of the Truman
Administration to take the Navy's role in any future
conflict seriously.
When the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, preemptor-
ily cancelled the Navy's proposed large deck carrier, the
USS United States, in the spring of 1949, the Navy military
leadership set about to find a forum in which to set out
their concerns about the future U.S. military force struc-
ture. The forum the Navy received to state its case was a
two part series of hearings before the House Armed Services
Committee during August and December of 1949. The hearings
were ostensibly called to investigate charges leveled
against the Air Force's B-36 bomber procurement program but
were ultimately broadened to a debate on what the national
military strategy should be and whether or not the
unification of the armed forces in the Department of Defense
was effectively serving the national interest. Although
these hearings did not result in any concrete action (other
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than getting the CNO fired) , they at least gave the Navy an
opportunity to state its concerns about the direction in
which national military strategy seemed to be heading.
Ultimately the framework of atomic age military strategy and
the continuing importance of conventional military force
(including the Navy) was made clear not by bureaucratic
infighting in Washington but by the outbreak of the Korean
War in June of 1950.
II. THE SYSTEM
The bureaucratic system for planning and managing
national security guestions in 1949 was roughly analogous to
the system as it exists today in the Executive Branch. The
National Security Act of 1947 had created the Department of
Defense (known between 1947 and 1949 as the National Mili-
tary Establishment) , the National Security Council (NSC)
,
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) , and the Air Force.
The Army, Navy, and Air Force were each headed by a civilian
Secretary who was subordinate to the Secretary of Defense.
While the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Systems
(PPBS) did not come into existence until the 1960's, the
three services submitted their annual budgets to the Secre-
tary of Defense who in turn submitted them to the President
for presentation to Congress. The whole Executive Branch
budget was coordinated for the President by the Bureau of
the Budget which was headed by a Director.
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The reorganization of the military establishment in 1947
caused Congress to reorganize its committees which were
charged with overseeing military matters. The two houses of
Congress each created an Armed Services Committee which,
together with the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees, were the principle Congressional oversight
bodies concerned with the Department of Defense.
Within the uniformed military services the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) were charged with being the principal mili-
tary advisers to the President. The Commandant of Marines
was not yet a member of the JCS and the position of Chairman
of the JCS was not formally created until the National
Security Act of 1947 was amended in 1949. For questions of
strategy the JCS was advised by the Joint Strategic Survey
Committee.
In addition to the formal bureaucratic structure for
managing national security issues, the "system" for deciding
these issues also contained informal and unstructured
methods of influencing the decision question. Anyone
familiar with how issues are decided today in Washington
would find the use of publicity, information leaks, and the
involvement of defense contractors in assisting different
factions in the debate, which were elements of the B-36/USS
United States controversy in 1949, to be very familiar.
In the late 1940' s nationally distributed magazines
played a much more important role in influencing public
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opinion than they do today. It is not surprising then to
understand that the Air Force and Navy partisans who wished
to sway public opinion to their position took to the pages
of the Reader's Digest and the Saturday Evening Post to make
their case directly to the public. The role of press leaks
and how defense contractors became involved will be
explained when the sequence of events leading to the House
Armed Services Committee is covered.
Just as the formal and informal structure and methods of
planning strategy in the late 1940' s would seem familiar to
a Washington insider today, the use of the budgetary process
as a battleground for alternative strategies wold also be
familiar. With President Truman adamant that the defense
budget be maintained within established limits, the deci-
sions as to which weapons systems would be procured with the
limited funds available were clearly where the nation's
military strategy was also being decided. If the President
was adamant that the overall defense budget could not be
raised and if the enthusiasm for atomic bombing was giving
the Air Force B-3 6 budgetary priority over the Navy's
programs, then it was clear to the uniformed Navy leaders
that they would have to convince Congress that the B-36 and
atomic bombing were not going to have a decisive effect on
winning future wars.
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III. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS
The bottom line of the B-36/USS United States debate was
the question of how important strategic atomic bombing was
going to be in any war in which the United States became
involved. One of the reasons that feelings ran so high on
both sides of this debate was because the uncertainty about
how the advent of nuclear weapons was going to change the
nature of war left both sides in the debate unconstrained in
making a wide variety of assumptions about the implications
of nuclear weapons.
Those people who favored building the B-36 assumed that
the advent of nuclear weapons would decisively change the
nature of war. Perhaps because of the dramatic suddenness
with which the atomic bombing of Japan had brought that
nation to surrender, it was assumed that no nation subjected
to strategic bombing of its industrial base with nuclear
weapons could continue to wage war. By 1948 it had become
clear that the Soviet Union was the new major adversary of
the United States. In planning for a war with the Soviet
Union strategic bombing advocates assumed that the United
States would feel no compunction to immediately commence an
all-out strategic nuclear attack on the Soviet Union upon
the outbreak of hostilities. In making this assumption
these planners were relying on the underlying assumption
that the United States would continue to enjoy a monopoly on
nuclear weapons for as long as perhaps 20 years. This
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assumption was shattered in September 1949 when atmospheric
measurements revealed that the Soviets had exploded their
first atomic bomb. In the rush to see the atomic bomb as
the ultimate weapon and the ultimate guarantor of peace
those persons who favored the reliance on nuclear weapons
also assumed that the only thing preventing the Soviets from
overrunning Europe was the deterrent of nuclear retaliation
from the United States.
In opposing a predominant reliance on the ability of
nuclear weapons to keep the peace or restore peace if war
broke out, the senior officers of the United States Navy
looked to the future with a completely different set of
assumptions. Their assumptions were colored by the fact
that they had to almost all experienced the Second World War
as commanders in the Pacific Theater and had seen a war in
which overwhelming naval power had been the key to victory.
In their view the Japanese had already been brought to their
knees through the efficacy of naval blockade and assault and
the atomic weapons used on Japan had only given the Japanese
an honorable excuse to surrender. It was clear that atomic
weapons would be an important new weapon in the arsenal but
they saw no reason to believe that these weapons would be so
decisive as to obviate the need for a strong Navy with a
well-developed power projection capability. These naval
leaders assumed that the Navy would continue to play an
important role in the security of the United States in
120
accordance with the theories of seapower espoused by Alfred
T. Mahan. To them the procurement of a flush deck carrier
was a natural evolution of capital ship design. The naval
lessons learned during the war conclusively pointed to the
need for larger carriers capable of carrying larger and more
powerful aircraft. Accordingly, these same leaders saw the
national infatuation with strategic bombing as the ultimate
guarantor of Pax Americana as a dangerous illusion. The
force procurement decisions that were being made to the
detriment of their perceived needs in naval force structure
were fundamentally risking to undermine the Navy's ability
to carry out its critical role in protecting the national
security.
One of the most fundamental aspects of American national
security management is the unquestioning willingness of all
participants to resolve differences within the context of a
mutually agreed-upon set of constraints. Although the
subordination of the military to civilian control is usually
taken for granted in the United States, it should be
remembered that unquestioning allegiance to the principles
of rule of law and government on the authority of the
Constitution is an exception rather than the rule in the
history of nations. It is a testament to the strong convic-
tions held by the uniformed leaders of the Navy that the
national leadership was making a fundamentally incorrect
decision on how to provide for the nation's security that
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they were willing to engage in bureaucratic maneuvering to
get around the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of
Defense in order to get their concerns expressed to the
Congress. In appealing to Congress, these leaders demon-
strated another fundamental constraint on U.S. strategic
planning—the need to muster and sustain popular support for
the strategies chosen. Another constraint which was imposed
by President Truman and tended to intensify the stakes in
this controversy was the requirement to live within the
confines of what the government could afford to pay for. In
the years since this debate took place the executive and
legislative branches have learned the fine art of choosing
not to choose in making procurement decisions that have
strategic implications. Instead of making choices, it has
become standard to fund all programs, perhaps not at levels
that are strategically or economically logical, but well
enough to keep everyone's rice bowl at least half filled and
avoid political risk.
IV. ANALYSIS
In order to understand how this debate established the
framework for all subsequent debates on national strategy in
the United States it is necessary to give an abbreviated
chronology of how those officers in the Navy that were
concerned about the direction the national strategy was
going got their views expressed before Congress without the
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support of the civilian leadership to which they were
subordinate.
In May of 1949, a couple of months after Secretary
Johnson had cancelled the procurement of the USS United
States, Cedric Worth, a Special Assistant to Deputy
Secretary of the Navy Dan Kimball, began gathering materials
concerning rumors that were brought to his attention about
the Air Force's B-36 program with the help of some of the
naval officers serving in the Pentagon. Worth apparently
also received assistance in this effort from Glenn Martin, a
Baltimore aircraft contractor whose own Air Force tactical
aircraft contracts had suffered as a result of a shift of
Air Force funding to the B-36 bomber which was manufactured
by Consolidated Vultee. The materials that Worth had
gathered about the B-36 eventually were brought to the
attention of several Congressmen including Representative
James Van Zandt, a Republican member of the House Armed
Services Committee. The documents charged that the Air
Force had exaggerated the capabilities of the B-36 and
leveled and that the fact that the B-3 6 was incapable of
performing its strategic bombing mission was being covered
up by the Air Force because the Secretary of the Air Force
and the Secretary of Defense owned stock in the Consolidated
Vultee company.
When Congressman Van Zandt was unable to convince Carl
Vinson, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee,
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to open hearings on the charges against the B-36, he tried
to convince House Speaker Sam Rayburn to appoint an indepen-
dent committee to investigate the charges. Congressman
Vinson, a supporter of the B-36, realized that he would be
unable to prevent hearings on the B-36 and that it would be
better if his own committee conducted the hearings. In
early June of 1949 the House Armed Services Committee
reached agreement to conduct hearings on the charges brought
against the B-3 6. However, in defining the scope of their
hearings the Committee approved an agenda that considerably
broadened the objectives of the hearings. In addition to
establishing the veracity of the charges about the B-36
program and seeking to find out the source of the charges,
the committee decided to investigate: a) the roles and
missions of the Air Force and Navy, b) whether or not the
decision to cancel the USS United States was sound, c)
whether or not the Air Force was concentrating too much on
the strategic bombing mission to the detriment of its
tactical support mission, d) the procedures used by the JCS
in making weapons procurement recommendations, e) the effec-
tiveness of strategic bombing and whether it was a sound
strategy for the nation to follow, and finally f) any other
matters developed in the investigation which were considered
pertinent. With such a broad charter the stage was set for
the Navy to present its case.
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The scope of the hearings was decided in early June and
the hearings were scheduled to open in early August of 1949.
In the ensuing two months the Air Force and Navy made
preparations to present testimony to the committee. The Air
Force made careful preparations for the hearings. W. Barton
Leach, a Harvard law professor and Colonel in the Air Force
Reserve, was appointed the "Coordinator-Director" of the Air
Force's preparation for the hearings. Mr. Leach and his
staff examined the charges which were being investigated and
prepared a comprehensive response to all of them. When
Joseph Keenan and James Gillin, who had been appointed as
the senior investigators for the Armed Services Committee,
came to the Pentagon to establish an office to work out of,
the Air Force gave them an office right across the hall from
Mr. Leach and his staff. Mr. Leach worked in close coopera-
tion with the congressional investigators and by the time
the hearings were convened in early August, had convinced
them that all of the charges against the B-36 program or the
process by which its procurement had been decided, were
groundless. The Air Force carefully tended to their public
image by using the months before the election to play down
their differences with the Navy.
In the Navy the preparations for the hearings fell to
Capt. Arleigh Burke who was the head of OP-23, the Organiza-
tional Policy and Research Division of the CNO's staff. The
OP-23 staff had other responsibilities in addition to their
125
role in preparing for the hearings. Because the concerns of
professional naval officers about the subjects to be covered
in the hearings were not shared by the Secretary of the Navy
and because the CNO, Admiral Denfield, was perceived by
other naval officers as supporting the Secretary against the
interests of the Navy, Arleigh Burke and his staff were
given little encouragement in making preparations for the
hearings. As a consequence, it is not surprising that the
Navy's preparation for the hearings was less than the Air
Force's preparations.
When the hearings opened in August of 1949 the Air
Force's careful preparation paid off. The committee was
impressed with the Air Force defense of the B-36 and the
procurement process and found no reason to pursue the
charges made against the B-3 6 further. The committee post-
poned further hearings on the questions about unification of
the armed services and what strategy the country should
adopt until October.
At the conclusion of the first part of the hearings in
August, Cedric Worth had disclosed to the committee that his
office had been responsible for gathering the material on
which the charges the committee was investigating were
based. When the Air Force was successful in refuting the
specific charges against the B-3 6 in the first part of the
hearings, the Navy opened its own investigation into Worth's
preparations of the materials that had led to the hearings.
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This investigation, which took the form of a court of
inquiry headed by Adm. Thomas Kinkaid, eventually concluded
that Worth had acted on his own in preparing the documents
against the B-36 and providing them to members of Congress.
One of the naval officers that Adm. Kinkaid's court of
inquiry had scheduled to testify was Capt. John Crommelin.
Capt. Crommelin, a naval aviator with a distinguished war
record, was working on the staff of the JCS at this time.
In preparation for his testimony before the Kinkaid court of
inquiry, Capt. Crommelin had prepared a statement which
denounced the unification of the armed services as a
mistake. When the court of inquiry was recessed before he
got a chance to testify, Capt. Crommelin felt so strongly
that his views should be heard that he called a press
conference and read his prepared statement to the press.
The Secretary of the Navy, John Matthews, was extremely
upset that a Navy Captain would issue statements to the
press outside of official channels. But because a large
number of other officers in the Navy felt that Capt.
Crommelin was right and considered him something of a hero
for expressing their views in public, Secretary Matthews
found himself politically unable to take any punitive action
against Capt. Crommelin. In an attempt to prevent further
public airing of Navy grievances in the press without
authorization, Secretary Matthews issued a directive to all
Navy officers that their expressions of concern about policy
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matters would be more appropriate and effective if they were
made through official channels.
At about the same time that the events above were
unfolding in Washington, Deputy Secretary of the Navy
Kimball, addressing a conference of Pacific Fleet officers
in Monterey, California, encouraged his audience to express
their concerns through official channels about recent deci-
sions by the Secretary of Defense to make further cuts in
the defense budget which would have a major impact on the
Navy. Vice Admiral Gerald Bogan, Commander of the First
Task Force of the Pacific Fleet, decided to take Secretary
Kimball's advise and express the concerns that he knew were
shared by many of his fellow officers. Vice Admiral Bogan
wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Navy via the
Commander of the Pacific Fleet and the CNO. In his letter
Admiral Bogan expressed support for the views which Captain
Crommelin had expressed in public and noted that the Secre-
tary was trying to keep similar views against unification,
held by many naval officers, within official channels in the
belief that they were mistaken and should not publicly ques-
tion a policy which had already become law. Admiral Bogan
went on to state that he believed that morale within the
Navy was at its lowest point since he had been commissioned
and that the perceived preference for strategic bombing to
the exclusion of building the forces necessary for the
requirements of the Navy was leading many junior officers to
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question whether there was even any future in making the
Navy a career.
Admiral Arthur Radford, the Commander of the Pacific
Fleet, and the CNO both gave Admiral Bogan's letter a
neutral endorsement before sending it on, noting only that
Admiral Bogan was a respected officer and that they believed
that his views were widely held by other officers in the
Navy. When Bogan's letter reached Washington, Captain
Crommelin managed to get a copy of it and released it to the
press, much to the chagrin of Secretary Matthews.
When the Bogan letter became public, Carl Vinson, who
had been attempting to cancel any further hearings by the
Armed Services committee, recognized that the Navy's
concerns would have to be given a full airing at the second
part of the hearings. Secretary Matthews attempted to
persuade Congressman Vinson to postpone further hearings
until January of 1950. Admiral Radford, representing the
views of the Navy officer corps, persuaded Vinson to proceed
immediately with the hearing in order to perhaps undo some
of the damage to the Navy Budget that Secretary Johnson's
cuts would have in reducing further the Navy's force
structure.
The second part of the Armed Service Committee hearings
opened on the 6th of October 1949. This part of the
hearings have since become known to history as the hearings
on "Unification and Strategy." The first week of these
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hearings was taken up by witnesses for the Navy's point of
view. In all the Navy presented 23 witnesses. The Navy's
testimony is notable for the diversity of directions in
which it proceeded.
The first witness to be called was Secretary Matthews.
He opened his testimony with a prepared statement denouncing
the officers of his own service for their public display of
dissension from policies that had been enacted into law by
Congress. The low regard held for Secretary Matthews as the
leader of the Navy by his own officers was demonstrated
during the hearings when Secretary Matthews, responding to a
guestion about the ability of naval officers dissenting
views to be given a fair hearing through official channels,
stated that he saw no reason for any officer to doubt that
his views would be considered. The Naval officers in the
audience laughed out loud at this remark.
Following the Secretary of the Navy, the remaining
witnesses to testify in favor of the Navy's position were
all, with one exception, either active duty or retired Naval
officers. The list of Navy witnesses reads like a who's who
of the past, present, and future Navy of the time. The
first officer to testify was Admiral Radford, Commander of
the Pacific Fleet. He criticized the B-36 as a bad gamble
for the country, expressed his concern that nuclear deter-
rence would not prevent war and might start a war, and
promoted the flush-deck designed USS United States as the
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prototype of a new generation of carriers. Following
Admiral Radford's testimony, a series of 10 "technical"
witnesses testified on various difficulties associated with
high altitude strategic bombing. These "experts" testified
to the difficulty of accurately hitting targets from high
altitude, the ease which fighter aircraft would have in
intercepting the bombers, and the technical difficulties of
radar bombing at night. One of these witnesses, Commander
Eugene Tatom, an aviation ordnance specialist, went so far
as to denigrate the efficacy of atomic bombing by stating
that a man standing at one end of the main runway of
Washington's National Airport and unshielded except for his
own clothing, would escape serious injury from an atomic
bomb detonated at the other end of the runway. Admiral
Blandy, Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, followed the
technical witnesses. Since Adm. Blandy 's experience was in
battleships, is testimony was seen as a refutation of the
Secretary of the Navy's assertion that it was only naval
aviators who were dissatisfied with the direction the
nation's military strategy was heading. Adm. Blandy was one
of the few Navy witnesses to speak of the positive aspects
of naval power such as its flexibility rather than concen-
trating on attacking the B-36.
The remainder of the Navy's witnesses continued the
attack on the B-3 6 and strategic bombing in general from
every possible aspect. The testimony included the arguments
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that strategic bombing was irrelevant to the defense of
Europe , that it was too expensive, that the Navy had too few
ships operational now to adequately carry out its mission,
and the suggestion to build both the B-36 and the USS United
States.
The last Naval officer to testify was the CNO, Admiral
Denfield. During the week between the Secretary of the
Navy's and the time the CNO gave his testimony, Secre-tary
Matthews had tried to find out what the CNO planned to say
during his testimony. However, the CNO had put him off by
saying that he had not yet prepared his remarks. When the
CNO did testify, he came out strongly for the arguments
which his fellow officers had made. His testimony made
Admiral Denfield a hero to his fellow officers and cost him
his job when the Secretary of the Navy persuaded President
Truman to replace him shortly after the hearings were
concluded.
To present the Air Force's views that relied on only two
witnesses—the Secretary of the Air Force, Stuart Symington,
and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Hoyt
Vandenberg. The Secretary of the Air Force pointed out
certain misrepresentations of fact in the testimony of some
of the Navy witnesses, cited evidence to show that the Air
Force was not relying unduly on the B-36 to the exclusion of
other programs, and stated that the Air Force did not
believe that wars could be won with strategic bombing alone.
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The Chief of Staff of the Air Force reinforced his Secre-
tary's testimony and repeated some of the points the Air
Force had made in the testimony about the B-36 which had
occurred during the first part of the hearings in August.
The hearings continued for several more days and
included testimony by several more important military
figures including General Omar Bradley who was the Chairman
of the JCS and who denounced the Navy witnesses as a bunch
of "fancy dans" who were unwilling to be team players.
However, the central drama of the hearings was the dispute
between the Navy and the Air Force.
After the conclusion of the testimony the Army Services
Committee eventually printed its report in March of 1950
which unanimously reported 32 of the 33 conclusions reached
by the committee. The one conclusion which was not agreed
upon was that Admiral Denfield had been relieved because of
his testimony. The other conclusions of the committee were
notable only for their moderation. The committee did not
recommend that the USS United States be restored to the
budget and in fact nothing that came from the hearings was
of any substantive benefit to addressing the concerns of the
naval officers who had testified. But while the hearings
did not change the Navy's fortunes in the Washington budget
battle, the Korean War, which broke out in June of 1950,
soon demonstrated that strategic bombing with nuclear
weapons was not the answer to every military problem and
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that there were still compelling reasons to maintain a
strong Navy with powerful carrier battle groups as its
principle means of power projection.
Looking back with the historical perspective of 4 years
since the B-36/USS United States took place, the whole
affairs has the appearance of a tempest in a teapot.
However, to the naval officers of the time they were fight-
ing to convince the nation not to abandon the importance of
a strong Navy for what they saw as the illusory promise of a
total reliance on nuclear deterrence with strategic bombers.
If in hindsight their concerns for the future of the Navy
and the nation seem overly dramatic, their assumptions about
the continued importance of naval power and their criticism
of a national strategy that planned to rely exclusively on
nuclear deterrence were right on the mark.
In retrospect, the means this group of navy partisans
employed to get their views heard by Congress might seem
shady and disloyal to their leadership. But given the fact
that they were gravely concerned about the future of the
nation and the fact that the civilian leaders over them were
seen as part of the problem and not part of the solution,
what were they to do? Today Washington has come to accept
the strategic news leak and the passing of unauthorized
information from one part of the government to another as
basic tools in the bureaucratic infighters kit bag. If the
Navy's testimony in the hearings seems disorganized and
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diffuse to the point of being ineffective, is it surprising?
After all, these naval leaders had risen to their positions
not as bureaucratic infighters but as operational commanders
in wartime. That these same commanders who had lead the
Navy to victory were unable to lead a successful bureau-
cratic campaign is evidence that the same leadership talents
the nation's military needs in war are not necessarily the
talents it needs in times of peace. The fact that the
various positions taken by witnesses for the Navy in the
hearings ran off in every direction and seemed to lack any
clear sense of purpose can be attributed to the fact that
the Secretary of the Navy was unsympathetic to the concerns
of his officers and the CNO did not clearly see that his
loyalties should be to his officers rather than to the
Secretary until the hearings were already in progress.
The B-36/USS United States controversy was in many ways
a prototype for the way debates on national strategy have
been carried out in their country ever since. Legions of
Washington insiders have come to understand that if a
particular strategy is to be put forward its success or
failure depends on whether the appropriate procurement
battles in the budget cycle can be won. Like a number of
similar strategy debates that have followed it, the ultimate
arbiter of the outcome of the debate was not the eloquence
of the arguments put forward or the subtle use of bureau-
cratic maneuvering to win advantage in the Washington arena
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but rather the unfolding of events on the international
scene which settled the dispute.
V. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. For a comprehensive survey of the events surrounding the
B-36/USS United States controversy, see Paul Hammond's
"Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations,
Strategy and Politics," published in Harold Stein's
American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case
Studies , a Twentieth Century Fund study published by the
University of Alabama Press in 1963.
2
.
A more abbreviated relating the same events told from
the Air Force perspective is contained in Herman S.
Wolk's "Revolt of the Admiral," published in Air Force
Magazine in the May 1988 issue beginning on page 52.
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NAVY LONG-RANGE PLANNING:
THE EXTENDED AND STRATEGIC VIEW
LT James A. Pelkofski
I. BACKGROUND
The original long-range planning office for the U.S.
Navy was the General Board, active from 1900-1951. The
General Board served as an advisory body to the Secretary of
the Navy (SecNav) , dealing with force level and strategic
issues about a decade into the future. [Ref. l:p. 62]
The Board's period of greatest influence was prior to
World War I when it participated with the Army in the formu-
lation of war plans. However, in 1915 the General Board
lost its war planning responsibilities to the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and in 1932 the Board was
reduced quantitatively and qualitatively in membership.
Finally, after a reorganization and split in Navy planning
responsibilities in 1945, the General Board lost its once
powerful influence. [Ref. 2: pp. A-l—A-4]
The convening of the Ad Hoc Committee to Study Long
Range Shipbuilding Plans and Programs was an attempt in 1954
to revive long-range Navy planning and it led to the forma-
tion of the Long Range Objectives Group (OP-93) and the
Naval Warfare Analysis Group in 1955 [Ref. 3:pp. 53-54].
OP-93 worked for the CNO, advising him on issues such as
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naval missions and requirements 10-15 years into the future
[Ref. l:p. 63].
The major output of OP-93 was its annual statement on
Long Range Objectives (LRO) , a planning and guidance docu-
ment, widely circulated to subordinate levels to facilitate
and direct overall long-range Navy planning [Ref. 2:pp. A-9
—A-ll]. Furthermore, part of OP-93 was the innovative
Institute of Naval Studies, formed in 1961 and incorporating
the Naval Long Range Studies Project of the Naval War
College. [Ref. 2:p. A-12]
With the advent of the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System (PPBS) , OP-93 began to lose its influence.
In 1963, OP-93 was essentially demoted, removed from the
office of the CNO and placed under Navy Program Planning
(OP-090—now known as OP-08) [Ref . 2:p. A-12].
In 1964, the LRO became the MRO (Medium Range Objec-
tives)
, a document that was far more fiscally influenced and
less strategically conceptual than its predecessor. By the
mid-1960s, the MRO had been displaced by the Navy Strategic
Study (NSS) , a policy document developed by the Deputy CNO
for Plans and Policy (OP-06) specifically for use within
PPBS. [Ref. 2:p. A-14] Moreover, in 1966 the Systems
Analysis Division (OP-96) took over Navy long-range planning




Thus, from the early 1960s and into the late 1970s, PPBS
and systems analysis, limited to a 5-10 year horizon,
dominated Navy planning. [Ref. 2: pp. A-14—A-15] Function-
al, rather than conceptual planning, was dominant and was
characterized by a lack of integration and centralization at
the CNO and SecNav levels [Ref. 2:p. A-19],
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM
Presently, Navy long-range planning is mainly the
product of two systems: extended planning and strategic
planning. The former is a function of short-term trend
analysis and linear extrapolation; the latter is a non-
linear approach that attempts to identify and influence
discontinuities in the long term future. [Ref. 4: pp. 2-3]
The extended planning system is characterized by PPBS.
Ideally, the system is initiated by the CNO's Program
Advisory Memorandum (CPAM) , a broad maritime strategy that
highlights key considerations for forces necessary to
execute the promulgated strategy [Ref. 5:p. 26]. The system
incorporates the CPAM and guidance from SecNav into the
Program Planning and Development Phases, designed to match
resources to programs to fulfill the top-level guidance
[Ref. 5:p. 23].
Paralleling and supplementing programming is the
development of Warfare Mission Area Appraisals by the
Director of Naval Warfare (OP-07) . These appraisals are
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studies of tends in warfare capabilities 5, 10, and some-
times 20 years into the future. They provide a warfare-
oriented link between the CNO's maritime strategy and the
POM (Program Objective Memorandum) , the output of the Navy's
extended planning system. [Ref. 5:pp. 31-32]
A critical portion of the Warfare Mission Area Apprai-
sals is Warfare Area Planning. The maritime strategy is
divided into mission areas from which mission area strate-
gies are developed and incorporated into a Master Plan [Ref.
5:p. 33]. Ideally, master planning is guided by the Joint
Long-Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA) to identify alterna-
tive futures [Ref. 4: Enclosure (1)]. The Master Plan is a
comprehensive plan in a warfare mission area that is
"fiscally and technically executable." [Ref. 5:p. 35]
Long-range planners within the various warfare areas,
such as OP-02 (subsurface) , OP-03 (surface) , and OP-05
(air) , contribute to the development of the Master Plans, as
do the planners within OP-06 (Plans, Policy, Strategy, and
Operations) [Ref. 6].
At the end of the process, OP-08 integrates and balances
inputs with any additional CNO/SecNav guidance and finalizes
the POM [Ref. 5:p. 24]. Thus, ideally, the maritime
strategy guides the development of programs and Master Plans
which are integrated into the POM, a list of Navy require-
ments for the next five years [Ref. 5: p. 21]. The POM has
been described as "each Service's most concrete statement of
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a Long Range Plan." [Ref. 5:p. 21] Finally, the POMs are
aggregated into an overall Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) for
the Department of Defense (DOD) [Ref. 5:p. 17].
Also incorporated into navy extended planning is the
Navy Long-Range MPT (Manpower, Personnel and Training)
Strategy, Mid-Range Change in the POMs and FYDP, and the
Extended Planning Annex (EPAO—a 15 year linear extension of
the POM [Ref. 4: pp. 1-2].
Strategic planning in the Navy supplements PPBS and is
predominantly an amalgam of several groups. Foremost is 0P-
00K, the Navy Long Range Planning Group, working for the CNO
within the CNO Executive Panel (CEP) [Ref. 6], OP-OOK's
stated mission is "[t]o advise the CNO on a wide range of
scientific, political-military and strategic matters; to
examine long-range Navy planning issues; and to serve as the
link between the CNO and the CEP." [Ref. 7]
OP-00K is largely policy oriented and operates as an
informal long-range strategic body for the CNO [Ref. 6],
Two important annual planning outputs of OP-00K are its
Long-Range Planner's Conference, designed "to address long-
range planning issues of importance to senior level officers
involved in the Navy's long-range planning process" [Ref. 7]
and the Long Range Assessment—a 20 year planning projection
guided by the JLRSA [Ref. 6].
Related to OP-00K is the Strategic Studies Group (SSG)
,
located at the Naval War College. The SSG supplements the
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work of OP-00K and conducts CNO projects in both long and
short term strategic thinking. [Ref. 8]
Finally, another group that is involved with strategic
planning is OP-603 (Strategic Concepts Group) , within OP-60.
This group deals primarily in maritime strategy concepts and
conducts forecasts out to a 10-20 year horizon. [Ref. 9]
III. KEY ASSUMPTIONS/CONSTRAINTS
Several key assumptions and common constraints may be
identified in the process and development of Navy long-range
planning.
The first assumption made by those conducting Navy long-
range planning is that a navy is essential to the preserva-
tion of U.S. interests and national security [Ref. 10:p. 5].
Debate occurs over the degree that the Navy is essential
;
for example, planners may disagree over the effect the Navy
might have in the outcome of a land war in Europe. However,
consensus is reached over the general necessity of a navy in
the U.S. national interest.
A related planning assumption is that a fundamental and
significant shift has occurred in the maritime balance
between the U.S. and the USSR, the primary threat [Ref.
11: p. 1]. Therefore, naval forces and strategies must be
planned to contain, deter, and defeat, if necessary, a
Soviet Navy whose capabilities are growing [Ref. 10:pp.
3,7].
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Furthermore, the Soviet naval challenge is also a
constraint to U.S. planning as, under a greater threat,
American forces may suffer a relative degradation in capa-
bilities and influence. Thus, planners recognize that the
Navy is limited in its capabilities and long-range planning
must make choices for how best to utilize these constrained
capabilities [Ref. ll:p. 9].
Another assumption made by Navy long-range planners is
the uncertainty inherent to their task. All planning
involves varying degrees of uncertainty and thus planning
must hedge accordingly [Ref. 4:p. 2]. Specific uncertain-
ties include the changing nature of the threat, rising costs
and decreasing funds, new technologies, and, because of the
versatility of Navy platforms, emergent roles and employment
of naval forces [Ref. 2:p. A-l] . Moreover, planners are
currently dealing with blurred U.S. interests resulting from
an increasingly interdependent, multipolar world [Ref. 10: p.
5]. The uncertainties weigh on the ability of the planners
to optimize resources toward attainment of objectives;
therefore, uncertainty may also be viewed as a constraint.
Planners also make assumptions over the methodology used
to determine force procurement for the future. For example,
some planners base their assumptions on a scenario, such as
the Maritime Strategy [Ref. 5:p. 23]; others prefer to plan
in terms of capability output, similar to that modeled in
The Navy Strategic Planning Experiment [Ref. 2:p. 16].
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Methodologies are not necessarily either/or and planners are
likely to overlap their methods. Assumptions common to
either methodology (as well as others that might be employed
by navy planners) include recognition of the flexibility of
naval forces; the need for significant numbers of ships,
submarines, and aircraft; and the requirement for force
projection capability [Ref. 10:pp. 8-11].
Two primary constraints upon Navy long-range planning
involve the budget and time. Budgetary constraints, and
associated resource limitations, are exacerbated by the high
and rising costs of Navy platforms and new technology [Ref.
l:p. 64]. As the budget grows tighter, the range of options
for planners dwindles, yet choices are made more difficult.
Furthermore, inter-service battles become more polemic, thus
increasing the difficulty of successful adjustment to fiscal
constraints [Ref. 5:p. 24].
Time is predominantly a systemic constraint. Naval
systems average at least ten years from initial planning to
initial deployment, a fact that should not hinder long-range
planning. However, force procurement occurs within the
PPBS, a system geared more toward short-range planning; but
planning naval forces is not conducive to the near-term.
[Ref. 10:p. 1]
In addition, time, although seemingly favorable to naval
forces given 20-40 year longevities [Ref. 10:p. 1], works as
a disadvantage in an age where technologies race against
144
obsolescence and ultimately lose in record-breaking fashion.
Thus, the advantages to long term planning and fiscal
savings that might characterize Navy platforms must be
weighed against the disadvantages of rapidly outmoded
technologies [Ref. 2:p. A-l]
.
Finally, time is also a practical constraint for long-
range planning. Coherent thinking for long-range planning
requires unhindered time; however, planners are not often
afforded the time to do such thinking [Ref. 3:p. 55].
IV. ANALYSIS
This section will analyze Navy long-range planning as it
is conducted in the extended approach and the strategic
approach. General observations will be discussed in the
final analysis.
A. EXTENDED PLANNING
The extended planning method is a functional approach
that involves low risk prediction for the short term and is
budget oriented [Ref. 5:p. 15]. As discussed earlier,
extended planning corresponds to PPBS.
Problems occur when the functional approach is equated
with long-range planning and PPBS is confused with strategy
[Ref. ll:p. 11]. PPBS and the POM system are successful in
integrating "planning, technology, strategy, and resources
into an executable program." [Ref. 5: p. 22] However, the
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overall program seems to be the lowest acceptable output of
an unwieldy system and not the product of purposeful and
thoughtful long-range planning.
For example, POM development seems to be reactive,
rather than proactive, and the tight schedule within which
it evolves is likely to suppress, rather than encourage,
innovation [Ref. l:p. 62]. Although proponents of the POM
system claim that it is scenario-driven [Ref. 5:p. 23], the
broad scenarios may attempt to appease too many factions.
Therefore, the process of making difficult planning choices
that are necessary in a coherent but fiscally constrained
planning process is complicated and degraded.
Guidance for POM development is initiated at the top
levels of the Navy by the CNO and SecNav [Ref. 5:p. 17].
Furthermore, during POM development, the CNO Executive
Panel, OP-08, and OP-90 (Program Development Review
Committee) serve an oversight function [Ref. 5:p. 23].
However, feedback and involvement in the latter stages of
the process by the high level initiators occurs too close to
the end of the cycle when time is the severest constraint
and thus the greatest influence, possibly precluding strate-
gic and planning considerations, even if changes are
necessary.
For example, as previously discussed, OP-08 integrates
and balances programs in the POM. This would seem to be an
opportunity for planning evaluation and adjustment, but by
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this point in the PPBS cycle, time and budget, rather than
strategy, may drive choices.
In addition, programming in PPBS often hinders long-
range planning as individual programs become institutional-
ized within parochial bureaucracies capable of exploiting
the short term, yet unending, PPBS cycle. Moreover,
displacement of programs is difficult once entered into
PPBS. [Ref. l:p. 62]
Such ingrained programming fiscally stabilizes what
might otherwise be an expensive system of programming by
fits and starts. However, new initiatives are inevitably at
a disadvantage and emergent strategic developments are slow
to affect the programming process [Ref. l:p. 62].
In-fighting between the parochial bureaucracies that
emerge perpetuates program institutionalization and focuses
debate on costs rather than planning and strategy [Ref.
12:p. 39], Alliances loyal to their programs engage in
fiscal in-fighting and not conceptual or strategic debate
[Ref. 12:p. 39]. The result is that programs drive the
budget instead of long-range planning driving programs and
the budget [Ref. ll:p. 12].
The most effective and innovative long-range planning
within PPBS occurs during Warfare Area Planning and the
Master Plan development. Planning in these areas is
dynamic, employing unconstrained and imaginative techniques
such as wargaming, modeling, and expert judgment [Ref. 5: p.
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33]. However, long-range planning in the warfare areas and
Master Plans are operational in scope; strategic integration
of the operational plans appears to be lacking.
In conclusion, the extended planning approach of PPBS is
a largely decentralized process [Ref. 4:p. 2]. Initial
centralized guidance seems to degenerate into decentralized
disarray. Although long-range extended planning is done at
different levels, divergent methodologies, objectives, and
reguirements result in a linear plan that is much less than
the sum of its parts [Ref. 4:p. 2]. The synthesis of the
numerous Master Plans and program documents is more an
output of bureaucratic battles and compromises rather than
strategic consensus [Ref. ll:p. 12]. It seems that integra-
tion is lacking, possibilities for mutual support are
neglected, and RDT&D (research, development, testing, evalu-
ation) fails to be maximized [Ref. 4:p. 2]. Hence, overall
fiscal inefficiency seems to characterize a system ideally
designed for planning budget maximization.
B. STRATEGIC PLANNING
The strategic planning method is a conceptual approach
that involves high risk prediction for the long term [Ref.
7]. Effective strategic planning employs a top-down system
in which high level conceptual planning groups such as the
General Board, the Long Range Objectives Group, and OP-00K
generate planning guidance, objectives, and requirements for
subordinate planning levels [Ref. 13:p. 5].
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Among the advantages of such conceptual planning groups
are their relatively independent and unconstrained charter
and their numerically practical size [Ref. 13:p. 5]. The
10-15 year planning horizon viewed by the General Board and
OP-93 was reasonable for a long-range outlook; however,
given the longevity of Navy platforms, it seems the planning
horizon could be extended.
A system that engages in strategic planning is more apt
to intuitively incorporate the most useful elements high-
lighted in The Navy Strategic Planning Experiment . Such
elements would include the rational (but possibly neglected)
requirement of initially defining objectives and goals and
subsequently planning for their attainment [Ref. ll:pp. 3-
4].
Perhaps most important, though, would be the inherent
recognition, within conceptual planning groups, of the need
to make choices, as detailed within the Strategic Planning
Experiment . Although the study outlines a specific cell
model, 1 the primary objective is the need to identify areas
and missions of critical and secondary importance, to prior-
itize, and to plan in accordance with priorities [Ref.
11: pp. 9-11]. Thus, long-range planning would apply current
and future assets in relation to essential and non-essential




needs, recognizing the practical limitations that require
planners to make hard but necessary choices.
What emerges, ideally, is a limited but operable
flexible response capability underpinned by a rational net
assessment of the threat. Conceptual planning groups may be
inherently apt at making the choices necessary to develop
practical long-range plans, similar to the ideas presented
in the Strategic Planning Experiment .
Similarly, conceptual planning groups may also plan more
in terms of output services than in weapons systems [Ref.
ll:p. 16]. In other words, strategic planning would engage
in developing capabilities to fulfill a plan rather than
adapting specific weapons systems to a plan. Thus, technol-
ogy would be a planning asset rather than a strategic deter-
minant, although the distinction is vague and emerging
technological opportunities must be exploited. Technology,
however, cannot be the driving force behind planning, and
conceptual planning groups could possibly avoid such a
proclivity.
Another related trap that could be avoided by strategic
planning within conceptual planning groups is the bureau-
cratic in-fighting over programs and individual strategies
[Ref. 12:pp. 36-38]. Members of such groups would not
necessarily be immune to tacit or even explicit program and
strategy alliances; however, group dynamics could limit such
tendencies.
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Much of what seems to affect extended planning within
PPBS is short term action, characterized by crisis manage-
ment [Ref. 3:p. 55]. Conceptual planning groups, by their
long term vision and charter, could avoid the problem of
crisis management, focusing primarily on the future.
By their nature, conceptual planning groups seem more
adept at encouraging and developing innovative ideas to
shape the future [Ref. 13:p. 5]. By contrast, extended,
linear planning might neglect innovation that stretches past
the short term. Strategic planning is designed to look past
the short term, to develop ideas based on discontinuities,
and to plan accordingly [Ref. 4:p. 3],
In conclusion, strategic planning within conceptual
planning groups is capable of effective long-range planning.
Moreover, effective long-range planning would make better
use of PPBS by efficiently applying fiscal constraints to a
thoughtful projection of the future [Ref. ll:p. 11].
C. FINAL ANALYSIS
In this section, general observations concerning
national strategy, top-down management, naval force flexi-
bility, historical initiatives, utilization of technology,
and warfighting are discussed in relation to long-range
planning in the Navy.
1. National Strategy
The POM has been described as the "Navy's corporate
plan to implement its portion of national military policy
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and strategy." [Ref. 5: p. 24] If each military service
views its POM in a similar manner, then national strategy
seems to be a synthesis of independently developed plans
among competing services. In other words, there seems to be
a political and military disconnect perpetrated by a lack of
a cohesive national strategy.
Without national strategic guidance, efficient naval
planning cannot occur [Ref. ll:p. 2]. Unless limits are
defined for naval objectives, naval planners are forced to
plan for too many contingencies with too few assets [Ref.
11 :p. 2]. The current Maritime Strategy is a thoughtful
attempt to adapt to an undefined national strategy [Ref.
14 :p. 421] but it is understandably parochial and represents
a bottom-up approach to planning.
Thus, national strategic guidance and subsequent
joint, integrated military planning would improve long-range
planning in each of the services. The present method of
integration is a short-sighted and polemic "micro-review" of
service POMs by OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense)
,
OMB (Office of Management and Budget) , and Congress, from
which emerges a policy that is, once again, the output of
bureaucratic battles and compromises rather than planning
[Ref. 13:p. 12].
2 . Top-Down Management
In general, the current planning system in the Navy,
as well as the DOD, is a bottom-up approach in which lower
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levels are afforded excessive freedom and influence in
determining long-range planning. This is not to degrade the
importance of subordinate levels in long-range planning;
rather, it is a criticism of the failure of top level
officials to guide and direct long-range planning.
For example, proponents of PPBS claim that frequent
marginal changes to the FYDP is not a bottom-up approach
[Ref. 5:p. 23]. Although this may be true, it may also
reflect the limits imposed on high level planners to effect
only incremental changes to planning.
Thus, high level conceptual development should guide
subordinate, functional planning from the top-down with fre-
quent feedback and follow-up. What appears to occur is high
level functional "tinkering" in a system over which the
leadership has limited control [Ref. l:p. 62].
3 . Naval Force Flexibility
The nature of naval forces provides planners with
what should be a favorable dilemma: how to utilize forces
characterized by great flexibility. Such planning seems
most appropriate for broad, conceptual planning, rather than
functional planning that might be too constraining.
Related to the utility of conceptual planning for
flexible forces is the method of planning in accordance with
output services or capabilities rather than scenarios.
Scenarios are certainly useful tools for planning but
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excessive reliance can preclude considerations of other
available options for employing naval forces.
The flexibility of naval forces requires a range of
planning options in order to maximize use of these versatile
forces [Ref. 10:p. 3]. Furthermore, the long platform life
of many naval assets adds significant duration to their
characteristic flexibility [Ref. 10:p. 1], Thus, the
requirement is even greater for effective long-range
planning in the Navy, given force flexibility and
durability.
4 . Historical Initiatives
The history of long-range planning in the Navy has
seen many excellent initiatives, such as the General Board,
OP-93, and OP-00X (established in 1980; disestablished in
1983) [Ref. 15:p. 2], but little historical continuity.
With the exception of the currently operating OP-00K (the
successor to OP-00X) , valuable long-range planning
initiatives suffered from a limited life span. Therefore,
the discontinuity characterized by recurring historical
initiatives has precluded continuity in overall planning and
analytic knowledge.
Some have observed that the lack of personnel conti-
nuity in the Navy precludes effective centralized long-range
planning due to the drain of lost lessons learned [Ref.
15: p. 21]. Although some degree of 'corporate knowledge' is
inevitably lost in the frequent shuffle of naval personnel
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rotation, an enduring planning organization would minimize
the knowledge drain occurring during personnel turnover.
Certainly, much knowledge could be preserved in organiza-
tional archives. Moreover, an enduring planning organiza-
tion could be more conducive to planning and analytical
continuity, thereby enhancing the overall process of long-
range planning. Presently, such continuity is lacking.
5. Utilization of Technology
It is questionable to what extent current long-range
planning in the Navy maximizes the use of new technology.
Apparently, the decentralized system of planning in the Navy
fails to efficiently utilize advances in technology and
neglects integrated and directed approaches toward techno-
logical research and development [Ref. 4:p. 2]. Certainly,
without centralized and effective long-range planning, suc-
cessful and economical exploitation of technology is
unlikely.
6. Warfiahtina Emphasis
Finally, PPBS seems to neglect the fact that plan-
ning must ultimately prepare to fight and win wars, a point
not always in evidence in a budget-conscious system. War-
fighting should dominate Navy long-range planning on all
levels. As discussed earlier, operational level planning is
oriented to warfighting, but only at the operational level.




As noted in a Center for Naval Analysis research memor-
andum, "it would probably be difficult for any one office to
be responsible for an overall Navy-wide comprehensive plan."
[Ref. 15: p. 21] While this may be true, the Navy's present
planning system, in its decentralized form, is not conduct-
ing effective long-range planning.
Rather, in the final analysis, planning in the Navy has
adapted to PPBS, resulting in an extended, functional
planning system that is not designed for the long range.
Although conceptual long-range planning is conducted on
various levels by different offices within the Navy, the
decentralized nature of such planning reduces the potential
benefits of strategic planning to ad hoc, sporadic
successes. A process of centralized and integrated long-
range planning in the Navy has not yet been realized.
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NAVAL FORCE PLANNING STUDY
LT John R. Hafey
I. BACKGROUND
Admiral Thomas Moorer, USN (Ret.) once noted that the
cost of the Vietnam Conflict to the U.S. Navy was a genera-
tion of new ships. The financial burden of the war itself,
coupled with that of the Great Society, shifted budgetary
priorities away from force modernization programs. As a
result, a number of naval ships were retired in the late
1960 's and early 1970' s without replacement. Naval end
strength declined dramatically.
It is the relative decline in the size of the Navy that
provides the proper context for examining naval force plan-
ning efforts during both the Carter and Reagan Administra-
tions. Essentially, the Navy was attempting during this
period to redress the imbalance wrought by Vietnam; to
rebuild a Navy capable of attaining maritime superiority
over any adversary for the remainder of the century.
The Navy has made significant gains to that end during
the Ford Administration. Ford's last five year Shipbuilding
Plan called for purchase of 157 ships at a cost of about $60
billion. After taking office in January 1977, President
Carter initially supported the Ford plan. As work began in
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earnest on the FY 1979 defense budget (Carter's first), how-
ever, the Administration's support began to waiver.
A draft Defense Guidance circulated in the fall of 1977
implied that a Navy of 4 50 ships with 10 carrier battle
groups (CVBGs) would be adequate to fulfill projected stra-
tegic requirements . This was significantly below the Navy's
estimate of 600 ships with 15 CVBGs. The Carter draft docu-
ment was based upon a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in
Central Europe. According to the scenario, naval forces
would engage only in defensive sea control operations.
Moreover, the construct did not consider action on the
flanks or in other theaters to be relevant to the force-
sizing problem. Throughout most of the Carter Administra-
tion, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) would
maintain that sizing forces from the Central Front scenario




The Navy questioned the planning assumptions of the
draft Guidance. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown directed
that Navy Secretary W. Graham Claytor commission a study
group to articulate the Navy's point of view. Thus, into
this politically volatile atmosphere, Sea Plan 2000 was
born.
1Critics would contest this assumption. Some main-
tained that this scenario was used because it was readily
adaptable to quantitative methods of policy analysis and
that the systems analysts were dictating military strategy.
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This essay examines Sea Plan 2000 from three different
angles: from a systemic perspective; from the planner's
perspective; and in terms of failure/success. It is the
contention of this study that the naval force planning study
known as Sea Plan 2000 was both a failure and a success. It
was a short term failure in terms of the political environ-
ment of the late 1970's. Over the longer term, however, the
plan was more successful. It provided the institutional
rationale for a 600 ship Navy.
II. THE PLANNING SYSTEM
When Secretary Claytor commissioned the Sea Plan 2000
study, he went outside normal Navy planning channels. Sea
Plan 2000 was an ad hoc, one-time planning committee. It
was directed by Francis J. "Bing" West, then of the Naval
War College's Center for Advanced Research. The panel
consisted of ten naval and two Marine Corps officers between
the ranks of 0-4 to 0-6 and four technical advisors. The
group produced two large SECRET volumes and an UNCLASSIFIED
executive summary (which does not do justice to the scope
and breadth of the entire body)
.
The methodology used in the study can be described as
follows: project a wide range of alternative situations
that future naval forces might be involved in; determine
what force levels and platforms are required to meet those
situations; and back up the force level predictions with
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extensive battle and campaign analyses. It should be noted
that the projected situations were based on the past uses of
naval forces and were not closely tied to any specific
scenario. The plan sought to answer two generic questions:
(1) what can policy-makers expect from naval forces (pro-
vides the linkage between national interests/objectives and
naval missions/capabilities)?; and (2) how capable are our
forces (corollary—what forces are required) to carry out
these tasks through the year 2000?
Essentially, the study attempts to articulate the utili-
ty of naval forces to the policy-maker. An underlying
assumption is that a decision-maker who is knowledgeable
about the range of activities that naval forces perform in
support of national policy will make more informed decisions
on the future size and structure of the Navy. The following
statement aptly summarizes the panel • s force planning
perspective:
Given the past uses of naval forces and the uncertainty of
the future environment, naval planning should focus upon
capabilities, not scenarios, and upon a range of measures,
not a dominant force-sizing criterion.
In order to determine what capabilities future forces
should possess, the study contends, one must relate national
security objectives to naval missions or tasks. Sea Plan
2000 accomplished this as follows. First, three key
national security objectives were postulated. Next, a
series of measures or tasks that naval forces perform in
support of these objectives were outlined (i.e., what must
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forces be capable of in order to secure this objective?)
.
The objectives and the measures are depicted in Figure 1.
Once this framework was established, the forces required to
effectively execute the tasks could be recommended based
upon extensive analytical capabilities studies. 2





Capability to Affect Events Ashore
Superiority at Sea versus the Soviets
Deter Global War
Protect Sea Lines of Communications
Reinforce Allies
Put Military Pressure on Soviets
Hedge Against Uncertainty
Figure 1
In summary, Sea Plan 2000 adopted a four part planning
system. First, it provided the policy-maker with a guide on
how naval forces could be used. Next, it recommended force
levels commensurate with task fulfillment. Third, the plan
backed up these recommendations with numerical and battle
2Volume 2 of Sea Plan 2000 contains the capabilities
analyses.
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analyses. Finally, the panel made recommendations on dif-
ferent budgetary options and the risks associated with each.
III. PLANNING OBJECTIVES/ASSUMPTIONS/CONSTRAINTS
A. OBJECTIVES
As a naval study, the obvious objective that guided Sea
Plan 2000 personnel was to convince the policy-maker of the
broad utility of naval forces. The study sought to influ-
ence the decision-making process in ways favorable to the
Navy. A second objective was to take a hard look at the
environment at sea through the year 2 000 in order to deter-
mine how future forces might cope in a changing world.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
The Sea Plan 2 000 group operated under a number of
unwritten assumptions. These assumptions probably influ-
enced the final report. First, Sea Plan 2000 was a naval
force planning study. No attempt was made to determine if
some other type of force might be more capable of fulfilling
projected strategic requirements. It was assumed that naval
units were best suited to a particular end.
Second, it was assumed that the mix of current naval
forces (i.e., surface, subsurface and sea-based air) was
basically correct. The study did not examine radical depar-
tures from the present force structure. Some were critical
of Sea Plan 2 000 for not departing more from the current
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structure. However, it is probably not realistic to
advocate a radically different force structure in the 20
year window that the group was concerned with.
A third assumption concerns the future international
environment. The study projected an environment hostile to
U.S. interests in most areas of the world. In fact, a large
part of the rationale for procuring additional naval forces
was based upon a hostile environment, with U.S. interests
worldwide under attack. The kinds of forces required in a
more benign world were not really considered.
Fourth, there were implicit assumptions made with
respect to the kind of hostilities forces would encounter in
the future. For example, there was almost no discussion of
nuclear war at sea. In general, the study group broadly
assumed that any future war would be both conventional and
prolonged.
The final and perhaps most crucial assumption made by
the Sea Plan 2000 group was that they would fulfill their
charter—to plan a Navy for the year 2000. This is not a
trivial matter. Many naval programs were in jeopardy during
the fall of 1977 and spring of 1978. However, rather than
addressing these short-term political issues, the group
instead focuses upon the long-term future of the Navy. The
net result is that the study might be called a short-term
failure, but was much more successful over the longer term.
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C. CONSTRAINTS
Two points are relevant with respect to constraints and
the Sea Plan 2000 study. First, the proposed force struc-
tures were based upon reasonable budgetary assumptions. The
panel proposed three planning options (see Figure 2) : a
high risk/low flexibility 440 ship fleet based on 1% real
budget growth until 2 000; a minimally capable fleet of 540
ships based on 3% real growth; and a highly versatile 600
ship fleet based on 4% real growth. Thus, the planners took
fiscal constraints into account in their calculations.
PLANNING OPTIONS
TYPE 1% 3% 4%
CV 11 13 15
BB
AEGIS 10 24 28
CRU/DES 74 100 114
FF 136 152 158
SSN 80 94 98
SSBN 25 25 25
OTHER 139 172 194
TOTAL* 475/440 580/536 632/586
*lst number includes Naval Reserve and Seal ift Ships
2nd number is active line strength
Figure 2
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However, the nature of the Sea Plan 2000 charter meant
that the planners were not encouraged to recommend priori-
ties at the national level. Conversely, the panel specifi-
cally stated that it did not advocate establishing
priorities among the projected naval missions. Therefore,
on the one hand, planning options were severely constrained
at the national level (only naval forces were considered)
.
However, the planners operated in a relatively uncon-
strained environment at the naval level (did not have to





Sea Plan 2000 was publicly announced on 27 March 1978 by
Navy Secretary Claytor. The site for the announcement was
the Current Strategy Forum ongoing at the Naval War College.
The public release of Sea Plan 2000 (specifically the
unclassified Executive Summary) brought to a head the con-
troversy that had been brewing between the Navy and OSD
throughout the spring (see Annotated Bibliography for New
York Times articles on the controversy) . At issue was the
future role of naval forces in national military strategy
and thus the size and character of the Navy. Briefly,
Defense Secretary Brown desired to relegate the Navy to a
defensive sea control role, focusing procurement monies on
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smaller, less capable ships rather than battle group forces.
The Navy sought to maintain its traditional forward offen-
sive role in strategy.
Three days prior to the release of Sea Plan 2000, the
Carter Administration released their version of the Ford 5
Year Shipbuilding Plan. 3 Carter proposed to cut naval force
procurement in half—from 157 ships at $60 billion to 70
ships at $32 billion. Defense Department officials implied
that monies saved by the shipbuilding cuts could be used to
upgrade Army and Air Force capabilities in Central Europe.
Essentially, the situation that had led to the creation of
the Sea Plan 2000 panel in the first place had become a
political reality before the study was even released.
Sea Plan 2 000 came to be seen as the Navy's formal
response to the Carter Administration's defense strategy.
It was viewed by many in and out of government as a bureau-
cratic counterattack to the Administration's shipbuilding
cutbacks. The defense debate that resulted lasted for
nearly a year thereafter. In some respects the Navy
position was vindicated when Congress authorized construc-
tion of an additional NIMITZ-class nuclear carrier, overrid-
ing Carter's recommendation for a medium-sized version.
Nonetheless, differences between the Navy and the Adminis-
tration over strategy made Sea Plan 2000 a politically
3The Carter Plan was released at 6 p.m. on Friday, 24
March 1978.
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controversial study. Therefore , it became a less than
optimum tool for arguing the Navy's position, at least in
the short term.
B. LONG-TERM RESULTS
Over the longer-term, Sea Plan 2000 would become the
cornerstone of the 600 ship Navy. By the early 1980's, the
political situation had changed dramatically. The combina-
tion of the revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan highlighted the strategic requirement for forces
optimized for roles that transcend the Central Front scenar-
io. Moreover, the international environment was shaping up
to be as hostile as the Navy study had predicted. Finally,
the Administration had taken power on the platform of
restoring American naval and military strength worldwide.
The Navy developed the Maritime Strategy to articulate
its needs and guide its vision in this new environment.
However, many of the assumptions and force level recommenda-
tions contained in the Maritime Strategy were almost cer-
tainly adapted from the work of the Sea Plan 2000 group.
Over the longer-term, the study must be viewed as a quali-
fied success.
C. CONCLUSIONS
The Sea Plan 2000 Naval Force Planning Study approached
the planning problem in the way that navies prefer to look
at the future: emphasizing capabilities over specific
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scenarios; designing broadly flexible forces capable of a
variety of actions; backing up recommendations with opera-
tions analysis. The study explains how naval forces support
national security objectives across the conflict spectrum
from peace to crisis to war. It is required reading for
anyone with a desire to understand the utility of naval
forces and how naval officers view the world.
The principal shortcoming of the study was its failure
to adequately address the political context of the planning
milieu. In some respects, the study was a victim of the
circumstances at that time. However, as all procurement
decisions are eventually political, the naval force planner
must fully consider political issues in his deliberations.
Sea Plan 2000 was a short-term failure, at least in part,
because these issues were not adequately considered.
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THE MARITIME STRATEGY:
A CASE STUDY IN STRATEGIC PLANNING
LT J.H. Fenter
I. WHAT IS THE MARITIME STRATEGY?
The Maritime Strategy is the United States Navy contri-
bution to the National Military Strategy. It was developed
as a baseline for a global conventional war against the
Soviet Union, and is derived from the aims put forth in the
NSDDs issued by the President. The inputs for development
and changes in the Maritime Strategy are taken from the
Secretary of Defense in the Defense Guidance, the Joint
Strategic Planning Document and JSCAP, feedback and sugges-
tions from the CINCs, and the alliances and treaties which
are currently binding on the United States. The Maritime
Strategy has as its objectives the following:
1. Deterrence of war with the Soviet Union.
2. Forward operations and escalation control in all areas
in the event of war.
3
.
Termination of the war on terms which favor the United
States and its allies. [Ref. 1]
The premise of the Maritime Strategy is that it will be a
global, coalition, protracted non-nuclear conflict. From
that premise, it draws the following concepts of readiness:
1. The United States Navy must operate with a forward
posture in peacetime in order to be prepared for
transition to war in the minimum time possible, to
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protect our exposed allies, and to achieve maximum
deterrent effect with such a posture.
2. A high state of readiness for combat must be main-
tained by the fleet in order to survive the initial
Soviet assault and to transition to war as quickly and
smoothly as possible.
3. The United States must maintain a lead in the develop-
ment and use of defense advanced technology in order
to offset Soviet numerical advantages and to nullify
Soviet weapons systems as much as possible.
4. The Navy must retain flexibility within the strategy
in order to adapt to tactical and technological
changes imposed by progress or by new Soviet
developments
.
5. The Navy must maintain maximum mobility in order to
meet Soviet thrusts anywhere in the world, to escalate
horizontally in an area which will deter the Soviets,
and to minimize the targets presented to Soviet
forces. [Ref. 1]
Given the above, the Maritime Strategy coopts the Army
and Air Force into itself by giving them specific missions
in support of its operations in addition to their self-
imposed missions in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. The
NATO and Pacific allies are also assigned roles in conduct-
ing the Maritime Strategy in specific maritime areas, thus
reinforcing the idea of a global, coalition conflict in
which all parties are interdependent.
The primary objective in developing the Maritime Strate-
gy is to deter a war with the Soviet Union by forcing them
to have a perception of such a war as unprofitable and
highly risky. This can only be done by maintaining a posi-
tion of strength and preparedness.
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The heart of our evolving Maritime Strategy is crisis
response. If war with the Soviets ever comes, it will
probably result from a crisis that escalates out of con-
trol. Our ability to contain and control crises is an
important factor in our ability to prevent global
conflict. [Ref. l:p. 8]
II. THE HISTORY OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY
The Maritime Strategy was published in an unclassified
form for public release in a Naval Institute Proceedings
Supplement in January of 1986. But the development of the
concepts behind it and assembly of the strategy in a clearly
stated form began several years beforehand.
In the mid and late 1970' s, following the Arab-Israeli
1973 war and the attendant U.S. -Soviet confrontation in the
Mediterranean, the United States Navy (along with its sister
services) perceived a growth in Soviet military capabilities
which was not accompanied by a corresponding U.S. growth.
This situation called into question the ability of the Navy
to accomplish its goal of ensuring the resupply of Europe in
the event of war. Senior officers of the Navy examined the
problem and attempted to redefine the role of the Navy in
future conflicts in light of the growing Soviet capabili-
ties. In 1977, the result was the publishing of Sea Plan
2000 [Ref. 2], which expanded the Navy role to a global
offensive with participation from maritime allies. The need
for a 600 ship Navy in order to accomplish the goals of the
new plan was included, although options for less investment
178
were also included in the study. These lesser options,
stated in % growth of Navy funding, contained warnings of
reduced capability, minimal deterrent effect and high risk
of failure in the event of a war; they were basically an
argument for the 600 ship fleet. Following the airing of
Sea Plan 2000 . there was extensive debate in professional
journals about the merits and faults of the plan. In
particular, the Naval Institute Proceedings published a
series of articles on various geographic areas and the
strategies to be used in each between May of 1979 and May of
1980. These articles were meant to discuss and flesh out
areas of the plan. [Ref. 3]
Following the election of President Reagan in 1980,
there was a hiatus in the discussion of military strategy as
the new administration learned the "ropes" of dealing with
the armed services. The new Secretary of Defense and Secre-
tary of the Navy concentrated first on obtaining large
budget increases for the services, and later on the strate-
gies for those services. But in February of 1984, Navy
Secretary Lehman published his "Nine Principles" in Proceed-
ings , which can be summed up as follows:
- A coherent, realistic national strategy
- A strong national will
- The character of government institutions
- Superior military leadership
- Adequate military materiel strength
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- Superior Allied naval forces
- Integration of specific geography and naval strategy
- Forward naval employment strategy
- Sealift capability. [Ref. 4]
The Secretary's points echoed the Seaplan premises, but
emphasized more the requirement for a national strategy
which was forward and maritime in nature, and which included
in a more integral way the Allied navies and maritime capa-
bilities (including merchant hulls) . Additionally, there
were no "less expensive" options offered; the premise was
that the United States simply could not afford to risk
losing the maritime battle.
The discussion continued, with comments on the direction
of U.S. and NATO strategy being extensively covered in the
Proceedings Sea Link supplement of 1984, and the "No Bastion
for the Bear" series in 1984 and 1985. Meanwhile, under the
direction of CNO's Hayward and Watkins, the Maritime Strate-
gy was being gamed out extensively at the Naval War College
by the Strategic Studies Group. [Ref. 5] By 1985, the
existence of the Maritime Strategy was well-known; the
classified version had been released and was being discussed
in the professional journals at length. Following release
in unclassified form in January of 1986, an invitation to
debate the form and content of the strategy was extended to
the naval community. Since then there has been ongoing
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debate over several key points and accusations. Some of
these issues are:
- The Maritime Strategy does not address nuclear war
except in the concept of deterring it. It assumes the
war at sea is non-nuclear.
- The Maritime Strategy was formulated and disseminated
with little or no input from those who must play a
critical role in executing it.
- The Maritime Strategy is a budget weapon for the Navy in
order to justify new programs and spending (the 600 ship
Navy)
.
The issues have not yet been resolved, and so it is
difficult to assess the effects of the Maritime Strategy or
the truthfulness of the arguments. But there are certain
yardsticks by which to measure both.
III. MEASURING THE MARITIME STRATEGY
The Maritime Strategy can be looked at as being three
different things; one, a warfighting strategy which will
emphasize the offensive for the U.S. Navy and prey on the
weaknesses of the Soviet military, while helping to control
nuclear escalation; two, a declaratory strategy designed to
elicit desired reactions from the Soviet Union and our mari-
time allies in order to improve the position of the United
States (and the Navy) in some military or political way; and
three, as a budget justification for the construction of
aircraft carriers, attack submarines and advanced surface
ships, and Navy personnel increases.
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If the Maritime Strategy is to be used in warfighting,
and is the basis for the CINC warplans should a war begin
next week, then its effectiveness must be measured by the
ability of the forces in being and in the near future to
execute the strategy. Assuming that the deterrent aspect of
the strategy has failed, can the United States fight
successfully using this strategy? (There is only one sure
way to find out, but that is not an option!) In order to
conduct the initial operations in Soviet home waters (north
of the GIUK gap and the Sea of Okhotsk) , we must have a
large SSN force, capable of operating unsupported, under ice
and in the marginal ice zone, against a numerically superior
Soviet SSN picket force. The Soviet force will be operating
in familiar waters with extensive air and surface ASW sup-
port. Our SSNs must fulfill a triple role of: 1) keeping
the enemy submarine forces and the supporting surface forces
pinned back in the bastions and away from critical NATO and
Pacific SLOCs, 2) hunting down and destroying Soviet SSBNs,
SSGNs, and major surface targets, and 3) launching conven-
tional TLAM strikes against theater targets to suppress
Soviet Naval Aviation and PVO interceptor actions. The
current 688 class submarines deployed in the fleet have
limited under-ice capability, with no hardening of the sail
and rudder, no vertical position for the fairwater planes,
and less depth capability than the older 637 class subma-
rines which do possess these features. However, the older
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ships are slightly noisier and slower than the 688 class.
The SSN-21 class currently under design should help rectify
those weaknesses. The use of passive and active counter-
measures to reduce Soviet sensor and weapons effectiveness
has always been emphasized, with anechoic hull coatings
being used to some extent on newer ships. However, the
numerical and familiarity disadvantages of operating in the
bastions, and the high probability of detection of a NATO
sub following a weapon launch there, make the survivability
of a U.S. SSN less than optimum.
Should the SSN force succeed in pinning the Soviets back
in the bastions and suppressing (to some extent) the threat
of land-based air strikes against battle groups, the next
step of the strategy is to expand operations to the flanks
of the battle, using carrier-based air power and sea
launched cruise missiles to relieve pressure on the front
lines and inserting Marine landing forces at critical areas
while reinforcing Norway and Japan. Meanwhile, the surface
Navy and supporting air and submarine assets would destroy
the forward deployed Soviet Navy and Merchant Marine units,
and clear Soviet minefields which interfere with SLOCs and
fleet movement. The mine warfare problem is a sensitive
one, with a dearth of minesweepers pointed out recently in
the Persian Gulf crisis. The need for 15 carrier battle
groups is based on conducting such operations simultaneously
in all areas of the globe; the need to do so is a
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possibility. At the moment, the U.S. Navy does not possess
the forces needed to execute these missions simultaneously,
unless the Allied navies are included in the balance. [Ref.
6]
If the Maritime Strategy is a declaratory strategy
designed to elicit a response from the Soviet Union (and
others) , the most likely desired response would be a Soviet
pullback from its aggressively expanding maritime deploy-
ments of the 1970' s, when OKEAN 70 and 75 established the
Soviet Navy as a global naval power. The Soviets have
pulled back since the late 70' s, restricting their exercises
to the waters relatively near their shores and minimizing
deployments to open ocean. The question then is, are they
doing so because of the Maritime Strategy, or is there
another reason? Some possible explanations are economic
squeeze on the Soviet Navy, an acceptance of a subordinate
role to the overall Soviet military (signaled by the retire-
ment of ADM Gorshkov) , and a consolidation of strength in
areas where they feel that the U.S. Navy will be at a disad-
vantage. There is a possibility that the Maritime Strategy
is not causing the Soviets to react, but vice versa.
The Maritime Strategy as a declaratory policy may also
be a device by which the United States Navy is pressuring
the Army, Air Force and allied countries to provide the
support which it desires. If so, the results have been
mixed, with some elements of the Army and Air Force
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rejecting the strategy outright, and allies refusing to sign
on since they were not adeguately consulted prior to being
assigned roles in the strategy.
The Maritime Strategy, if a device to increase the Navy
budget and increase naval dominance of the U.S. defense
picture, has had mixed success. On the one hand, the Navy
has received the lion's share of the Pentagon budget
throughout the Reagan Administration's tenure, and has
carried on construction of Nimitz class carriers and Los
Angeles class submarines at a good rate. On the other hand,
the debate over the SSN-21 submarine has been stalled, the
early retirement of Garcia class frigates, and the fight to
fund the AEGIS program increases have all put the 600 ship
Navy farther into the future, and the likely defense budget
cuts in the future do not bode well for the Navy. All in
all, however, the Navy should retain a better position vis-
a-vis conventional war than the Army and Air Force despite
budget cuts due to the constant use of navy forces in crisis
response keeping the Navy in the public eye.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The Maritime Strategy, as a case study in success or
failure as a strategy, is a mixed bag. It is probably a
combination of three different strategies with different
success rates, depending on whose opinion one receives. The
overall picture of the Maritime Strategy case is undergoing
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revision constantly, and it will be a few years before it
can be judged a true success or failure in any area. Since
it is the only strategy the U.S. Navy has, it is the tool
which must be used until something better comes along.
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AIR FORCE LONG RANGE PLANNING
LT David Ricker
I. INTRODUCTION
Long range planning in the Air Force has developed over
the years into a well-organized institutional process.
Today's long range planning process begins at the top of the
organization with the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the
Air Force signing the Planning Guidance Memorandum and
encompasses every echelon of the Air Force organization.
Although today ' s planning system is directed from the top
and well-integrated, Air Force long range planning has not
always been centrally directed, diversified or enduring.
Various titles and organizational structures have been used
for the Air Force long range planning process but two
recurring themes have been manifested in each phase of the
planning evolution. Until the late 1970s long range
planning was conducted by ad hoc planning staffs at various
echelons in the Air Force organization. Unhappy with long
range planning, Secretary of the Air Force John Stetson
realized the need for an institutionalized process and
consequently directed a study group to examine the feasibil-
ity of developing an institutionalized planning process that
might possibly incorporate long range planning techniques
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used by the business community, provide a 20 year forecast
and recommend strategy alternatives. The planning process
recommended by the study group was institute in 1978 and has
survived until today. Although the planning system was new,
many strategies, concepts and ideas concerning the mission
of the Air Force and the purpose of air power that had
existed prior to and throughout the history of the Air Force
were incorporated in the new long range planning system.
Today's long range planning is still influenced by two
recurring themes that have helped to shape the "air
strategy" for air power since the 1920s. [Ref. 1]
II. THE ORIGINS OF AIR STRATEGY
Although the United States Air Force was not officially
organized as an independent branch of the armed services
until 1947, U.S. long range planning for the use of air
power has been taking place from the time aircraft were
first introduced as an instrument of war. In order to
realistically evaluate long range planning in the United
States Air Force it is necessary to investigate the theories
of some early air power strategists prior to the 1947
genesis of today's Air Force. Two early air power strategic
thinkers have had the most impact on Air Force planning and




Giulio Douhet, a general in the Italian Army who saw a
significant change in warfare due to the airplane, began
writing about the role of air power in future wars in the
early 1900s. After World War I he wrote a comprehensive
book titled "The Command of the Air" which explained his
theory of air power in warfare. Central to Douhet' s theory
of air power was the significance of strategic bombing.
Douhet' s explanation of how the airplane had completely
changed warfare was profound.
The airplane has complete freedom of action and direc-
tion; it can fly to and from any point of the compass in
the shortest time—in a straight line—by any route deemed
expedient. All the influences which have conditioned and
characterized warfare from the beginning are powerless to
affect aerial action. By virtue of this new weapon, the
repercussions of war are no linger limited by the farthest
artillery range of surface guns, but can be directly felt
for hundreds and hundreds of miles over all the lands and
seas of nations at war. No longer can areas exist in
which life can be lived in safety and tranquility, nor can
the battlefield any longer be limited to actual combatants
....There will be no distinction any longer between
soldiers and civilians. The defenses on land and sea will
no longer serve to protect the country behind them; nor
can victory on land or sea protect the people from enemy
aerial attacks unless that victory insures the
destruction, by actual occupation of the enemy's terri-
tory, of all that gives life to his aerial forces.... By
bombing railroad junctions and depots, population centers
at road junctions, military depots, and other vital objec-
tives, an Air Force could handicap the mobilization of an
Army. By bombing naval bases, arsenals, oil stores,
battleships at anchor, and mercantile ports, it could
prevent the efficient operation of a navy. By bombing the
most vital civilian centers it could spread terror through
the nation and quickly break down a nation's material and
moral resistance. A complete breakdown of the social
structure cannot but take place in a country subjected to
this kind of merciless pounding from the air. [Ref. 2]
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As can be seen from the excerpt above, Douhet was
convinced strategic bombing had altered the nature of war to
such an extent that any nation without an air force capable
of strategic bombing would be quickly defeated. To properly
implement his theory of air power a critical restructuring
of his nation's armed forces was needed to properly utilize
air power.
In order to direct this revolution in warfare, an inde-
pendent air force was needed. An air force subordinate to
the army or navy would be diverted from the primary mission
of strategic bombing by generals and admirals who would be
concerned with their particular type of warfare and might
fail to understand the significance of air power in future
wars.
As long as aerial forces remain mere auxiliaries of the
army and navy, there will be no real aerial warfare in
case of conflict. True, there will be air battles of
major and minor proportions, but always subject to land or
sea operations. Before any real aerial warfare can take
place, its basic elements, such as planes, personnel, and
their organization into an autonomous fighting body, must
first be created and forged into an efficient fighting
organization. [Ref. 2:p. 191]
B. BILLY MITCHELL
America's foremost crusader for air power was General
William "Billy" Mitchell. A contemporary of Douhet,
Mitchell was also a vocal proponent of the role of air power
in future wars. Like Douhet, Mitchell was convinced of the
need for an independent air force and the role air power
would play in future wars. In his epic book Winged Defense ,
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Mitchell spelled out his theories concerning the role of air
power and the revolution in warfare the aircraft had ushered
into the 2 0th century. Although Douhet and Mitchell had
many similar views concerning the future of air power, a
significant difference existed concerning the role of
pursuit, or fighter aircraft and ground support aircraft.
Unlike Douhet, who believed strategic bombing was the key to
air power, Mitchell proposed a role for all aircraft and
included support for ground and naval forces. [Ref. 3] The
controversy over the role of fighters continues among air
power strategists today and has influenced Air Force
planning as the top leadership cycles between bomber and
fighter pilots.
C. AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL
The Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) was organized in
the early 193 0s to study and develop tactics for implement-
ing air power in combatant roles in future wars. The ACTS
embraced Douhet 's and Mitchell's writings on the role of air
power and subsequently developed an air doctrine and several
tactics for air power in future wars. The ACTS played a
significant role in Army Air Corps planning and in 1940 four
officers from the school staff were selected to comprise the
first Air Staff planning team. The Air Staff was responsi-
ble for the development of long range planning for the use
of air power in World War II. Called War Plans Division I,
the plan became the blueprint for the creation of the Army
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Air Force and the conduct of the air war against Germany.
Embracing the theories of air power presented by Douhet and
Mitchell, the first planning staff was convinced of the
importance of strategic bombing and the need for an indepen-
dent air force to properly implement the advantages of air
power. [Ref. 3: p. 17]
III. POST WORLD WAR II PLANNING
The Army Air Force's "air strategy" (developed by the
officers from the ACTS and incorporated into the first war
plans implemented by the Army Air Force in WW II) continued
to emphasize the need for strategic bombing directed by an
independent air force. As the war turned in favor of the
Allies, General Arnold, the commander of the Army Air Force,
issued new directives to his planning staff to begin
planning for the future of air power after the war.
By 1945 the planning staff was encountering considerable
opposition to its future plans for air power due to ongoing
studies of the effects of strategic bombing on the war in
Europe. Reports such as the Strategic Bombing Survey ques-
tioned the postulation that air power alone could win the
war. In August 1945 the staff's dilemma over strategic
bombing was solved as COL Tibbets of the 509th Composite
Bombing Group dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan.
By 1947 the Department of the Air Force was created as an
independent branch of the armed forces of the United States
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and strategic bombing was the buzz word by all discussing
future wars. With long range bombers and nuclear weapons,
air power directed by the Air Force was the deterrent
solution for the perseverance of peace or winning any future
war. The Air Staff had succeeded in reaching its goal of an
independent air force and permanently establishing the place
of strategic bombing in future wars. The next planning
project of the newly created Air Force was a long range
study called "Toward New Horizons." Toward New Horizons
became the foundation plan for the structure and force
composition of the Air Force during the 1950s and 1960s.
[Ref. 4]
In 1976 a study was undertaken at the reguest of the Air
Force by the Rand Corporation to determine what technologies
should be pursued to develop the capabilities that will be
needed in the future. In addition to studying long range
development/planning methods, the study also examined
strategic planning in the Air Force. The recommendations of
the Rand report appear instrumental in the reorganization of
strategic planning by Secretary of the Air Force John
Stetson.
The report found strategic planning continued to be a
function of the Air Staff as it had since the 193 0s.
However, the Air Staff's performance in the role of
strategic planning varied markedly from the ideal strategic
planning conception. The only formal setting of future
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goals accomplished by the Air Staff occurred during the
formulation of the POM. The POM is a force procurement
document that is based on standard threat projections and
current national security policy direction. The POM is a
functional planning and management control document, not a
strategic planning document. As long as Air Staff director-
ates were responsible for providing guidance for the POM,
long range strategic planning was left undone. [Ref. 5]
With only a limited variety of long-range goals presently
developed—and these by methods inappropriate to the
uncertainties of a distant future—and without a realistic
assessment of future resource availability, it is not
surprising that the Air Force seems to lack clear formula-
tion of its strategic policy. At present there is no Air
Force statement of its decisions about long-range policy
or its corporate view of future priorities. Particularly
lacking are any intimations of its corporate preferences
as to the future force and system goals. .. .Strategic
policy recommendations do reach the Air Force's top level
management from time to time in the form of special
studies and as by-products of current program reviews....
Reports from these study efforts may gain wide circulation
as a result of high level Air Staff encouragement.
Seldom, however, is it made clear whether the policy
recommendations of these reports are endorsed or rejected
as official expressions of Air Force long-range strategic
policy. [Ref. 5:pp. 69-71]
The report recommended a change in the organizational struc-
ture with the strategic planning staff established as an
element of the Chief of Staff's personal staff. The change
would allow access to the top leadership of the Air Force
and increase the credibility of the planning staff. The
Strategic Planning Staff would then be free to prepare a
strategic planning document under the direction of Air Force
leaders without conflict from other Staff Directorates whose
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primary responsibility is preparation of the POM. Alterna-
tive futures that might threaten current programs would be
considered at least by the top leaders prior to their modi-
fication by special interest groups within the Air Force.
The Rand report recommendations along with the Long Range
Planning Study Group report resulted in long range planning
changes that are found in the planning process today.
IV. LONG RANGE PLANNING TODAY
Since Secretary of the Air Force John Stetson's feasi-
bility study in 1978, long range planning within the Air
Force has become an integral part of the planning and pro-
curement process within the Air Force. Interchanges between
the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff remain the
foundation of the process and provide the inputs for
development of the Planning Guidance Memorandum (POM) . In
addition to integrating long range planning into the overall
Air Force planning process, active participation by the
major Air Commands also takes place. The USAF Global
Assessment has become the supporting document for the
Planning Guidance Memorandum (PGM) . Prepared by the Long
Range Planning Staff (or contracted out by the staff) , this
document looks forward 15 to 20 years and provides a long
range view of the environment in which the Air Force expects
to operate.
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The centerpiece that makes the planning system function
is the PGM. The PGM provides broad executive guidance and
long term perspectives to initiate the planning cycle. From
the guidance provided by the PGM the planning staff then
develops the USAF Planning Guide. The Planning Guide pro-
vides a rank order of the future capabilities the Air Force
requires to perform its missions. From the Planning Guide
Air Force Staff Directorates develop the Planning Input and
the Strategy and Policy Assessment. These documents are
used by programmers to provide input into the Air Force POM
which is the guiding document in the procurement process.
Figure 1 provides a flow diagram of the Air Force long range
planning system. [Ref. 6] Although an organized process
for planning exists, that does not necessarily indicate
successful long range planning. The following is a brief


































Although one would think that after 40 years the impor-
tance of air power was firmly established in the minds of
all Americans, this does seem to be the case to Air Force
leaders of the past or present. The USAF Global Assessment
seems to indicate a failure of the national military strate-
gy to emphasize the importance of the two most important
themes to Air Force planners, i.e., a need for an indepen-
dent Air Force and the importance of air power and strategic
bombing. Because previous planning systems provided too
many opportunities for individual unit interests and in-
house (within the Air Force) controversies, the importance
of air power could be diminished. To prevent such fragmen-
tation of mission and importance of air power, the Planning
Guidance Memorandum (PGM) attempts to provide the top down
direction needed to diminish such controversies. It seems
Air Force leaders saw a need for improvements in long range
planning, however, they failed to see their own biases that
could hinder effective strategic planning. How well today's
system is working is still being evaluated, but some
strengths and weaknesses can be observed.
B. STRENGTHS
The major strength of the current system is seen in the
clearly defined planning process and the delegation of
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responsibilities by the top leaders of the Air Force. The
importance of top down direction has been substantiated by
the business community and adopted by the Air Force. In
addition to top down direction, Air Force leaders provide
clearly defined goals to all Air Force commands and receive
feedback from those commands. Long range goals are subse-
quently updated annually to attempt to provide rapid inte-
gration of the changing international situations and fast
paced technological changes presented through feedback and
contract studies.
Another strength of the system is in its attempt to work
within the DoD system. The Long Range Planning Staff
provides inputs based upon long range views of the future
roles of air power to both Joint Planning Staffs and pro-
curement staffs. Incorporated within the system is an
effort to implement the Air Force view of the future into
the DoD procurement system and influence the systems that
will be developed and procured in the future.
C. WEAKNESSES
An apparent weakness in the planning process is seen
during the preparation of the Global Assessment document
which provides guidance to the Secretary and Chief. Because
of the all-encompassing scope of the national military stra-
tegy and the broad definition of national interests by the
Executive Department, the Air Force attempts to define
national interests by looking through Air Force glasses.
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This action injects biases at the beginning of the planning
process as the national interests are defined by those with
special interests in perpetuating air power. A better plan
would be developed if the national strategy were stated more
explicitly and air planners were then tasked to provide
future plans based on those strategies.
One weakness noticed is the Air Force's reluctance to
consider all uses of air power in their long range plans.
If an independent direction of air power is the most effi-
cient method, then inter-service rivalry should be
diminished and all air platforms and capabilities should be
considered as a whole. Although the Navy and Army would
likely oppose such plans, they should still be presented
along with the consequences of continued fragmentation of
air power.
Another weakness noticed is the lack of control by the
Air Force of the air assets of the Air National Guard and
the lack of inclusion of their impact on future planning.
Development of the Air National Guard should be in accord
with the future as perceived by Air Force long range
planners for maximum utilization of those assets during a
national crisis.
Another failure often cited is that strategic planning
is not really long range. Most plans seem to diffuse at the
same point as the POM ceases to consider the future.
Although this relationship may be difficult to prove, the
202
impact budget planning has on long range strategic planning
can be questioned. Those who accomplish the planning also
cycle between staff and operational billets and are inti-
mately familiar with the personnel in both operational and
budget positions. To describe a future where a system
currently being procured would be unnecessary would probably
spell disaster for the career of the planner. A possible
solution to these types of conflicts would be to establish
permanent professional planners and integrate more civilians
into the process.
The final weakness noted was the power Air Force Systems
Command has on future planning and the control it exercises
over the entire Air Force procurement process. Although the
planning process has top down direction, goals and
objectives presented by the planning staff must pass through
Systems Command before they get to the programmers who
prepare the POM.
VI. CONCLUSION
Air Force long range planning appears to be the best
functionally organized planning process within the services.
The Air Force has learned much from the business world and
integrated those procedures that seem most beneficial in its
planning process. The top leaders are involved in the
process and provide direction to all echelons of the Air
Force. If strategic planning in the Air Force continues to
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receive the direction from the leadership that it has in the
past, the system should continue to improve and produce
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THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE:
PLANNING FOR MOBILIZATION OR POLITICS?
LT Walter Kreitler
I. PROGRAM BACKGROUND
The United States Strategic Mineral Stockpile has
endured changes in U.S. warfighting strategy, world non-fuel
mineral market conditions and various domestic special
interest groups to emerge a federal program inconsistent in
its ability to implement United States defense policy. Like
many programs with a constituency which pursues ends for
which the program was not designed, the Strategic Mineral
Stockpile operates in a climate which fosters stable markets
and deficit control vice mobilization preparedness.
The contemporary situation regarding the National
Defense Stockpile is typical of its 30-odd year history.
The logic of having the stockpile reflect contemporary U.S.
warplanning is irrefutable. To this end the amounts and
types of material that should be available for emergency use
provides for the worst case wartime scenario. The current
National Security Strategy of the United States published in
January 1988 discusses the need for;
On the industrial side, the maintenance of a broad, techo-
logically superior mobilization base is a fundamental ele-
ment of U.S. defense policy. . .this capability supports
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deterrence and provides the ability for a timely and
flexible response to the full range of plausible threats. 1
The rebuilding of U.S. military capabilities in the
early 1980s has enabled the U.S. to react with flexibility
to meet whatever threat it viewed as pressing. Clearly, the
revitalization of U.S. military forces committee to the
North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) has enabled that
organization to credibly maintain a conventional deterrent.
The cornerstone of the U.S. deterrent is the ability, and
the intention, to escalate horizontally and in the dimension
of time. It is in the dimension of time that the National
Defense Stockpile comes into play.
The Reagan Administration inherited an NDS program from
the Carter years that utilized a three year time horizon for
executing mobilization and warfighting. In the sense that
this provided a clear dictate for war planning purposes the
NDS had a well-managed supply of a wide variety of
materials, albeit not all truly critical or strategic. Some
significant gaps did indeed exist (and still do) in various
critical materials, most notably in the Platinum metals
group and titanium. Despite this, the general trend has
been to maintain the planned stockpile as it has existed
since the mid-1960s without regard to major swings in
military planning contingencies.
^National Security of the United States, January 1988,
The White House, Washington, D.C., p. 21.
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AGE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE ASSETS 2
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT
The origins of the need for a strategic reserve of
material was recognized in the 1880s. 3 While the initial
exploration was only to determine what mineral shortcomings
existed in the contiguous United States, the pre-World War
II Reconstruction Finance Corporation established via the
Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 1939,
served to martial critical and strategic materials. 4
Following the Second World War, the stockpiles were
2Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Stockpile Report
to Congress," January 1988, pp. 8-9, 19.
3Amos Jordan and Robert Kilmarx, Strategic Mineral
Dependence . Center for Strategic Studies Georgetown Univer-
sity, Sage Publishing, Beverly Hills, CA, 1979, p. 40.
4Strategic minerals are those not available in the
United States vice critical minerals which, while important,
are available in the Continental United States.
208
subsequently consolidated by legislation of 1946. This
legislation established the Army Navy Munitions Board as the
cognizant authority for determining the mobilization
requirements. The 1950 Strategic and Critical Materials Act
is in effect today is the authority by which current
materials are stockpiled.
This Act required that the NDS be managed by a committee
consisting of representation from the Departments of State,
Commerce, Treasury, Defense, Interior and Agriculture.
Clearly, each member of that group had his own agenda. From
the view of the Department of Interior, the NDS was the
perfect tool to protect the domestic mining industry. Agri-
culture's interest was in the Barter Program, in which
excess foodstuffs procured with federal subsidies could be
exchanged for minerals. Commerce, Treasury and State all
were interested, albeit for different reasons, in where the
minerals for the NDS were purchased, under what terms and
what impacts this would have on the mineral market prices. 5
These bureaucratic forces were largely counterproductive
to determining the actual requirements. The primary deter-
minant of the NDS composition should be the type of war and
mobilization being planned for. The evolution of nuclear
weapons and strategy had little impact on the initial
requirements of the stockpile. Until 1958 a five year
5Raymond Mikesell, Stockpiling Strategic Materials .
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1986, p. 12.
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mobilization was planned on. In 1958 the National Security
Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff prevailed and a three
year planning horizon was implemented. 6 This remained the
normal stockpile goal through today, with a hiatus in the
Nixon Administration which called for a one year stockpile. 7
One feature of NDS operations which makes the measure-
ment of total requirements difficult is that the level of
planning must make arbitrary assumptions about the wartime
civilian economy, some of which involve unpleasant issues.
In addition, stockpile goals are only adequate to mobilize
the economy, not sustain it in every category of NDS
holdings. In cases where no domestic production capacity
existed or foreign supply was not reliable, then the
stockpile would be required to be a three year supply. 8
The actual amounts of material required are currently
derived via a system devised under President Ford's Adminis-
tration. Under this plan, three tiers of requirements were
organized, military needs, essential civilian needs and
general civilian needs. Within these areas amounts needed
to sustain the war effort are computed. Factored in are
time phasing of warfighting, problems with lead times for
6Mikesell, Stockpiling Strategic Materials , p. 17
7Jordan, Strategic Mineral Dependence , p. 45.
8Jordan, Strategic Mineral Dependence , p. 45.
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production and problems with supply of minerals mined
overseas. 9
The system for determining aggregate NDS requirements is
complicated by the nature of reliability of sources, the
degree to which sea lines of communication will be
assaulted, and the nature of the war itself. These items
are specifically not mentioned in summary of the Annual
Materials Plan (AMP) , the annual plan that directs stockpile
operations. In addition there exists the difficult problem
of ascertaining the nature of the civilian sector of the
economy in a mobilization scenario. This combination of key
wartime problems is balanced against more mundane (although
in peacetime no less important) issues. Specifically:
The AMP is developed in a manner that balances National
Defense Stockpile requirements against the need to avoid
undue market disruption and to conform with budget
limitations. 10
In summary, the plan for the NDS is generated by the
requirement to mobilize U.S. industry for a three year war,
in which some minerals will not be available from the con-
tinental United States (CONUS) . After determining the
aggregate needs of essential industries to execute this
mobilization, annual incremental changes to the NDS are made
9Mikesell, Stockpiling Strategic Materials , p. 35.
10,lStockpile Report to Congress," Federal Emergency
Management Agency, August 1987, p. 20. It should be noted
that the AMP is generated from an Interagency working group
that does involve DoD input.
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primarily on the basis of not disrupting markets, via the
AMP.
III. PLANNING CONSTRAINTS FOR THE CONTEMPORARY NDS
As mentioned earlier, the goals of the NDS are to ensure
that the United States mobilization efforts are not hampered
by a lack of any particular mineral. The determinants of
how much and of what are largely a function of what type of
mobilization will be expected. The degree of access to out-
side sources and the level of support given the non-defense
sector of the economy are also key issues. That these
planning guidelines are obvious is not to say they are the
absolute constraints on NDS objectives. A large and varied
group of officials dictate requirements for the NDS, all
with different bureaucratic agenda.
With the problems inherent in reaching a consensus
amongst an inter-agency working group acting as a barrier to
changing the NDS holdings, the Reagan Administration took
the initiative in the summer of 1985. In ordering the
National Security Council to study NDS composition, the NSC
was given the commission to conduct a zero-based review.
The results of the study indicated that the NDS was largely
surplus material, and the NDS goal should be reduced in
dollar value from $16.1 Billion to $.7 Billion. 11 By
11General Accounting Office, "National Defense Stock-
pile," May 1987, Washington, D.C., p. 2.
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proposing to reduce the NDS holdings by 59% through sales,
the Administration hoped to be able to modernize the
remainder of the stockpile by purchasing materials of a more
suitable quality. 12 By readjusting the levels of various
minerals, some gains could be made in aggregate stockpile
holdings in areas where the NDS was deficient.
In the White House announcement of 8 July 1985 to reduce
the NDS levels and restructure the overall amounts in
various holdings the Administration cited the following as
rationale:
This [1984] review concluded that a number of basic errors
and unrealistic assumptions were used in the 1979 study.
The present study relied on more realistic assumptions
regarding oil availability, essential civilian require-
ments and domestic materials production. The new stock-
pile, unlike the one proposed in 1979, does not reflect
the stockpiling of materials to ensure non-essential
consumer production in a protracted military conflict.
The stockpile does reflect essential civilian goods
production with per capita consumption at more than twice
the WWII level.... In all areas the latest, best available
data was used. By contrast, the previous 1979 stockpile
goals relied on 1967 data in many cases. 13
The model used to generate requirements is a complex
production function; a combination of sensitivity analysis
and macro-economic theory. The model relies on factors such
as taxes, interest rates, civilian sector demand, etc. The
American Mining Congress, representing the U.S. mining
12 For instance, the capacity to utilize some materials
held is no longer available in the U.S., in addition some
items have a shelf life or are no longer utilized in indus-
try. See Table I.
13White House Press Release, July 8, 1985, Washington,
D.C.
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industry in Washington, D.C was never consulted regarding
industry input for the stockpile model. 14 This is a key
discontinuity in the stockpile planning process. The model
accounts for a variety of contingency plans, yet the U.S.
mining industry may not be capable of mobilizing to the
degree the current plan calls for. 15
The planning constraints for the National Defense Stock-
pile are clearly outlined in the most recent Strategic and
Critical Materials Stock Piling Act. The ultimate goal of
the NDS is to ensure:
The quantities of the materials stockpiled should be
sufficient to sustain the United States for a period of
not less than three years in the event of a national
emergency. 16
This goal, according to the White House proposal, can be met
with a revitalized NDS which, although small in absolute
holdings, reflects the current U.S. capacity to utilize the
materials at hand. This is a major point of contention.
One issue agreed upon by both the American Mining Congress
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (currently the
custodians of the NDS) is the inability of U.S. industry to
use some of the materials held in the stockpile. Both
organizations cite the movement of the ferro-alloy industry
14Discussions with American Mining Congress officials,
13 May, 1988. Also GAO Report on NSC study, pp. 2, 28, 32.
15Discussions with American Mining Congress officials,
13 May, 1988.
16The Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act
(Public Law 96-41, United States Code 98 et seq.).
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to "off shore" (read overseas) locations as representative
of this problem. U.S. industries require more finished
products in terms of the metals industry than was true in
the 1950s when the NDS was established. 17
Up until the proposal by the White House to sell off a
major portion of the NDS, the degree of freedom given the
President was substantial in managing the stockpile.
Congress, opting to side against the Office of Management
and Budget, wanted to retain control over the NDS, and
constrained Presidential action by requiring Congressional
approval for sales of the magnitude proposed in July of
1985. 18
These guidelines are a sharp departure from years prior
when a great degree of freedom was given to the Executive
Branch to administer the NDS. Clearly these changes are in
direct response to the Administration plan to reduce the NDS
holdings and change the composition of the stockpile itself.
IV. NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE; CAPABILITY VERSUS
PLANNING
Three areas of analysis are required to examine the NDS
strategic plan, and its ability to assist in generating a
mobilized war economy. First, and most basic to determining
17Conversations with FEMA and AMC officials, dated 16
May 1988.
18National Defense Stockpile Amendments of 1987 (Public
Law 100-180, December 1987)
.
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NDS success, is the fit of NDS holdings to current National
Defense Strategy Goals. Second, are the holdings adequate
for these plans, and more critically, is the material usable
to industry to produce wartime equipment and munitions.
Lastly, to what degree is the NDS planning and execution
free from political interference. In evaluating these three
key issues, the measure of potential utility of the NDS can
be judged. It will be the purpose of this section to
determine whether the various legislation enacted regarding
the NDS since 1980 has been to increase its ability to serve
the nation in crisis or to further political and bureaucrat-
ic agendas of various involved organizations.
A. CURRENT NDS HOLDINGS VERSUS NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
The current composition of the NDS is only somewhat
indicative of the type of declaratory military currently
espoused by the White House. In reviewing the key holdings
of the NDS (see Appendix A) , several key questions arise.
Do these materials enable the contemporary U.S. industry to
mobilize for three years and fight and win a protracted
global war? Are the supplies of materials that must come
from overseas capable of arriving via long ocean transits
and/or from reliable suppliers? Is the NDS capable of
providing enough material for the civilian economy to avoid
any problems with morale and shortages on the home front?
All these questions must be addressed. In addition,
assuming the minimal amount of NDS holdings would be
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adequate to see the nation through a war, is an additional
amount required to supply our Allies or to assist in post-
war transition to a civilian economy?
B. UTILITY OF CURRENT NDS HOLDINGS
It is difficult to ascertain to what degree the NDS
would be useful in mobilizing U.S. industry. Stockpile
officials have a rather lengthy procedure for releasing NDS
holdings, a procedure which bears review here. In order for
the materials to be used they must be first released by the
President, as per the current law. 19 Even after Presiden-
tial release, material must not be available in the United
States at any price. Following both the necessary and
sufficient conditions, the President is petitioned via the
Departments of Commerce and Defense to allow the NDS
holdings to be purchased by a company producing defense-
essential materials. 20 While the administrative processes
may be cumbersome, it can easily be imagined how this could
be facilitated in a crisis. What would be difficult to
follow is how the knowledge of the NDS would impact prices
in a mobilization scenario. Obviously, the mobilization is
the only important issue, yet in a pre-crisis phase, the
acquisition of war materials would be very important. That
19United States Code, Title 50, Public Law 96-41
(effective date, 31 March, 1987) .
2 Conversations with FEMA personnel, 16 May, 1988.
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industry could turn this into a bone of contention via price
gouging could create problems in a critical time. 21
The question of the quality and utility of the NDS hold-
ings is one which is addressed by the Administration NDS
reductions proposal. The types of material held are not
usable in their stockpile form. For example, chromite ore
comes in several grades for various purposes. The U.S. does
not have the capacity to refine these materials into
required forms. 22 These two factors led to the Ferro-alloys
upgrade program in which some materials will be modernized
via sale and purchase of semi-finished material. While this
program is the correct direction for the NDS to go, it would
be very expensive to upgrade all required material in the
near term.
C. MOBILIZING THE U.S. METALS INDUSTRY
The only real model for war mobilization in the United
States is the Second World War. In this war the United
States continued to import many strategic materials. In
examining this model several problems become obvious:
1. 81% of all specialized ore carrying ships were sunk in
the period January 1942 through December 1942.
21The August 1987 Stock Pile Report to Congress points
out the need to initiate mobilization prior to the outbreak
of hostilities, page 66.
22 Raymond F. Mikesell, Non-Fuel Minerals: Foreign
Dependence and National Security , University of Michigan
Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 1987, p. 154.
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2. Over 200,000 tons of mineral products had to be trans-
ported by air in 1943 alone.
3
.
In some critical fields the supply was so tight that
loss of a single ship caused a bow wave of tightening
in many industries. 2 -*
With these problems in mind, it is difficult to under-
stand the rationale used by the National Security Council in
determining shipping attrition issues in the study of stra-
tegic materials in mobilization. Specifically, the head of
the working group involving Sealane Attrition was initially
an Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Ship Building and
Logistics. He was replaced after six months by a represen-
tative from 0MB, whose credentials go unmentioned. 24
The NDS of today must be able to supply industry with
material it may use immediately. The industrial base that
went to war in 1941 no longer exists today. Many basic
industries have been forced out of operation in the U.S. due
to problems in the areas of labor costs, environmental
protection, depleted resources and excessive regulation.
The stockpiling of raw material for an industry which may
not be able to process them in time of crisis is a dangerous
diseconomy. In time of mobilization, no shipping will be
available to transport U.S. materials to foreign smelters to
be shipped back to the United States.
23 Items #1, #2, #3, John Morgan, The Domestic Mining
Industry in the United States in World War II . Pennsylvania
State College, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949, pp.
330-341.
24GAO, "National Defense Stockpile," p. 27.
219
On one hand the stockpile must be varied enough to
support all industrial needs in a mobilization, yet it must
accurately reflect current capacity for the U.S. metals
industry. This includes incorporation of new technology
into NDS planning. An example of a key strategic mineral
being made relatively less important is cobalt. In produc-
tion of aircraft jet engines, substitutes of various alloys
(nickel, aluminum and molybdenum) have been found more
effective in turbines and compressors than cobalt alloys. 25
As an aside, the NDS program is heavily involved with
research for substitute materials. The range of programs
runs from metallurgical research to growing rubber (guayule)
domestically. These programs are administered by a variety
of Departments, involving Agriculture, Defense, and Interior
being the leading agencies. 26 Mineral substitution programs
are much more controversial as they involve examining
various areas for possible deposits. Naturalists have
historically opposed research into designated Wilderness
Wildlife Areas. This is a powerful force to contend with
not only for production, but to merely examine potential. 27
The American Mining Congress is not comfortable with the
NDS for several reasons, not all of them significant to
mobilization. What is of import, however, is the industry
25Mikesell, Stockpiling Strategic Materials, p. 61.
26,,Stockpile Report to Congress, January 1988," p. 34
27
"Stockpile Report to Congress, January 1988," p. 23
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concern of a disconnect in the types of materials needed and
the types of material available upon mobilization. The
types of material available do not reflect the U.S. smelter
capacity to process it. For instance, the U.S. domestic
steel industry continues to shrink. The total U.S. output
will drop by four percent between 1985 and 1990, and no new
blast furnaces are planned in this timeframe. 28
With these types of problems endemic in the metals
industry, the ability to sustain production in wartime may
be very difficult. Military uses of metals, even when dis-
placing civilian production, are high. There are no guaran-
tees that the current capacity would survive intact a war
which might include various types of sabotage, long-range
precision guided munitions, or worst case, use of nuclear
weapons
.
D. PLANNING FOR A WARTIME ECONOMY
Amongst all the various elements involving the genera-
tion of NDS goals, none is more contentious or sensitive
than the nature of the wartime economy civilian sector. The
degree to which factors of production are diverted to
civilian use is important for two reasons. First, increased
civilian use will entail (if sustained) a requirement for
larger NDS holdings. Second, the morale factor of having to
28William Hogan, Steel in the United States; Restruc-
turing to Compete . Heath and Company, Lexington, MA, 1984,
p. 137.
221
do without requires a degree of sacrifice which is largely
foreign to the "American way of war." Even in World War II,
the U.S. economy grew at roughly 3% per annum. There is no
guarantee that this would be possible in a future global war
involving mobilization. In the major reductions proposed in
the summer of 1985, the third tier, non-essential civilian
production was given a thorough review. The study on which
the new plan was based required that stockpile requirements
for non-essential civilian production be eliminated. 29 In
addition the new study revealed that earlier programs had
made incorrect assumptions regarding the availability of
oil, and domestic mineral production. 30 The sanguine
approach taken to dismiss civilian non-essentials may make
sustained war effort more difficult in terms of keeping the
population behind the war effort. The primary discussion of
this aspect of the NDS is addressed in the response of the
National Security Council (NSC) to GAO criticisms of new
planning methodology. In the response the NSC made three
main points.
1. A 50% increase in both civilian and defense sectors of
the economy would not be possible due to oil shortages
and wartime production requirements.
2. The economy will not be able to expand to meet non-




"Stockpile Report to the Congress, 1987," p. 58.
30
"Stockpile Report to the Congress, 1987," p. 58.
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3. The GAO recategorization of 50% of non-essential to
essential for purposes of stockpiling criteria is
contrary to the spirit of the NDS. 31
In the final analysis, the reason the Reagan Administra-
tion proposed the reduction in the NDS was due to the NSC
study citing the need to restructure (and reduce) the stock-
pile to better fit a realistic wartime economy. The NSC,
and the OMB, both felt the NDS was out of line with the war
scenario that the NSC found most likely. The GAO response
was that the assumptions, although accurate to a degree for
the scenario postulated, did not represent worst case, or
even provide for a reasonable range of contingencies. This
divergence of opinion in the most basic of issues, the
nature of mobilization to utilize the NDS, is the central
issue of the NDS debates.
V. CONCLUSION
The conclusions and lessons to be drawn regarding the
strategic management and planning for the NDS fall into two
groups. First, to what degree does the stated purpose and
composition of the NDS match the National Defense Strategy,
and secondly, how does the NDS match the real requirements
for mobilization. It is always difficult to assess the
effectiveness of a plan that is never executed, often
31National Security Council letter dated 22 April 1987,
Serial 2995, to the General Accounting Office, Office of the
Comptroller General.
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debated and never fully funded. Despite this there seems to
be a belated correlation (since the early 1970s) between the
NDS and what the National Strategy purported to be. The
truly critical problem is the reconciliation of the NDS and
the mobilization capacity.
A. NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
STOCKPILE
The NDS under the current administration has reflected
two major thrusts of policy. First, by modernizing the NDS
(which included reducing it in absolute terms) , an effort
was made to actually procure material which would be useful
to U.S. industry during time of war. It can be stated as
proof that the entire effort of reinvigorating the Depart-
ment of Defense would be incomplete without reviewing the
mobilization capacity. 32 As an important adjunct to that,
the sale of NDS assets would finance the purchase and
upgrade of materials required under a new NDS plan. As a
reduction of holdings on the order of 59% was proposed, a
substantial amount of surplus funds would be transferred to
the U.S. Treasury to reduce the Federal Deficit.
This proposed sales program and subsequent transfer of
funds is what has become a political problem. The Law as
enacted on 31 March 1987 specifically states:
32It should be noted that a JCS exercise held in 1978,
"Nifty Nugget," highlighted some of the key weaknesses in
the NDS holdings.
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The purpose of the Stockpile is to serve the interest of
national defense only and is not to be used for economic
or budgetary purposes. 33
The proponents of selling off the NDS and "freshening" its
holdings include the Department of Defense, and to a lesser
degree, industry officials. The mining industry does not
want to see any disturbances to the free market for
minerals. The fact that the revenues would be transferred
to the Treasury to eliminate some portion of the debt is of
interest to many who view the sales program as an error.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) sees the NDS as a
potential for deficit reduction. Industry sees NDS sales as
not only affecting markets, but also creating problems for
mine subsidies.
If the sales program can be taken at face value and
assume the Administration was only interested in actually
improving the overall defense posture, then the deficit
reduction argument loses its momentum. Since the Reagan
Administration has sought to improve all U.S. defense
capabilities across the board, it would seem that this
argument is not reasonable. Nonetheless, Congress passed
legislation which essentially requires the President to have
approval prior to making major adjustments to NDS holdings.
The management control of the NDS will pass to the
Defense Logistics Agency by July 1, 1988. Government
33Public Law, 96-41, Title 50 U.S. Code, Section 3,
Paragraph b. It is of interest that this constraint on NDS
use comes before the quantity and length of mobilization section.
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officials hope to find a greater level of support for NDS
issues in the new management arrangement. Some skeptics,
however, cite the Pentagon as having "larger fish to fry"
and see the transfer as an admittance of the NDS being too
hard to update to usable levels, and too entrenched to be
done away with. 34
In terms of incorporating the NDS into military strate-
gic planning, several important items are of note. The Navy
Maritime Strategy, which foretells of relatively little
interference in the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) is
taken as an article of faith by the NDS plan which calls for
reducing the total stockpile. The ability to obtain
minerals from nations other than Mexico or Canada is viewed
as a reasonable planning assumption. Despite the earlier
noted experience of WW II shipping losses, and possible
problems with political reliability for some African mineral
rich states, an optimistic view of free use of the seas in a
protracted conventional war is an important planning feature
of the revised (and unimplemented) NDS goals.
B. THE UTILITY OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE
The utility of the NDS is a function of what the stock-
pile consists of, the release procedures, the degree of
crisis and, most importantly, the ability to turn minerals
34FEMA, the current controlling agency does have a
large and varied agenda, to include housing for the home-
less, etc.
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into munitions. Having discussed at length the various com-
ponents of the NDS, the release criteria, it is now time to
examine if any NDS at all can be utilized.
In 1981 there were but five plants capable of making the
large metal forgings required for large aircraft parts.
There was only one factory capable of forging tank turrets
and hulls, the remaining were out of business due to lack of
demand and high costs from regulations regarding Occupation-
al Safety and Health Administration. Exotic metals forgings
and castings can require a lead time of over 120 weeks. 35
These are not the signs of an industry capable of wartime
surging. Of course, the example of the Second World War
would imply that the excess capacity exists, yet, that
capacity existed in the form of plants, foundries and yards
which were underutilized (initially) and only later included
new factory production. There is little evidence to support
the notion that U.S. industry would be capable of rapidly
supporting an exponential growth of high technology weapons
and munitions production. In fact, a 1976 Defense Science
Board Plan for Industrial Mobilization was labeled "virtual-
ly worthless" by that same Board in 1979. 36 Little has
happened that would refute that assertion.
35
"Industrial Planning and Defense Planning," Senior
Conference Final Report, United States Military Academy,
West Point, NY, June 4, 1981, pp. 6,7,8.
36
"Industrial Planning and Defense Planning," p. 8.
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The Reagan Administration plan which would have upgraded
the NDS ability to contribute to an industrial mobilization
faces strong political opposition. The Congress moved
quickly to protect the NDS from sale (and modernization) and
has only provided the appropriations for upgrade to continue
the Ferro-alloy program. This is also an issue in light of
the program's key role in maintaining any ferro-alloy
furnace in the United States. 37 The Reagan Administration
has sought to align the NDS with its National Defense
Policy. The amount of success has been hampered by a desire
in Congress to not allow the NDS sales to impact metals
market prices and to maintain the NDS as is.
In light of the Executive Branch's historical and
continuing efforts to maintain an NDS which was in line with
the contemporary view of the most likely mobilization sce-
nario, no gains can be forecast for the NDS as a whole.
Unfortunately, the concept, although well-conceived, was
poorly executed. This does not mean that the NDS is without
use. It simply means that it is as useful as it can be
within the constraints applied politically. Since there is
only marginal bi-partisan support for defense issues in
general, the NDS in particular, there are, to quote an
unnamed NDS official, "larger fish to fry." The impact of
this will only be realized in the worst case, a total war.
37
"Stockpile Report to the Congress, January 1988," p,
2.
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The "Post Industrial" United States has to make a conscious
(and expensive) decision as to the value of maintaining an
industrial base capable of mobilizing to fight a prolonged
war. Until this decision is made, any declaratory policy
will be just declaratory.
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Figure 6
INVENTORY OF STOCKPILE MATERIALS
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THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE:
PLANNING FOR PETROLEUM SECURITY
Ted Guillory
I. BACKGROUND
In expressing their displeasure with the United States
for its support of Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the
Arab nations imposed the 1973-74 oil embargo. For the first
time in history, oil was used as a weapon in attempting to
gain political concessions. This opportunity was made
possible to the Arabs because of the U.S. substantial
dependence upon Middle-Eastern oil. 1 At that time,
approximately 49.6 percent of the U.S. total imports of oil
came from this region making up slightly over 17 percent of
the oil consumed in this country. 2 In view of the U.S.
demand levels for petroleum, dependence upon foreign oil was
inescapable; however, the reliance upon a single region for
the greater portion of those imports had the adverse effect
of making the U.S. vulnerable to the Arab oil disruption. 3
'The Strategic Petroleum Reserve: An Overview of Its
Development and Use in the Event of an Oil Supply Disrup-
tion (GAO/RCED-85-134, September 30, 1985), 4.
2The World Almanac and Book of Facts . 1988 ed. , s.v.,
"Petroleum."
3Reoort of the National Petroleum Council's Committee
on Emergency Preparedness for Interruption of Petroleum
Imports into the United States , by C.C. Garvin, Jr. Chairman
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As a result of the Arabs attempted blackmail, the 1973-
74 oil embargo had a profound impact upon the United States'
economic interest. Not only did the U.S. experience higher
inflation and balance of payment problems, but it is esti-
mated that between 35 to 45 billion dollars in GNP was lost
and more than 500,000 jobs disappeared. 4 If there was
anything positive to be derived from the embargo, it was
that it brought into focus questions about the future vul-
nerability of the U.S. economy to Arab oil.
In response to the demonstrated vulnerability of the
U.S. economy to Middle-Eastern oil, the Congress, in 1975,
passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) . In
addition to calling for other conservation measures, the
EPCA called for the establishment of the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve (SPR) . The SPR was intended to be a ready source of
oil in the event of a future embargo. 5 The objectives of
the SPR were threefold:
- To reduce the anticipated economic effect of another oil
supply disruption,
- To reduce vulnerability to supply disruption,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), 1.
4The Strategic Petroleum Reserve: An Overview of its
Development and Use in the Event of an Oil Supply Disrup-
tion
, 4.
5The Strategic Petroleum Reserve: An Overview of its
Development and Use in the Event of an Oil Supply Disrup-
tion . 4.
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- To help the U.S. meet its commitment as a member of the
International Energy Agency, of maintaining a reserve
equal to 90 days of the previous years net oil imports. 6
In planning for the accomplishment of these objectives,
a three phase plan was initiated. Phase I called for the
storage of about 260 million barrels of oil. it encompassed
the acquisition and modifying of caverns for oil storage in
Southeastern Texas and Southwestern Louisiana. Phase II,
which began in 1979, involved creating new caverns at three
of the original Phase I sites. These additional caverns
would increase the SPR's capacity to approximately 550
million barrels. Phase III, which began in 1982 and was
originally scheduled for completion in 1990, involves
creating additional capacity to the implementation level of
750-million barrels by adding additional caverns to three
existing storage sites and developing a new site in
Southeastern Texas. 7
The SPR was a major undertaking by the U.S. government
in reducing its vulnerability to future oil supply disrup-
tion. However, when one compares the program's accomplish-
ments against its stated objectives and plans, the SPR can
be judged as being only moderately successful.
6The Strategic Petroleum Reserve; An Overview of its
Development and Use in the Event of an Oil Supply Disrup-
tion . 4.
7The Strategic Petroleum Reserve: An Overview of its




The Executive Department is charged with the overall
responsibility for planning and managing the SPR. Before
the establishment of the Department of Energy (DOE) , in
1977, the Federal Energy Administration assumed these
functions. Since that time, the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Energy for the SPR has been responsible for the perform-
ance of these duties. With the exception of the Defense
Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) purchasing the oil for the SPR,
the SPR is autonomous of any other government department.
As shown in Figure 1, the SPR is organized along the
lines of the typical governmental centralized system.
Although it appears that the President holds exclusive
authority over the SPR, the Congress, because of its control
over the nation's purse, can exert just as much influence as
the President upon the development and operations of the
SPR.
Under the Deputy Assistant Secretary's guidance, manage-
ment for the SPR has been divided into a Program Office and
a Project Office. The Program Office has cognizances over
program management, planning, and budgeting, while the
Project Office is concerned with the day-to-day operations
of the SPR. 8
8The Strategic Petroleum Reserve: An Overview of its



























Figure 1. SPR Organization
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Perhaps not intentionally, the initial planning for the
SPR followed Ascher's model as depicted in Figure 2. 9 The
United States' interest was to decrease its vulnerability to
an oil supply disruption. In stating this interest at this
level of generality instead of just focusing upon the Middle
East, planning is of a more enduring nature. That is,
interest described at a high level generality provides for a
strategy that will encompass other potential sources of oil
disruption. Moreover, an interest stated at this level is




Figure 2. SPR's Strategic Planning Model 10
It appears that the only environment considered in
formulating the SPR's strategy was one of instability of
supply. More specifically, as the demand for oil increases,
the U.S. would become more vulnerable to an embargo.
Considering the impact of the 73-74 oil embargo upon the
U.S. economy there was no other realistic alternative
environment to be considered.
9William Ascher and William H. Overholt, Strategic
Planning and Forecasting (New York: A Wiley-Interscience
Publication, 1983), 21-37.
10Ascher, Strategic Planning and Forecasting . 22.
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Similarly, since only a single environment was
considered, the resulting core strategy provided for the
development of the SPR. The initial plan called for "the
SPR to be large enough to offset the highest amount of oil
imported during a consecutive three month period in 1974-
75." 11 However, in 1977, as a result of increased U.S.
petroleum imports, this requirement was revised and
increased the SPR's ultimate size to one-million barrels and
expanded the implementation plan to provide for 750 million
barrels.
III. KEY ELEMENTS
Since there is no precise method of predicting the
future, planning must be based upon some key assumption.
Moreover, because resources are limited and because any
long-range plan must be executed during a minimum of two
administrations, constraints are imposed upon any governmen-
tal plan. The SPR, not being an exception, was devised and
has endured in the context of the aforementioned. The
following list of assumptions and constraints are what this
author believes are paramount to the SPR.
13-The Strategic Petroleum Reserve; An Overview of its




The major assumption in planning for the SPR was that a
reserve containing a three month supply of oil with a daily
drawdown rate of 3.3 million barrels per day would be enough
to offset approximately 45 percent of the then projected
1985 import rate of 7.5 million barrels per day. With this
assumption being central to the planning process, a number
of sub-assumptions can be drawn.
- Based on the initial SPR size, it is obvious that the
planners assumed that any future embargo would be of a
short duration.
- It was assumed that during a disruption, oil could be
withdrawn from the reserve, sold, and processed before
prices would start to rise.
- In a similar manner, it is assumed that oil companies
who purchase SPR oil would expeditiously process the oil
and place it on the market before prices rise.
B. CONSTRAINTS
- It is estimated that the total cost of the SPR would be
approximately 45 billion dollars. The Reagan Adminis-
tration has viewed the SPR's funding as a good place for
reductions. During these times of austere budgeting,
one can only expect that further reductions will be
attempted
.
- The U.S. must be cautious in its purchases of oil for
the SPR as to not to place pressure on the oil market
that could result in higher prices.
- Currently, the U.S. is filling the reserve at a rate of
75,000 barrels per day. If this continues it will take
until 1995 before the reserve reaches the 750 million
barrel implementation level.
- The SPR is supposed to have the capability of a drawdown
of 3.3 million barrels of oil per day during an oil dis-
ruption. However, no test of the SPR's facilities has
been conducted to determine if this is feasible.
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- An unforeseeable constraint upon the SPR accomplishing
its objectives during a time of an oil disruption might
be that of a delayed Presidential election in invoking a
drawdown. The President's failure to take early action
could result "from fear of increasing the public anxiety
about the shortage." 12 A situation as such would lead
to panic buying thereby bidding up prices and defeating
one of the prime objectives of the SPR.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SPR PROBLEM
The very idea of a department other than defense
developing a forward looking strategy can be considered a
success. Too often Congress has attempted to legislate a
strategy as a means of doing what is politically expedient
and when the pressure for action subsides these plans are
shelved and replaced with more pressing issues. However,
the development of the SPR has been an ongoing program since
its inception in 1975. Although the SPR has been consis-
tent, because of the program's shortsightedness and
inability to accomplish its stated objectives and plans in a
timely manner, the SPR can at best be described as being
only moderately successful.
Planning the ultimate size of the SPR is the most
glaring example of the program's shortsightedness. The
initial SPR plan called for the reserve to be large enough
to contain a three-month supply of the total U.S. net
imports. While it is highly unlikely that there would be a
120il Reserves: An Analysis of Cost—
P
ast. Present.
and Future (GAO/RCED-87-204FS, September 1987), 19.
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total embargo against the U.S., it was believed that a
reserve of this magnitude could offset some of the effects
of an embargo from any supplier of U.S. oil. It is esti-
mated that the SPR contained 534 million barrels at the end
of fiscal year 1987. 13 With the U.S. net total per day
imports estimated to be 5,289,000 barrels, the U.S. has a
100 day supply of imported oil in reserve. Moreover, con-
sidering that the U.S. imports approximately 1,148,000
barrels of oil per day from the Arab members of the Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) , the 1987 SPR
oil level contains a 465 day supply. 14 Superficially, the
current levels in the reserve appear quite adequate for U.S.
purposes. However, one can not determine the adequacy of
the SPR solely in terms of only U.S. needs.
After the 1973 oil embargo, most of the Western European
countries along with the United States and Japan, in
effect, linked their oil markets together into a single
oil market by signing an international sharing agreement.
According to this agreement, should any one signatory be
denied access to the world oil markets, the other signa-
tories will share a portion of their own oil reserves. 15
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy testified before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that 46% of Western
13Oil Reserves: An Analysis of Cost—Past. Present,
and Future f 6.
14The World Almanac and Book of Facts . 1988 ed. , s.v.,
"Petroleum.
"
15U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
National Security Policy Implications of United States
Operations in the Persian Gulf . Report of the Defense Policy
Panel and the Investigations Subcommittee, Committee Print
No. 9 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 1987, pp. 16-17.
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European, 60% of Japanese, and 15% of U.S. oil imports came
from the Persian Gulf in 1986. 16 If the Arab members of
OPEC were to invoke an embargo against the signatories of
the aforementioned sharing agreement, the U.S. would
ultimately be asked to draw upon its SPR to aid its allies.
As a result, the potential domestic strife and international
friction which could arise from such a situation suggest
that the current size of the SPR is inadequate to handle
these contingencies.
As previously mentioned, the current fill rate for the
SPR is 75,000 barrels per day. If this fill rate continues,
it will 1995 before the implementation level of 750 million
barrels is obtained. In addition, no plans have been made
for developing the storage capacity for the final 250
million authorized in 1977. Although bureaucratic red tape
contributed to many of the delays, taking 20 years to
complete two-thirds of a project gives the SPR less than
satisfactory marks in managing the plan.
16Richard W. Murphy, "Persian Gulf: Stakes and Risks,"
Current Policy No. 963, U.S. Department of State, pp. 2-3.
(Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Murphy before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 29, 1987.)
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NASA IN THE 1960S: MANAGEMENT SUCCESS, PLANNING FAILURE
LT David A. Hildebrandt
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
in the 1960s, among other things, was a good example of a
management system well-suited to the tasks at hand. During
this period, the agency overcame tremendous technological
obstacles and successfully integrated vast numbers of sub-
systems into one system designed to accomplish one ambi-
tious goal—to put a man on the moon and return him to
earth. The agency's ability to achieve this only eight
years after the goal was announced by President John F.
Kennedy must be attributed, to a large degree, to the
flexible system of management created by NASA. NASA's
management system imposed a penalty, however, on its ability
to chart a course into the future. This paper explores the
impact of NASA's decentralized management structure on its
ability to conduct long-range planning. The period examined
is 1961-1968, the height of the Apollo effort.
The circumstances surrounding the birth of NASA deter-
mined the agency's identity for its first decade. NASA was
born out of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,
which was a direct response to Sputnik I in 1957. The pride
of the United States had been offended by having been beaten
into space, and there were fears of falling irretrievably
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behind in the "space race." The Soviet advantage in space
was viewed by many as a serious threat to U.S. national
security. A clamor arose among the public and in Congress
to do something in space, and quickly. [Ref. l:pp. 14-20]
The Eisenhower Administration responded rapidly, but its
proposed legislation did not meet with the full approval of
some defense-minded Congressmen and Senators. In particu-
lar, Eisenhower's intent to place the nation's new space
agency firmly in civilian hands led to concerns that he was
being too cavalier with the security of the United States
[Ref. l:pp. 19-20]. Many felt that the leadership of the
group which would form the nucleus of the new space agency,
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, was too
conservative to lead the nation in competition in space with
the Soviet Union [Ref. l:p. 19]. Eisenhower's wishes
prevailed for the most part, however, and the Act entrusted
the U.S. space effort, with the exception of matters
directly related to weapons development or military opera-
tions, to the civilian-headed NASA [Ref. 2:p. 13].
The early years of NASA (1958-1961) were characterized
by disagreement between the Executive Branch and Congress
over the level of effort the U.S. should exert in space.
NASA's first Ten-Year Plan was submitted in 1960; the
President attacked it as too expensive, the Congress viewed
it as not ambitious enough [Ref. l:pp. 36-37]. Until the
end of Eisenhower's term in January 1961, the Congress
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appeared anxious to pour money into the space effort; but
the President, more concerned about the nation's finances
and possessing more accurate information on Soviet
capabilities due to U-2 spyplane information, refused to go
along.
The political climate was ripe for a new President, John
F. Kennedy, to take charge in leading the nation into space.
Three months after his inauguration, Kennedy tasked Vice
President Lyndon Johnson with conducting a complete survey
of the U.S. space program. At the top of Kennedy's list of
questions was the following:
Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets by putting a
laboratory in space, or by a trip around the moon, or by a
rocket to land on the moon, or by a rocket to go to the
moon and back with a man? Is there any other space
program which promises dramatic results in which we could
win? [Ref. l:p. 138]
The goal reflected in this note—"beat the Soviets in space"
—turned into the Apollo program. The lunar landing mission
and manned spaceflight programs to prepare for it almost
immediately became "the dominant activity within the agency
[NASA]." [Ref. 3:p. 36] This received nearly unanimous
support from the President (obviously) , Congress, and the
American people. NASA had been given a mandate to put a man
on the moon.
NASA's management structure in the 1960s was never
stable for very long. This was due in large part to a
conscious attempt on the part of James E. Webb, NASA Admin-
istration from 1961 to 1968, to maintain a state of "desired
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disequilibrium." [Ref. 4: p. 6] The goal was "to avoid
those concepts and practices that would result in so much
organizational stability that maneuverability would be
lost." [Ref. 4: p. 6] As a result, any attempt to describe
NASA over a period of years either must be very general, or
very lengthy. The following discussion focuses on the broad
characteristics that remained stable for much of the 1960s.
After 1963, NASA settled into a structure which did not
change very much for the remainder of the decade. It was
highly decentralized, with most of the responsibility for
day-to-day operations resting with the field centers [Ref.
3:p. 43]. Managing a project, NASA's "output," was the
responsibility of a lead center; since a project might
include several subsystems which could be "parceled out" to
other centers, the lead center for a project had broad
powers to coordinate with other centers without going
through NASA Headquarters [Ref. 3:pp. 43-45].
It was the responsibility of the program offices—Manned
Space Flight, Space Sciences and Applications, and Advanced
Research and Technology—and the rest of NASA Headquarters
to ensure the field centers did not abuse their autonomy and
spin out of control pursuing their individual agendas. This
was accomplished by requiring adherence to a set of uniform
organizational procedures; controlling resource allocation;
reviewing the actions, primarily after the fact, of the
centers; and maintaining checks and balances to prevent one
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program office from becoming totally predominant [Ref. 3:pp.
62-64]. Administrator Webb's philosophy, which he tried to
imbue throughout the agency, was "management by exception,"
which "means that the higher levels of management were
called on for decisions 'only when something extraordinary
occurred in the process of executing approved projects'."
[Ref. 3:p. 63]
Given this decentralized management structure and the
disparity among the functions and sizes of the program
offices, it is not surprising that each devised its own
somewhat unique approach to planning. Nevertheless, there
were some similarities. Most of the planning conducted
under the auspices of the program offices can be considered
"intermediate-range"
—
programs with lead times of from five
to seven years. This process can be summarized as formulat-
ing proposals for new projects; reviewing, approving, and
devoting resources to implement proposals; monitoring pro-
gress; and readjusting goals and resource allocation [Ref.
3:p. 142]. The tool used by senior management to control
this was the Phased Project Planning (PPP) system, which was
formally instituted by policy directive in 1965 to ratify
what was essentially already being done [Ref. 3:p. 158].
The purpose of PPP was to force a rational evaluation of a
project, comparing expected costs to expected benefits, at
distinct phases in a project's life: advanced studies,
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project definition, project design, and project development/
operations [Ref. 3:pp. 158-159]. A Project Approval
Document (PAD) , signed by the NASA Administrator, was
required before work could begin on any given phase of a
project; in other words, each phase had its own PAD. PADs
were reviewed annually and updated as necessary [Ref. 3: p.
161]
.
In contrast to intermediate-range planning, which was
delegated to the program offices subject to approval by the
Administrator, NASA's long-range planning at the beginning
of the 1960s was nominally the responsibility of the Office
of Plans and Program Evaluation, reporting directly to the
Administrator. This Office was abolished in 1963, being
replaced by the Policy Planning Board and the Planning
Review Panel , the former reporting to the Administrator and
the latter to the Associate Administrator. The Policy
Planning Board was abolished in 1965 [Ref. 3:p. 46]; after
1965, agency-wide long-range planning was primarily the
domain of ad hoc study groups and advisory panels consisting
of representatives from the outside scientific community
[Ref. 3:pp. 242-262]. There was never a formal link between
the long-range plan and PPP or budgeting [Ref. 3:p. 241].
NASA operated under three constraints that affected its
ability to plan, particularly for the long term. The first
constraint was the limit on civil service salaries. The
importance of this constraint is exemplified by the constant
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efforts of top NASA management to persuade the Civil Service
Commission to increase the number of positions in NASA that
were subject to less stringent salary limits (the so-called
"excepted" and "nonquota" positions) . These efforts met
with less than total success, and NASA's ability to compete
with civilian salaries often was in the hands of Congress
[Ref. 3:pp. 110-115]. While this constraint never crippled
NASA, policymakers within the agency had to keep in mind
that NASA could not compete for scientific and engineering
talent on the basis of salary; it was necessary to provide
other types of rewards to acquire and keep good people.
This, of course, had a deep effect on the agency's planning.
A second, but related, constraint was the nature of
NASA's workforce. Between one-third and two-fifths of NASA
employees were scientists or engineers [Ref. 3:p. 115];
NASA's engineers, in particular, were among the best in the
country [Ref. 3:p. 138]. While this was obviously an
advantage when it came to getting a job done, it introduced
some complications into the planning process. The typical
NASA scientist or engineer got his or her job satisfaction
from working on projects he or she found interesting; and as
professionals at or near the cutting edge of their fields,
they could have very definite ideas on what those projects
ought to be. For its own reasons, NASA felt it necessary to
be able to attract some of the best and the brightest; and
in order to do so, it had to guarantee a certain amount of
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scientific freedom to pursue personal interests. A long-
range plan could be seen as an impediment to freedom of
scientific inquiry.
The third constraint was the demands of the Apollo
schedule. All of the field centers and all of the program
offices would play a role in this huge project [Ref. 3: p.
36], and it was necessary to preserve a harmonious relation-
ship among them so they could work together with a minimum
of friction. One of Administrator Webb's concerns was that
a fixed long-range plan inevitably would alienate some of
the program offices and field centers, all of whom had their
own good ideas for where the U.S. should be going in space
[Ref. 3:p. 242]. This would impact negatively on the
agency's ability to complete the Apollo project on time.
Apollo was NASA's greatest management success, but it
also was a cause of some problems that continued to affect
the agency into the 1970s. THe success is analyzed first.
The decentralized system of management on which NASA
ultimately settled in 1963 was actually a return to a struc-
ture similar to the one which had existed prior to November
1961. Before November 1961 and after November 1963, each of
the field centers was subordinate to one of the program
offices; for example, after the November 1963 reorganiza-
tion, the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (Alabama),
the Manned Spacecraft Center (Houston) , and the Launch
Operations Center (Cape Canaveral) reported to the head of
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the Manned Space Flight program office. Between November
1961 and November 1963, however, the field centers reported
directly to the Associate Administrator, NASA's "general
manager" for day-to-day operations [Ref. 3:p. 36]. This was
a much more centralized arrangement, partially intended to
gain firmer control over the field center directors [Ref.
3:p. 36].
Any reorganization inevitably causes some degree of
initial confusion, and NASA's in 1961 was no exception. Ten
months after, in September 1962, there was still real confu-
sion in the management ranks; the center directors and the
program office heads in particular were unsure of their
roles [Ref. 3:p. 38]. In other circumstances, NASA may have
stayed with the system for a while longer to let people
become accustomed to it; there was, however, Apollo to keep
on track.
A harbinger of the eventual return to the pre-November
1961 structure was the creation in October 1962 of the
position of Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight Centers; more importantly, this title was assigned to
D. Brainerd Holmes, who retained his position as Director of
the Manned Space Flight Program Office. This effectively
removed three field centers from the Associate Administra-
tor's span of control [Ref. 2:p. 256], and placed them under
a program director. Within a year of centralization, decen-
tralization had reappeared in the management of the manned
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space flight effort because of a bottleneck at the Associate
Administrator level and the failure of informal coordination
at lower levels [Ref. 2:p. 256]. In November 1963, the
entire agency was reorganized to return to a structure
similar to the pre-November 1961 structure.
It is fair to say that the November 1961 reorganization
was never given a chance to work. The Associate Administra-
tor, Robert Seamans, Jr. , even claimed after the fact that
it was never intended to be permanent [Ref. 3:p. 42]. The
factors leading to the rapid reversal—confusion over formal
lines of authority, the breakdown in informal cooperation,
and the pressure of the Apollo deadline—are most interest-
ing, however, Apparently, they caused NASA to revert to the
management system it knew best and was comfortable with—the
field centers subordinate to the program offices, which
reported to the Associate Administrator. This was the
structure that NASA used to succeed in putting a man on the
moon. Whether the centralized system could have produced
the same results had it been given more time is a difficult
question to answer. Informal lines of communication have
always played a major role in NASA; the success of the cen-
tralized system would have depended in part on whether the
informal system could have been rebuilt.
While it may not be correct to say that NASA could not
have succeeded in putting a man on the moon without decen-
tralized management, it is definitely correct to say that
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NASA's decentralized management did not detract from the
achievement of that goal. The return to decentralization in
1963 appears to be, in large part, the path of least resis-
tance following an experiment in centralization that could
not be given much time to work. The Apollo project may not
have demanded decentralized management; but given the
organizational culture of NASA, the Apollo project provided
the impetus for a return to decentralization when central
control did not succeed.
As mentioned above, the field centers were responsible
for managing projects. The role of NASA Headquarters was to
allocate resources, to monitor progress, and to assess the
results. In order to perform these functions, Headquarters
required information and independent technical expertise.
This system worked well in managing the Apollo project, with
one exception—the Apollo 204 fire in 1967, which claimed
the lives of three astronauts. The system worked well
because: (a) the goal was clearly identified, (b) the
formal management structure was fairly flexible, and (c) the
network of informal liaison and cooperation recovered
following the November 1963 reorganization.
As a result of this system, NASA Headquarters reacted to
initiatives from the field rather than being an initiator in
its own right. This was not a problem in the manned space
flight effort, because the goal was unambiguous—put a man
on the moon. Proposals from the field centers in this area
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were aimed at how best to achieve that goal. In the other
program areas, Space Sciences and Applications and Advanced
Research and Technology, there were no agreed upon specific
goals. These programs had little focus, due in large part
to their very nature; but Headquarters had no mechanism to
enforce a unifying mission within these program offices, not
did it seem very interested in doing so, in part to preserve
freedom of scientific inquiry and to avoid internal fric-
tions. The same problems arose in attempting to formulate
goals for the Office of Manned Space Flight after Apollo
—
the agency could not come to internal agreement [Ref. 3: p.
244].
The failure of NASA's long-range planning during this
period, then, was due in part to the lack of a formal
mechanism for translating long-range plans into intermedi-
ate-range programs. In practical terms, this meant that the
output of the Office of Plans and Program Evaluation and its
successors carried very little weight in the formulation of
Project Approval Documents. The long-range planners
reported to the Administrator, but the individuals who
generally initiated proposals for new projects were at the
field centers; seldom did the twain meet.
The absence of a formal mechanism for translating plans
into programs is merely a symptom, however, of Administrator




He would not commit himself publicly to new programs where
costs were unpredictable, congressional approval
uncertain, the likelihood of changes ever-present, and the
program offices themselves deeply divided over long-range
plans. [Ref. 3:p. 242]
One could argue that the first three of these factors are
inherent in any attempt to perform long-range planning;
Webb's real problem was his inability or unwillingness to
enforce a unifying vision on the different program offices.
NASA's fundamental problem in long-range planning in the
1960s was identifying goals. In 1965, "there was almost no
agreement within NASA as to what should follow the lunar
landing" [Ref. 3:p. 243], which at that point was only four
years away. Paradoxically, Apollo, a program thrust upon
NASA by a visionary President and an eager Congress, had
united the agency; the attempt to plan beyond Apollo
threatened to divide it. The agency had become a bureauc-
racy, and plans for the future inevitably threatened certain
bureaucratic interests. Manned Space Flight, the predom-
inant interest within the agency, could be tolerated so long
as a public consensus existed in support of Apollo; after-
wards, however, it was argued by some that it was time to
concentrate on scientific research in space, which could be
accomplished just as well or better with unmanned probes.
This would imply a drastic shift in the balance of power
among the program offices, with all the resistance that
would create. In this way, articulating long-term goals for
the future threatened bureaucratic interests in the present.
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The real long-term planning in NASA, therefore, was done
by the field centers and the occasional input from outside
task forces and panels. In the case of the field centers,
the most important contribution to planning were advanced
studies; by definition these pertained to
. . . flight missions beyond those currently approved or
studies of as yet unapproved spacecraft, launch vehicle,
or aircraft systems that may lead toward such future
flight missions or studies leading to significant changes
on an already approved configuration of spacecraft and
launch vehicles. [Ref. 3:p. 147]
This broad definition could encompass just about anything.
As in other matters, NASA Headquarters exercised control
over these studies with PADs; as in other matters, top
management passed judgment on the initiative of others, but
did not exercise initiative itself. Furthermore, these
studies, which were intended to lay the groundwork for
future projects, were politically sensitive; an approved
study could be misinterpreted in Congress as an approved
program, for example [Ref. 3:p. 148]. Therefore, NASA's
ability to study future alternatives was impeded by
politics.
Many outside advisory groups existed upon which NASA
could draw for advice, but there was no formal requirement
to do so. The major problem in this area was that the
advisory process "was unpatterned and unsystematic." [Ref.
3:p. 250] Often, the contribution of outside scientists
consisted of demanding more control over NASA's science
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policy, which Webb was not willing to surrender [Ref. 3: p.
250] .
NASA was not unique in having internal fiefdoms whose
interests could be threatened by long-range plans. A unique
confluence of circumstances conspired, however, to prevent
NASA from overcoming its internal divisions to chart its own
course into the future. The demands of the Apollo schedule
prevented NASA from sticking to an experimental centralized
structure and forced it to return to a more familiar decen-
tralized system in 1963. It was necessary to preserve
harmonious relations among the program offices and field
centers, since they all would have to cooperate on Apollo;
this persuaded Webb to avoid troublesome issues, and the
long-term planning problem was swept under the rug. Contri-
buting to this was a perceived need to retain top-notch
engineers and scientists, without the ability to pay them
the going salary in industry; to compensate for this, it was
considered necessary to maintain some freedom of individual
scientific inquiry, and a long-range plan was perceived to
detract from that.
James Webb did not believe in long-range planning for
NASA, because NASA's future would be determined by political
considerations. He may have been right, but not for any of
the reasons mentioned above. One of the first steps in any
model of strategic planning is to identify characteristics
and trends in the environment; but NASA was in the position
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in the 1960s that too little was known about space to do
that. Without a definition of the environment, it is impos-
sible to conduct strategic planning. NASA's business in the
1960s was exploration to define the environment in space, so
the next generation could plan the exploitation of space.
In such an endeavor, the choice of goals must be a product
of politics, because no rational weighing of cost versus
benefit is possible—both are unknowns.
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I. BACKGROUND
The Supersonic Transport (SST) debate spanned more than
a decade. The momentum driving the project was primarily
centered in the aerospace industry and reportedly in 1958,
both Douglas and Lockheed were working on designs. In 1959,
an Air Force sponsored study on the possibility of super-
sonic flight, seemed to capture the imagination of the
industry and encouraged further investigation. [Ref. l:p.
7]
In 1960 Elwood Quesada, the director of the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) , strongly advocated an SST
project. He attempted to organize an official SST program
for Eisenhower's signature. He was unsuccessful and it was
left to the Kennedy Administration in 1961 to get the pro-
gram started. [Ref. l:pp. 13-15]
In 1960, Kennedy's appointee as Director of the FAA,
Najeeb Halaby, an ardent supporter of supersonic flight,
lobbied diligently with industry and government alike to
encourage their interest and continuously brought up the
subject with President Kennedy. In 1961 Kennedy came out in
263
support of the project and set aside government funds for
research and development. [Ref. l:pp. 21-22]
Several government agencies were tasked with feasibility
studies. Among these were the Office of Science and Tech-
nology, and the Commerce Department. Their findings were in
favor of an SST program. In 1963, Kennedy formally announ-
ced the SST program. His death in November of 1963 was a
grave setback. [Ref. l:p. 27]
On April 1, 1964, President Johnson created the Presi-
dent's Advisory Council on the SST (PAC) . This council was
to make further studies and advise the President whether he
should continue with the program. The council was chaired
by the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, and included
the Departments of Commerce and Treasury, National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration (NASA) , FAA, the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, and two advisors, Stanley
Osborne, an industrialist and Eugene Black, an economist.
[Ref. l:p. 72]
McNamara decided he could only make a responsible report
to the President after PAC had completed almost three years
of profit analysis. At the end of this period, after
numerous economic, feasibility, and financial studies, the
fourth and final report of the council was submitted to the
President on 22 December, 1966. It stated that the American
SST project was technically and economically feasible. How-
ever, the PAC failed to make any concrete recommendation for
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continuing the SST program. After receiving the PAC report,
President Johnson had his appointed director of the FAA,
William McKee, make the announcement that the Boeing-General
Electric design for the SST had been chosen by the FAA and
that prototype construction would begin. [Ref. l:pp. 170-
179]
In 1967, due to the developing crisis in Vietnam, budget
questions began to arise. Additionally, 1967 marked the
founding of the organization that was to be the thorn in the
SST's paw, the Citizen's League against the Sonic Boom. The
rising tide of public sentiment was focused through this
organization. Its founder, William Shurcliff, a physicist
at Harvard, was a tireless opponent and was determined to
stop the SST. [Ref. l:p. 221]
In May of 1967, design problems began to plague Boeing,
resulting in a delay until October 1978, when Boeing finally
was satisfied with its fixed-wing design. [Ref. l:pp. 181-
189]
By late 1969, articles on the controversy over the sonic
boom and the possible hazards to the ozone layer were prom-
inent in the media. Nixon's decision to support the SST on
23 September 1969 acted as a catalyst to organize all the
opponents against the SST. The public delivered its most
resounding protest on Earth Day, April 22, 1970. The SST
emerged as the major target of protest of environmental and
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conservation groups across the United States. [Ref. l:p.
281]
This upswelling prompted Congressional hearings in May.
In November 1970, the Senate Appropriations Committee voted
to approve funding for the SST for Fiscal Year 1971. In
December Nixon again came out in support of the SST. How-
ever, intensive campaigning and astute lobbying by oppon-
ents caused the House to vote against SST funding on March
18, 1971. The Senate voted against the project on March 24,
and the SST program was discontinued. [Ref. l:pp. 322-325]
II. THE SYSTEM
The prevailing planning system at the time was the
formation of committees and councils of top government
officials to study proposed projects. Additionally,
Presidents would assign special advisors to analyze pro-
grams, choosing people from academia and industry who
specialized in the areas under study. Often the opinions of
the specialists reflected the opinions of the President or
other top government officials.
Though Halaby was a skilled bureaucrat and understood
the politics of the government, he did not plan beyond
building the transport. Additionally he felt that the
project was worthwhile, no matter the cost. Therefore, when
McNamara was made head of the PAC, Halaby failed to conduct
analyses that satisfied the economic-minded chairman.
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McNamara was only concerned with the economic aspect of
the project. Therefore his planning and approval of the
program was based on his analysis of the feasibility
studies, financing arrangements, the market for the end
product, and how the royalties and profits would be shared.
Both FAA directors, Halaby and McKee, also used the
threat of the UK/French or the Soviet version of the SST
being used by domestic American airlines as impetus for the
American program. This, however, was not seen by McNamara
as a threat. He had stated that if the Soviets built a
workable, affordable SST, he would buy it. [Ref. l:pp. 47,
53, 62]
Until the public began to earnestly protest, the govern-
ment proponents of the program were not even aware of the
growing tide of opposition. There were no efforts made to
gain public support for the transport.
So basically there were two systems or plans for the SST
program. Halaby wanted to develop the technology, build the
prototype and then determine the role of the aircraft.
McNamara wanted the SST to be economically feasible and saw
beyond the prototype, requiring that the program be examined
as if the prototype were already built.
III. KEY ASSUMPTIONS
Halaby, the FAA Administrator, was the champion of the
SST. His qualifications included a law degree, and time as
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a test pilot and flight instructor. He had been an aviation
intelligence officer for the Department of State, as well as
a foreign affairs advisor to the Department of Defense. At
one time he had held the post of Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for National Security. His experience with
Washington and politics gave him the confidence and the
skills to build a firm foundation with government and
industry officials. [Ref. l:p. 104]
After his appointment as FAA Administrator in 1961,
Halaby pressed for large scale research, advocated placing
the SST program under FAA control, and unsuccessfully tried
to develop a rapport with the Secretary of Defense McNamara.
He did gain support from the NASA Administrator, and the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Additionally Halaby
established close contact with airframe and engine manufac-
turers in industry and requested briefings on corporate SST
activities and plans. [Ref. l:pp. 21-22, 104]
McNamara, though he gave grudging support in 1963, was
not as thrilled with the potential of the SST as Halaby.
His background consisted of an MBA from Harvard, and experi-
ence in corporate industry. He had a preference for
detailed feasibility studies and introduced the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) into the government.
For McNamara the SST prototype was not goal, the financial
success of the end result, the working SST, was the goal,
and he would not allow the program to continue and be funded
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if he felt that the goal could not be reached. McNamara saw
no military potential for the SST and doubted that the
transport has much commercial use. [Ref. l:pp. 51, 104]
McNamara also did not consider the public when he made
any SST decisions. Though he was soon preoccupied with the
Vietnam crisis, he still devoted quite a lot of time to the
SST program and to the PAC commission. [Ref. l:p. 126]
President Kennedy supported the SST project but did not
give it the push nor the media coverage he gave to the NASA
program. President Johnson also supported the SST, however
he soon became heavily involved with the Vietnam conflict
and could not devote much attention to the program.
Industry was very optimistic about the development of
the SST, in public. In private the manufacturers and
designers were much more reserved and skeptical. The
greatest problem industry faced was the question of
financing. Most of the companies felt the government should
fund the project up to at least 95%, while the companies
would pick up the rest of the tab. [Ref. l:pp. 64, 128]
The public remained fairly unconcerned and unaware of
the project until about 1967. At this point, the results of
several sonic boom studies had been released and the
response to this facet of the SST was rather negative. The
birth of the Citizens League against the Sonic Boom and the
eloquent opposition of the founder, William Shurcliff,
focused the energy of the protests. This media and public
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concern provoked Congressional hearings in 1967. However,
Congress decided in favor of the project. [Ref. l:pp. 221-
222, 255-256]
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PLAN
As stated earlier the SST program failed partly because
there seemed to be two plans with different goals.
Halaby wanted to develop the technology, build the
prototype and test it. He held the belief, widely accepted
at the time, that technology was good and should be
developed even though the expense might be great and the
rewards ambiguous. He did not concern himself about the
possible cost, nor did he care who paid for the program.
His concerns were for the U.S. to retain its hegemony in the
aerospace industry and not be forced to use foreign super-
sonic carriers.
Halaby failed because he lost control of the program.
The responsibility for different parts of it were parceled
out to advisory committees, and other government agencies.
McNamara was very concerned with the economics of the
project. His demands for years of studies and detailed
analyses of the results showed his priorities were not with
the possible unknown benefits that could accrue from the
project, but with the cost to the government, the profits,
and the final use of the end product.
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The greatest problems occurred because none of the con-
flicts were resolved. The results of the sonic boom tests
were controversial, even the validity of the tests them-
selves were questioned. The financing issues were never
resolved. Bickering was constant over who should bear the
financial burden for the research and development. Addi-
tionally, no one could decide which agency should manage the
program. There was doubt about the ability of the FAA to
manage a program the size of the SST. The Defense Depart-
ment wanted no part of the program, wishing to focus on
their own supersonic aircraft that would be used for
military purposes.
However, the single most important reason for the
failure of the SST program was the lack of public support.
None of the proponents seemed aware of the need to have the
backing, confidence and faith of the American people before
proceeding with major and expensive programs. Only by
having this support can a country muster the resources,
energy and financing needed to achieve great aims.
V. EPILOGUE
By 1974, many supporters of the SST had seen the results
of the Concorde program. The oil crisis in the 70s, the
financing problems, and the lack of a commercial market,
convinced the SST advocates that the decision to cancel the
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program had been wise. The public had apparently made the
right choice.
The original SST program was born in a society that
supported technological endeavors and allowed such decisions
to be determined for them by a small group of advocates from
industry and government. By the late 60s, however, the
public had changed from a passive and trusting population to
environmental and conservation activists, passionate,
aggressive, and determined to have a voice in their govern-
ment and a say in the priorities set by the country's
leaders. [Ref. l:pp. 328, 345]
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Recommended Texts Provided by Instructor (no readings assigned):
(1) National Security Strategy of the United States , January
1988
( 2) Discriminate Deterrence; Report of the Commission on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy , January 1988
Grade : Based upon in-class written assignments, classroom
presentation and participation, written assignments, and the
seminar paper.
Written Assignments : Two-page think pieces will be reguired
throughout the course in addition to the seminar paper. These
are to be original thought with no footnotes or additional
research reguired. Occasionally papers will be reguired that are
to be written in the classroom.
Seminar Paper : A major research paper is to be written that
addresses a specific case study in successful/failed strategic
planning/strategic management. The objective of the paper is to
identify and describe the system used for planning and the system
of execution/ implementation of that plan and to then identify
those elements of the planning/management system that were
present and resulted in success/ failure. The papers must analyze
and not merely describe; i.e. a descriptive paper will be
returned as incomplete. The annotated bibliography will be
considered in the grade assigned to the paper. Papers should
adhere to the following outline:
I - Background description of the international or national
context of events at the time, what was it that was being
planned, how did the planning process end (with a published
study/execution of plan etc.), and if implemented, was the
strategic management effort generally successful (or not). (2
pages maximum)
II - Description of the strategic planning/management system.
This should not be an especially detailed description of the
substance of the issues being planned but rather a description of
the system for planning. (3 pages maximum).
Ill - Key assumptions made by key personnel or in the plan and
constraints on the planning/management system. Were there common
goals and objectives that all parties agreed to? (3 pages
maximum)
.
IV - Analysis of the key elements of the plan/execution
system that were crucial to success/failure. (Open ended size)
V - Annotated Bibliography (Open ended size)
Due NLT Friday 17 June 1988
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Class Schedule
Monday 28 March - Course Introduction
-Course overview and requirements presented by instructor
-Seminar paper topics discussed
-Instructor provided texts passed out
-Case Study in Strategic Planning: videotape Beyond War
-In class exercise: outline of Beyond War strategic plan
(handwritten answers to the following questions to be turned in
at end of class period with xerox copies returned to students to
be used in at-home analysis)
(1) What is the problem?
( 2
)
What is the goal of the Beyond War group?
(3) How does the group expect to reach their goal?
(4) What is the expected end result of Beyond War's efforts?
Wednesday 30 March - Basics of Long-range Political-Military
Planning
-Readings: Smith pp. xv-22, Builder pp. 1-11, Brzezinski pp.
xiii-29
-Paper due: Analysis of (compare and contrast) the political-
military futures as advocated by Beyond War and Brzezinski:
can we plan plan for either of these? Paper to parallel class
discussion.
-Class discussion: Students will lead discussion of their viewing
of the Beyond War videotape and Brzezinski relative to: (1) the
future seen by each, (2) the methodologies used by each to
identify their versions of the future, and (3) how realistic
are each's strategic plan? Is the U.S. in a zero-sum or non-
zero sum game with the USSR? Students/faculty from UC Santa
Cruz have been invited to participate in discussion.
Monday 4 April - Methodologies for Long-range Planning &
Forecasting Part I.
-Readings: Smith pp. 49-92, Ascher pp. xi-93
-Class discussion: Students will lead discussion on (1) the role
of the analyst in support of political-military policy makers,
(2) the types of methodologies that are available to help staffs
and decision-makers, and (3) elements of a basic strategy.
-Students will select their seminar research paper topics by this
date
Wednesday 6 April - Methodologies for Long-range Planning &
Forecasting Part II
-Readings: Ascher pp. 94-157
-Paper due: Analysis of all the types of methodologies for
developing alternative futures likely to be of interest to
strategic planners in the DoN/DoD with strengths and weaknesses
of each method highlighted and likelihood that anyone in the
DoN/DoD would pay attention to each. Paper to be in the form of
a matrix. Use all methodologies found in texts.
-Class discussion: Student views of paper topic and overall
efforts to reduce uncertainty and aid decision-makers.
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Monday 11 April - Alternative Futures
-Readings: Brzezinski pp. 30-144
-Class discussion: Students to lead discussion on how to identify
the future that we plan for. To include inability to identify
all political variables, inability to describe an international
system, inability to predict, and need to plan anyway. How
might varying methodologies help predict?
-In class exercise: students will outline a Soviet scenario for
a general war or a specific campaign to be used in a war game.
Wednesday 13 April - Prescriptive Strategic Planning
-Readings: Smith pp. 93-133, Brzezinski pp. 145-250
-Class discussion: Students will lead discussion on what should
American goals be in peacetime, crises, or war? Do goals derive
from the threat, expected resources, or existing plans? Do we
prepare for the worst/best/most likely case? Does answer vary
in programming vs. war planning or declaratory vs. real
planning?
-Inc lass exercise: disarmament exercise.
Monday 18 April - Descriptive DoD Strategic Planning
-Readings: Joint Staff Officer' s Guide chapters 5-7, 10
-Paper due: Analysis of how likely it is that the current or
expected elements in the DoD forecasting and planning process
are capable of providing good advice and a system for strategic
planning/management to decision-makers. Paper is not to be
descriptive.
-Class discussion: Students will lead discussion on how likely is
it that decision-makers are well served by the current system?
DRMEC faculty have been invited to participate in the
discussion.
Wednesday 20 April - Problems with Present DoD Strategic Planning
-Readings: Ascher pp. 245-261, Smith pp. 23-48, Builder pp. 12-
98, Norman Bailey & Stefan Halper, "National Security for Whom?"
-Discussion: Students will lead discussion on how we can
integrate the needs of the varying multi-purpose organizations
within the DoD and the realities of the American political
system to have an effective long-range planning process.
Monday 25 April - War Planning
-Readings: Keith A. Dunn, "The Missing Link in Conflict
Termination Thought" Strategy," LTG John Cushman, "Strategic
Planning in the Military," SECDEF Statement to SASC 12 Jan 87,
pp. 1-3, & Allan Millett, et. al., "The Effectiveness of
Military Organizations"
-Paper due: What should the major goals be for the U.S. and USSR
if they engage in a major war? Each geographic area of world
must be covered and prioritized.
-Class discussion: Students will lead discussion on how to decide
the goals for the U.S. in a major war with the USSR and how we
should choose to allocate our military resources to the varying
theaters of military operations. Is war termination a zero-sum
or non-zero sum game?
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Wednesday 27 April - Business & Public Sector Strategic Planning
-Readings: LaRue Hosmer, "Introduction to Strategic Management ,
"
George pp. iii-iv & appendix D, Kenichi Ohmae The Mind of the
Strategist pp. xi-xiii, p. 1-41, 76-88, 269-277, LTC Al Gropman
"Long-range Planning," pp. 49-54, John Bryson & Robert
Einsweiler, "Strategic Planning," John Bryson & William
Roering, "Applying Private-Sector Strategic Planning in the
Public Sector"
-Guest lecturer: Associate Professor Nancy Roberts, Department of
Administrative Sciences
-Class discussion: What types of business and public sector
planning concepts are applicable to the DoN/DoD and why are they
applicable?
Monday 2 May - Research time for students
Wednesday 4 May - Research time for students
Monday 9 May - Student Presentations
-National Security Strategy published by White House
-Discriminate Deterrence report
-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead
discussion on role of line organizations and special blue-ribbon
panels in strategic planning process.
Wednesday 11 May - Student Presentations
-McNamara era and the start of PPBS in DoD
-Competitive Strategies
-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead
discussion on likelihood of business models being successful
within DoN/DoD in either programming or war planning.
Monday 16 May - Student Presentations
-Navy Long-range strategic planning
-Air Force Long-range strategic planning
-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead
discussion on role of service long-range planning efforts within
context of overall Executive Branch/DoD efforts.
Wednesday 18 May - Strategic Management/Implementation
-Readings: John Bryson, "A Strategic Planning Process for Public
& Non-profit Organizations," Richard Hamermesh, "The Forces
Shaping Strategic Decision Making," and Thomas Wheelen & J. David
Hunger, "Strategy Implememtation," & "Evaluation and Control."
-Guest Lecturer: Associate Professor Nancy Roberts, Department of
Administrative Sciences
-Class discussion: Implementing plans and necessary
infrastructure
Monday 23 May - Student Presentations
-Navy General Board
-War Planning between WWI & WWII: the Rainbow Plans
-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead
discussion on key elements found in general strategic planning
and war planning of the inter-war years.
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Wednesday 25 May - Student Presentations
-Seaplan 2000
-The Maritime Strategy
-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead
discussion on key elements in designing a general strategic plan
for the Navy in recent years
Monday 30 May - Holiday/Research Time
Wednesday 1 June - Student Presentations
-NASA
-SST
-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead
discussion on key elements in success/failures of these non-DoD
cases.
Monday 6 June - Student Presentations
-The B-36/USS United States controversy
-Strategic mineral stockpiling
-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead
discussion on key elements in success/failure of these cases.
Wednesday 8 June - Student Presentations
-Oil stockpiling
-Marshall Plan
-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead
discussion on key elements in success/failure of these cases.
Friday 10 June - Wrap Up
-Readings: Berend Bruins, "Should Naval Officers be
Strategists?", Businessweek "The New Breed of Strategic
Planner," Henry Mintzberg, "Crafting Strategy," & Lincoln
Bloomfield, "Anticipating the Future: Foreign Policy Planning"
-Class Discussion: Should naval officers be strategists?
-Guest participant: LTG/Dr. Robert Gard USA (Ret.), President of










NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL PROFESSOR NANCY ROBERTS
MN 4105 OFFICE: IN 216
FALL TERM 1989 PHONE: 646-2742
OFFICE HOURS:
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BY APPOINTMENT
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
I. COURSE MATERIALS:
John Bryson. Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit
Organizations . San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988.
Philip Heymann. The Politics of Public Management . New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.
Quinn, J.B., Mintzberg, H. James, R.M. The Strategy
Process: Concepts , Contexts , and Cases . Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988.
Other materials handed out in class.
II. COURSE DESCRIPTION:
This course deals with the strategic management of the
total enterprise. Strategic decisions are those that define the
major areas of the firm's (or organization's) development and the
allocation of resources to pursue strategic direction. This
course deals with strategic management because we are concerned
with both the determination of strategic direction and the
management of the strategic process. Our central focus will be
the problem identification, analysis, and action required by the
general manager to deal with strategic issues.
Strategic management is more than analysis. To be sure,
strategic analysis is a major part of this course. We will study
several analytical techniques for positioning a firm or
organization within a competitive environment. Strategic
analyses are compounded by the trade-offs inherent in any
situation. These trade-offs reflect the fact that organizations
consist of many players with multiple, competing objectives.
When dealing with these trade-offs, general managers must
confront the judgmental issues involved in establishing
organizational purpose and balancing economic and noneconomic
objectives.
Strategic management requires moving beyond analysis and
trade-offs into the realm of strategic action. Once the
analytical problem of selecting a strategy has been dealt with,
we should know what to do. Knowing what to do, however, is only
part of running an organization. (Some say it's the easy part.)
Knowing how to execute the selected strategy is essential to
success. To the extent possible in each case, we will concern
ourselves with the various combinations of systems (for example,
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information, control, reward, etc.), organization structures, and
people necessary to execute a given strategy. We will test our
ideas about the relationships between strategy and these other
elements as we proceed through the course.
Our perspective in this course is that of the general
manager whose responsibility is the long-term health of the
entire organization. The key tasks involved in general
management include the detection of and adaptation to
environmental change, the procurement and allocation of
resources, the integration of activities across subparts of the
organizations, and, at the most senior levels, the determination
of purpose and the setting of the organization's direction.
General managers, from our perspective, are managers who are
in the position to make strategic decisions for the organization.
Note that such managers need to have in-depth understanding of
the generic problems in all the relevant functional areas.
Furthermore, they must be able to deal with problems and issues
at the level of the total organization and its relationships with
relevant external environments.
Successful general managers are highly competent in problem
identification and analysis and have a strong action orientation.
One purpose of this course is to provide an environment which
will allow you to develop these skills, while at the same time
gaining a conceptual understanding of the complexity of the
strategic manager's task.
Functional specialists can benefit from the general
management perspective even though they may not be general
managers. Every function's actions should be coordinated with
the overall needs of the organization. In fact, functional
specialists are the people on whom general managers often rely to
implement their strategies. Since such functional managers can
be prone to suboptimization problems, they too, need to
understand the general manager's perspective.
III. OBJECTIVES:
In this course, "knowledge" has a more pragmatic meaning.
Knowledge here is the ability or wisdom to take appropriate
action in a changing reality, rather than a collection of facts
about a static world. The course objectives therefore include:
1. Development and reinforcement of a general management
point of view -- the capacity to view an organization from an
overall perspective in the context of its environment.
2. Development of an understanding of fundamental concepts
in strategic management: the levels and components of strategy;
value creation; competitive analysis; and organizational
evolution.
3. Integration of the knowledge gained in previous core
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courses and understanding of what part of that knowledge is
useful to general managers.
4. Development of those skills and knowledge peculiar to
general management and the general manager's job that have not
been covered in previous functional courses.
5. Development of an awareness of the various impacts of
external environmental forces on an organization's strategy.
6. Practice in distinguishing between basic causes of
organization problems and attendant symptoms.
7. Practice in working out business strategies and
implementation plans.
8. Development of habits of orderly, analytical thinking
and skill in reporting conclusions effectively in both written
and oral form.
9. Familiarity with some of the practical realities of
running different types of organizations.
IV. ACCOMPLISHING THE OBJECTIVES: COURSE REQUIREMENTS
Like any general management situation, this course includes
individual performance evaluation and feedback regarding your
demonstrated ability to learn, apply, and expand on the materials
that will be covered in class. These evaluations, selected to
aid in reaching the course objectives, will be based on class
participation and written work.
Class Participation
This course will be taught by the case method. (See note on
the case method in Quinn). The case method requires that a
student be present for and participate in class discussions in
order to develop problem solving skills and to stimulate other
forms of "learning". Therefore, I will expect you to participate
actively in case discussions.
In a typical class, one or more students would be asked to
start the class by answering a specific question or discussing a
specific issue. Preparation of the case (including the
assignment questions) should be sufficient to handle such a lead-
off assignment. After a few minutes of initial analysis, we will
open the discussion to the rest of the class. As a group, we
will then try to build a complete analysis of the situation and
address the problems and issues presented in the case. We will
also spend time talking about the implementation of those
recommendations and some of the complexities of effecting change
in strategic management situtations.
Most general managers spend very little time reading, and
even less time writing reports. The vast majority of their
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interactions with others are verbal. For this reason, the
development of verbal skills is given a high priority in this
course. The classroom should be considered a laboratory in which
you can test your ability to convince your peers of the
correctness of your approach to complex problems and of your
ability to achieve the desired results through the use of that
approach. Some of the things that have an impact on effective
class participation are the following:
1. Is the participant a good listener?
2. Are the points that are made relevant to the discussion?
Are they linked to the comments of others?
3. Do the comments add to our understanding of the
situation?
4. Do the comments show evidence of analysis of the case?
5. Does the participant distinguish among different kinds





6. Is there a willingness to share?
7. Is there a willingness to be creative and to test new
ideas, or are all comments "safe"? (For example,
repetition of case facts without analysis and
conclusions)
.
8. Is the participant willing to interact with other class
members?
9. Do comments clarify and highlight the important aspects
of earlier comments and lead to a clearer statement of
the concepts being covered?
The questions above deal with the process of class
participation. Of equal or greater concern is the content of
what you say. As will be noted subsequently, class participation
will be a major portion of your grade in this course.
Group Project.
Working in groups of , students will select one topic on
which to write: The Navy Context; The JCS Context; The DoD
Context; The Nasa Context; DoD and the Management of Change;
Maritime Strategy; Competitive Strategy; and National Security
Strategy. Your group is to prepare a written report (15 pages,
double-spaced) that is to be turned in on the day of your class
presentation. The report is to address the questions in the
syllabus for that day.
Let us use the Navy Context as an example of what is required in
the group project. Some of your report will be descriptive in
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nature (e.g. identifying the current strategic management efforts
in the Navy). Other parts (the majority of the report) will
require critical analysis. Having a strategic management system
ioes not necessarily imply that it functions well or functions as
it was intended. To what extent can you separate out what people
describe is the strategic management process from how that
process actually works, or if it works at all? Critical analysis
also will be required to apply what we have learned about the
nature context in business to strategic management in the Navy.
tfhat can be applied and what does not transfer?
En addition to your written report, your group is to prepare a
50-minute class presentation on your topic. If you will require
a reading assignment, be sure to hand it out at least one class
in advance of your presentation.
/. GRADING POLICY
The purpose of grading in this course, as in all courses, is
twofold. One is to evaluate your performance for purposes of the
academic system. The other (and more important) is to provide
/ou with feedback on your ability to develop, utilize, and share
/our ideas and conclusions concerning the topics and situations
covered in the course.








3roup Project Grades ; Group projects will be given a grade for
the entire project. ' In addition, each student will allocate as
nany as 10 or as low as points to each of the group members.
Based on the individual's contribution to the project, this
assessment will be done independently by each member of the group
and turned in to the instructor, who will average all of the
scores the individual receives. As an example, if a project was
awarded 15 points (perfect score), and the average score an
individual received was 5, the individual would receive a 20 out
of a possible 25 for the group project score. This grading
system takes both group and individual performance into account.
Grades for the groups classroom presentation will be
assessed in a similar way: 5 points for the presentation as
whole; anywhere from to 10 points allocated to each person
depending on the group's assessment.
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VI. OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE DETAIL
Since every faculty member tends to have somewhat different
expectations as to class behavior and course norms, I'd like to
outline a few of my expectations concerning such matters.
1. Because this is a case-oriented course, I consider
attendance in every class extremely important. Please schedule
other activities (for example field trips) at other times than
MN 4105.
2. In the event that for some unavoidable reason you have
to miss one class during the quarter, I would appreciate it if
you would let me know that in advance of class. Also, if you do
miss a class, I consider it your responsibility to find out from
your classmates what materials were covered, what additional
assignments were made, and what items may have been distributed
in class.
3. I plan to be prepared for every class and I hope you
will do the same. Since I will call on individuals whose hands
are not raised, you should let me know before the start of the
class if some emergency has made it impossible for you to be
prepared adequately for that class.
4. I will be happy to discuss the course, your progress, or
any other issues of concern to you on an individual basis.
The best way to see me is during my office hours, which will be
announced the first week of class. If you need to reach me at
other times, please leave a message in my Administration Sciences
mail box or call me at (646-2742) and I will get back to you as
soon as I can.
5. I consider the Honor Code to be an extremely important
part of the educational system. Group work is encouraged and
appropriate for general case preparation and for the group
assignment. However, any other written assignments and exams
must be solely your own work.
6. Given the importance of this course, I will do
everything that I can to use the class time effectively and would
ask that you do the same. This will include starting, arriving,
and ending on time.
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II. COURSE SCHEDULE
Part I: Strategic Management
lass 1: Introduction to Course
Overview of Course and Key Terms
Case: Robin Hood pp. 145-146
Questions: At the end of the case
lass 2: Course Preparation
Reading: Quinn, Preface xi-xv
Introduction xvii-xxv
Postscript 955-961
Group Projects: Students are to sign up for and begin
to work on group project.
lass 3: What is management?: Technocratic and Political
Handouts: "The Wisdom of Difference"
"Technocratic Management versus Political
Management"
"Technocratic Systems at Work"
"Political Management Systems at Work"
Questions to think about as you are reading:
1. What are the basic characteristics of technocratic
management?
2. To what extent did your previous work/ job involve
technocratic managment? Be prepared to explain.
3. What are the basic characteristics of poltical
management?
4. To what extent did your previous work/ job involve
political management? Be prepared to explain.
lass 4: Strategic Thinking
Readings: Quinn, chapter 1, pp. 42-50, ch 16
Case: Guns of August
Questions: At the end of the case
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Class 5: The Strategist
Readings: Quinn, chapter 2.
Case: MacArthur and the Phillipines pp 147-163
Questions: At the end of the case
Class 6: Strategic Analysis
Readings: Quinn, chapter 4.
Case: Federal Express pp. 750-780
Questions: At the end of the case
Class 7: Strategic Planning
Readings: Quinn, chapter 5.
Case: Comparative Planning Systems: Litton Industries
and Texas Instruments pp. 251-269
Questions: At the end of the case
Class 8: Strategic Implementation: Organization Structure and
Systems
Readings: Quinn, chapter 6.
Case: Polaroid pp 376-397
Questions: At the end of case
Class 9: Strategic Implementation: Culture
Readings: Quinn, chapter 8
Case: H-P pp. 875-898
Questions: What are the major aspects of H-P culture?
To what extent are "Japanese Management"
principles similar to H-P principles of
management?
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:iass 10: Strategic Implementation: Power
Readings: Quinn, ch 7
Case: British Steel (in class video)
Question: To what extent does power play a part in
British Steel's strategy formulation?
:iass 11: Strategic Implementation: Evaluation and Control
P
Readings: Quinn, Evaluation of a Business Strategy,
pp. 50-57
Handouts: Wheelan and Hunger, "Evaluation and Control"
Ratios
Case: H-P pp. 875-898
Questions: At the end of the case
How would you evaluate H-P ' s current
strategy?
Part II: Strategic Management in Profit and Public
Organizations: A Comparison
:iass 12: Strategic Management in Profit and Public
Organizations: The Similarities
Readings: Bryson, pp. xi-xv, 1-4, 11-21, 22-45, 46-
70, 199-215, 216-230
Question: What are the similarities between public
and profit organizations in terms of
strategic management?
^lass 13: Strategic Management in Governement Agencies,
Departments, the Executive Branch: The Differences
Readings: Preface and pp. 3-105 in Politics of Public
Management , by Heymann
Questions: What accounts for the distinctiveness of
management in the public sector?
To what extent do these distinctive aspects
of public management make the application of
strategic management difficult? impossible?
9
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Class 14: Strategic Management of Government Agencies,
Departments, the Executive Branch: The Differences
Readings: pp 109-189 in Politics of Public Management
by Heymann
Questions: What accounts for the distinctiveness of
of management in the public sector?
To what extent do these distinctive aspects
of public management make the application of
strategic management difficult? impossible?
Part III: The Context and Achieving Configuration
Class 15: The Innovation Context: NASA
First Part of Class:
Readings: Quinn, pp. 516-530, pp. 606-637
1. What are the characteristics of the innovation
context?
2. How is H-P an example of business in an
innovation context?
Second Part of Class: Report on Strategic Management
in NASA
Readings: To Be Assigned
1. To what extent is strategic management practiced
in NASA? Who is involved? What is done? When?
Where? Process?
2. What, if anything, can we learn from businesses in
an innovation context that can be applied to
Strategic Management in NASA?
Class 16: The Mature Context:
First Part of Class:
Readings: Quinn, pp. 546-558.
1. What are the characteristics of the mature
context?
2. How is Exon (pp. 457- 465) an example of business
in a mature context?
10
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Second Part of Class: Report on Strategic Management
in the Navy
Readings: To Be Assigned
1. To what extent is strategic management practiced
in the Navy? Who is involved? What is done? When?
Where? Process?
2. What, if anything, can we learn from businesses in
a mature context that can be applied to Strategic
Management in the Navy?
lass 17: The Diversified Context: DoD
First Part of Class:
Readings: Quinn, pp. 577-605
1. What are the characteristics of the diversified
context?
2. How is GM (pp. 480-491) an example of business
in a diversified context?
Second Part of Class: Report on Strategic Management
in DoD
Readings: To Be Assigned
1. To what extent is strategic management practiced
in DoD? Who is involved? What is done? When?
Where? Process?
2. What, if anything, can we learn from businesses in
a diversified context that can be applied to
Strategic Management in DoD?
lass 18: The Professional Context: JCS
First Part of Class:
Readings: Quinn, pp. 638-660
1. What are the characteristics of the professional
context?
2. How is Davidson Hospital (pp. 864- 869) an
example of a professional context?
11
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Second Part of Class: Report on Strategic Management
in JCS
Readings: To Be Assigned
1. To what extent is strategic management practiced
in the JCS? Who is involved? What is done?
Where? When? Process?
2. What, if anything, can we learn from businesses in
a professional context that can be applied to
Strategic Management in JCS?
Class 19: Managing Transitions
Readings: Quinn, pp. 661-704
Case: DoD and The Management of Change
Questions: According to the Staff Report to the
Senate Armed Services Committee, what
changes are needed in DoD?
What is your evaluation of these changes?
Do you have alternative recommendations to
propose?
Class 20: 1. Report on Maritime Strategy
Readings: To Be Announced
Questions: What is the Maritime Strategy?
How was this strategy devised? Who was
involved? To what extent did strategic
thinking and analysis and planning go
into the development of the maritime
strategy?
To what extent has this strategy been
implemented and evaluated? With what
degree of success/failure?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of
this strategy?
2. Report on Competitive Strategies
Readings: To Be Announced
Questions: What are Competitive Strategies?
12
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How were these strategies devised? Who was
involved? To what extent did strategic
thinking and analysis and planning go into
the development of competitive strategies?
To what extent has this strategy been
implemented and evaluated? With what degree
of success/failure?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of
this strategy?
Class 21: 1. National Security Strategy
Readings: To Be Announced
Questions: What is the National Security Strategy(ies)?
How was this strategy devised? Who was
involved? To what extent did strategic
thinking and analysis and planning go into
the development of the National Security
Strategy?
To what extent has this strategy been
implemented and evaluated? With what
degree of success/failure?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of
this strategy?
2. Alternatives for the Future
Handouts: "The United States Isn't a Company, It's not
Even Japan," pp. 169-186 in Bower
"Small May Be Beautiful, but Local Works,"
pp. 187-220 in Bower
"Who Leads," pp. 221-237 in Bower
Question: To what extent can the mechanisms Bower
introduces be applied to DoD?
Class 22: Final Exam
Appendix B
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VIII. JOURNALS AND REFERENCES IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
Journals
* Academy of Management Review
* Business Week
* Fortune
* Harvard Business Review
* Journal of Business Strategy
* Journal of Contemporary Business
* Journal of General Management
* Journal of Policy Analysis and Management





* Public Administration Review
* Strategic Management Journal
* Wall Street Journal
* available in NPS Dudley Knox Library
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